Conversely, by inducing Libya to dismantle its WMD programs and Iran to reveal nuclear procurement data in order to avert international pressure or U.S. military action, the war may have helped U.S. intelligence to grasp better the scope of the international supplier network run by Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan.

Finally, the invasion of Iraq has undoubtedly complicated the War on Terror. The invasion and events connected with it (such as the abuse of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. personnel) deeply humiliated many Iraqis and Arabs, and for many, confirmed Osama bin Laden's image of the West. The Iraq War will likely provide a new crop of recruits for jihadist groups in the Middle East, Europe and Asia.

Due to a lack of border controls and a functioning central government, Iraq has emerged as a principle arena of operations for jihadist groups committed to the fight against the United States and the establishment of democracy in Iraq, and a staging ground for attacks against neighboring states such as Turkey and Jordan. Re-establishing control over Iraq's borders and halting the activities of such groups will pose major challenges to a new Iraqi government.

Reshaping the Middle East

The United States went into Iraq with the declared intention of transforming it into a democracy that could serve as a model for the region. However, developments in Iraq since the war have served to underscore the formidable obstacles facing such an undertaking in a deeply divided society that continues to be wracked by communal tensions and political violence.

The influential role played by Shi'i and Sunni clerics in post-Saddam Iraq has raised concerns that Iraq may be on the way to becoming an Islamic republic. Because Saddam Hussein tolerated--and after the Gulf War encouraged--religious observance, while ruthlessly suppressing secular parties other than the ruling Ba'ath, the mosque networks and the Islamists were the best-organized entities in Iraq after his fall. These groups and their associated militias moved quickly to fill the void of authority in Iraq that followed the demise of the Ba'ath regime. The coalition's willingness to treat clerics as authority figures has likewise reinforced the role of religion and the clergy in post-Saddam Iraq (although the Islamists among them remain wary of the coalition's perceived commitment to secular democracy.)

For now, however, an "Islamic Republic" of Iraq seems an unlikely outcome. What is more certain is that Islam and Islamists are likely to play a greater role in public life in post-Saddam Iraq than at any other time in the modern history of the country, adding another layer of complexity to efforts to build a stable democracy based on cooperation and compromise among Iraqi's disparate sects and ethnic groups.

Furthermore, the unprecedented participation of Kurdish and Shi'a personalities and political parties in Iraq's cultural and political life is generating pressures for political change in neighboring states. This is likely to have dramatic implications for Iraq and the region. The enfranchisement of Iraq's Kurds has engendered concern by other Iraqis (particularly Turkomen and Shi'a) who fear that Kurdish gains will come at their expense, and may embolden Kurds in Syria, Turkey and Iran to demand greater political freedoms. The Shi'a revival has likewise alarmed many Iraqi Sunnis who fear marginalization and a loss of privilege and has apparently prompted foreign jihadists in Iraq to attack Shi'a worshippers and religious shrines in an effort to foment civil war. The rise of the Shi'a as a political force has also produced tensions with the Kurds concerning the role of religion in public life and the issue of federalism.

At the same time, there have been countervailing tendencies. In April 2004, Sunni and Shi'a insurgents fighting coalition forces made common cause, at least on a rhetorical and symbolic level. It remains to be seen whether a shared interest in fighting and expelling coalition forces can provide the basis for a military alliance.

The ascendancy of the Shi'a in Iraq has major implications for Iran. The re-emergence of Najaf and Karbala as centers of Shi'i religious learning and bastions of the dominant quietistic tradition within Shi'i Islam could undermine the pre-eminent status that Qom (in Iran) has enjoyed in the Shi'i world since the 1920s, further delegitimizing Iran's doctrine of clerical rule.

