SETTING PRIORITIES, however, does seem quite difficult for the U.S. government and, more importantly, for the pundits who argue against having to choose. A security first paradigm acknowledges that, particularly in states newly liberated from tyrannical rule, it is often necessary to work with the established tribal, ethnic or religious groups-even if these groups rule in an illiberal manner-as long as the new leadership maintains basic security and does not preclude long-term, gradual democratization.

A brief review of post-invasion Afghanistan and Iraq highlights the stark differences between a democratization agenda and the security first approach. For advocates of democratization, U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan are on course. In both countries, U.S. military offensives toppled oppressive, authoritarian governments. In Afghanistan, an assembly composed of prominent Afghanis selected one of their own, Hamid Karzai, as president, a selection later validated by elections. His election, as well as the 2005 parliamentary elections, was verified by the UN as equitable and free of major fraud. As many as three-quarters of Afghanistan's ten million eligible voters turned out in 2004, despite threats of violence. A new constitution includes support for human rights, with a mandate that at least two women from each province serve in Afghanistan's lower parliamentary house.

In Iraq, the American head of the Coalition Provisional Authority was quickly replaced by an Iraqi Interim Prime Minister, Iyad Allawi, in 2003, who in turn was replaced by an elected prime minister. A constitution won popular support, and then the people elected a parliament. As in Afghanistan, the threat of insurgent disruption did little to deter voters. Even many disaffected Sunnis visited the polls.

Viewed through the lens of a security first approach, however, the postwar developments in both nations read rather differently. By mid-2006, the Iraqi insurgency continued in full force and was steadily on the rise in Afghanistan. Sectarian conflicts in Iraq and strife among provincial warlords in Afghanistan were also on the rise. Large segments of both populations were increasingly opposed to the U.S. presence and alienated from the democratic institutions, in large part due to the persistent failure to provide security. In Afghanistan, President Karzai barely dared leave Kabul, and only traveled with heavily-armed American bodyguards within Kabul itself. Rights guaranteed in the constitution mean little in the countryside. Sharia law is increasingly enforced in Iraq and never ceased to be the norm in Afghanistan. In short, the democratization scenario did not pan out.

Under a security first scenario, occupying forces might have to make the second-worst decision to leave many elements of the old regime in place, and then slowly work to convert them, while allowing considerable time for new forces to grow. This is, of course, the "hidden lesson" from the U.S. and Allied experience in postwar Nazi Germany. In Afghanistan this would have meant working with the warlords and the heads of the main ethnic groups, and allowing them to have extensive local leeway as long as they maintained security and did not engage in war with one another. In Iraq, this would have meant giving much greater license on local issues to Kurdish and Shi‘a leaders, and leaving some of the Ba‘ath Party members in power in the Sunni areas. In mixed regions, especially Baghdad, neighborhoods might have been segregated as they were in Belfast, Beirut and Jerusalem, until a more effective national government could take root. This would entail leaving local militias intact-incorporating them as far as possible into official structures-and limiting U.S. intervention to preventing clashes among them and impositions of religious or ideological codes by violent, extralegal means. The leaders of Basra, for instance, would be free to ban alcohol and fine those who do not obey, and even enact dress codes for women, but not to bomb liquor stores or assassinate Sunnis.

Deferring to ethnic groups, upon which the security first approach builds, is supported by the trend of ethnic groups gaining autonomy vis-à-vis national governments. In contrast, forced nation building, in the name of democratization, bucks recent history and people's preferences.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in the difficulties Americans have faced in coping with the role of religion in public life, especially in the Muslim world. The West tends to associate progress with secularization, but confronting religious authorities, beliefs and allegiances head-on invites failure. A security first agenda is less concerned with changing long-held norms and focuses attention on ensuring that religious expression is non-violent.

The fact is that most believers of all religions, including Islam, are moderate and non-violent, though often illiberal. In Iraq, the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, by far the most influential Shi‘a religious authority, has repeatedly condemned assassinations, kidnappings and other forms of terror, supported free elections and the rule of law-but has not endorsed women's full equality with men or an unrestricted marketplace of ideas. Call him, and others like him, illiberal moderates. Over time, different religious and cultural communities might embrace a more liberal agenda. But they do not at present, and that should not disqualify them as allies in working to promote and extend security.

Finally, a security first approach also provides guidance on armed humanitarian intervention. The primacy of life means that the international community must intervene wherever populations suffer from genocide, defined in 1948 by the UN as widespread violence "committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group." However, armed interventions are not justified to protect a democratic regime from internal challenges of the kind faced by Haiti in 1994, when President Clinton sent 20,000 troops to reinstate Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Such challenges are common and even superpowers cannot realistically deal with all or even most of them-making decisions about when and when not to intervene inconsistent and hard to justify. One of the tragic features of international reality is that these matters must often be left to the people involved; painful domestic struggles are the growing pains of incipient democracies.

Moreover, under the primacy of life principle, any intervention must limit itself to security purposes. Troops should not be used for nation-building or "reconstruction." It is an odd notion that when one nation intervenes in another to stop a genocide, the rescuing nation "owes" political and economic aid. It is like arguing that a lifeguard who saves a drowning man owes him free swimming lessons. Indeed, the entanglements that followed in Kosovo, Bosnia and scores of other countries contribute to many nations' reluctance to stop genocides in places like Rwanda and Sudan. A primacy of life foreign policy avoids this pitfall.

However, the security first approach in no way precludes democratization by non-lethal means, such as sharing information, education, training, public diplomacy and financial resources. The United States already has a huge array of such public and private programs. These programs are difficult to evaluate, but in combination they may gradually improve the political cultures of the beneficiary nations.

A SECURITY first agenda is always difficult to accept if one still hopes that, with only a little extra effort (a few extra thousand troops here, tighter sanctions there, a tiny bit of aid more), the United States can fundamentally reshape states around the world. But as events over the last two years have dramatically shown, even superpowers are limited in their ability to change international realities. Getting security right is itself a very tall order. At the same time, focusing first on security-building does not mean ignoring democratization by peaceful means, as long as one realizes that democracy cannot be rushed and must be largely homegrown. This is the kind of realism that is faithful to our core values without risking our safety.

Amitai Etzioni is a professor of sociology and international relations at The George Washington University and author of Security First: For a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy(Yale: Spring 2007).

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