On the other hand, the rise of the Shi'a could lay the groundwork for the expansion of Iranian influence in Iraq. During the war and after, operatives of Lebanese Hizballah were reportedly sent to southern Iraq to gather intelligence concerning coalition forces--likely at the behest of Tehran. Likewise, the Badr Organization (formerly the Badr Corps militia) of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which enjoys strong ties to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, has established a significant presence in southern Iraq and Baghdad, potentially giving Tehran a degree of leverage over developments in Iraq. As a result, the Islamic Republic could, through its agents and allies, do great harm to coalition forces in Iraq, should it desire to do so. The ironic result is that the coalition military presence in Iraq limits, rather than enhances, Washington's ability to pressure Tehran regarding support for terror and its nuclear program.

As to the future, an Iraq in which Kurds and Shi'a hold senior government positions is unlikely to consider Iran a significant threat and is apt to have normal, if not cordial, relations with Tehran--an outcome that might not be completely to Washington's liking.

Finally, the rise of Iraq's Shi'a could embolden Shi'a communities in the Gulf to press for greater political rights. While in some places this might generate momentum for change, in others it might engender a backlash by Sunnis who view Shi'a political aspirations with trepidation. The United States may well be blamed by both friends and enemies in the Arab-Islamic world for any social and political tensions generated by such demands, just as it has been accused of conspiring with the Shi'a to corrupt and undermine orthodox (Sunni) Islam by some Al-Qaeda types. In this way, U.S. policy in Iraq could affect relations with allies in the Middle East and efforts to encourage political reform throughout the region.

In response to U.S. efforts to democratize Iraq, several Arab regimes have announced their intention to pursue reforms or have introduced what are in many cases token measures calculated to accommodate popular demands for change and deflect American pressure for reform (though some of these steps had long been contemplated).

American calls for democracy have, however, been greeted with skepticism by some Iraqis, and by the numerous critics of U.S. policy in the Arab world. These critics suspect U.S. motives, reject the neo-imperial aspects of the "imposition" of democracy from without, and fear that political reform will empower Islamists. Despite these qualms, 9/11 and OIF have placed the issue of political reform and democratization front and center on the Arab political agenda, fueling demands for reform and change.

The opposition of autocratic elites to this new strand in American Middle East policy is not surprising. They have much to lose should democracy take root. The United States, however, has to find ways to continue to work with its autocratic allies in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf--while prodding and pressing them to engage gradually in real reform and to open up their political systems without fomenting instability. Failure to do so will only ensure the perpetuation of a status quo that does not serve the long-term interests of the United States, its allies or the peoples of the region, deepening cynicism toward the United States. Having come this far, Washington cannot back off without doing additional harm to its interests in the Middle East, though recent revelations concerning the abuse of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. military personnel will further complicate these efforts.

The Way Ahead

The epochal events of the past year have already had a profound effect on the Arab-Islamic world. The long-term impact of these events, however, will be influenced, more than anything else, by whether the Coalition and the UN succeed in overseeing the formation of a legitimate (that is, elected) Iraqi government in the coming months.

The prospects for such an outcome are at best uncertain, and it seems likely that for the foreseeable future, Iraq will have a weak and divided central government. The demise of strong central government, in conjunction with the rise of local politics, may in fact prove to be Iraq's political salvation by providing a more healthy basis on which to build a viable, humane polity--if Iraq can avoid a descent into rampant political violence or civil war in the meantime.

Such an outcome will not, however, happen on its own. Coalition forces will continue to play a key role in preventing the political transition from being derailed by violence or hijacked by extremists. For this reason, they should stay in Iraq as long as they are needed and welcome. Growing impatience with the coalition presence, however, has already begun to limit its political and military influence (which was never as great as coalition officials liked to think.) Iraqis should be encouraged, when feasible, to find Iraqi solutions to their problems, and when coalition forces are needed, they should be used only after consulting with local and national Iraqi leaders. Care should be taken to avoid political collateral damage that could undermine the ability of the coalition to continue to play a critical role in shepherding the transition. Failure to do so could render the coalition presence untenable before the necessary Iraqi political and security structures have been put in place.

Essay Types: Essay