Paradoxically, some observers are so eager to embrace the Bolivarian Revolution as the real deal, an authentic and preferable response to what they perceive as savage U.S. imperialism and global capitalism, that they are willing to overlook Chavez's militarization of Venezuela and his attacks on democracy and civil rights. These are the same individuals who were first to condemn abuses in countries such as Pinochet's Chile or Fujimori's Peru. But the fact that Chavez is providing the country's many desperate citizens with more handouts and educational opportunities is not sufficient grounds for ignoring increasingly gross abuses.

Thus arises the question of Chavez's relationship with the democratic Left. Do these leaders share Chavez's revolutionary vision? Will the memory of the 1970s persecution by right-wing military dictatorships lead leftist presidents to oppose instinctively any serious effort by Chavez to promote the Bolivarian agenda at home and abroad?

Behind the scenes in private bilateral and multilateral settings, these governments often profess their profound concern with Chavez's antics and his ability and desire to challenge the democratic consensus. Yet, too often various Latin American governments indulge Chavez rhetorically in a display of "hemispheric solidarity." As has been the case for decades with Castro, there is often a strong temptation to overlook Chavez's alarming actions so that governments can bolster their "independent" or "non-aligned" bona fides, even if they totally reject such undemocratic practices in their own countries.

The recent case of the controversy over the election of a new secretary general of the Organization of American States (OAS) draws out this point. In their efforts to secure the election of Chilean José Miguel Insulza, the Chilean government modified its behavior toward Chavez, knowing full well that he supported Insulza's candidacy and would thus use oil largesse with numerous Caribbean countries to secure their votes for him.

What's more, Latin American governments are all too willing to allow Washington to do the heavy lifting on criticizing Chavez, a "good cop, bad cop" position that invariably leaves Washington on the receiving end of Caracas's ire for meddling in Venezuelan affairs.

The good news is that the democratic Left knows that Chavez's regional influence is antithetical to democracy and stable social reform; they are loathe to see him champion himself as leader of the region's poor. Yet, tacit acceptance of Chavez's antics and rhetoric is a weak way out, with unknown and potentially devastating consequences for democracy in the long run.

Washington Ignores Latin America?

IT IS COMMON to hear that the Bush Administration is ignoring the region; distracted by its military and political efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and its policies in China, the thinking goes, an apathetic Washington has turned a blind eye to Latin America at the very time when the region is in the throes of instability.

There is no question that many critical global issues take priority over much of the Western Hemisphere agenda, but given Washington's historic relationship with its Latin American neighbors, perhaps a little bit of distance between Washington and Latin America is not such a bad thing.

Of course, what is interesting about any sort of interventionist approaches toward Latin America is that they often backfire. Take, for example, Bolivia's 2002 presidential election when the U.S. ambassador publicly commented that the United States would cut assistance if voters elected indigenous candidate Evo Morales. The comments sparked a meteoric rise in Morales's support, vaulting him to within less than two percentage points of the presidency. Sometimes words and actions can have unintended, deleterious effects, especially given the sensitivity of the region's relationship with the United States. What is needed is a not a non-interventionist policy, but a low-key approach. While Morales now appears poised to win election in December, given the divided vote, his victory would likely not signify majority support from the population.

A number of Latin American governments--especially the leftist ones--are hesitant to be seen as too close to Washington; yet, behind the scenes they are developing increasingly deep and trustful relationships with the United States. The increasingly intimate and direct Lula-Bush dynamic comprises one of the most unexpected and overlooked odd couples in global relations right now. Journalists and other observers love to focus on the more visible rifts in the U.S.-Brazilian relationship, and trade is one area where disagreements abound. But this approach overlooks the frank and constructive ties that continue to grow away from the headlines. Indeed, the bilateral relationship is arguably the strongest in almost fifty years. To take one example, U.S.-Brazilian bilateral cooperation on terrorism and narcotics trafficking is encouraging other nations to become involved in what is undeniably a regional concern.

All of this does not mean, of course, that there are never differences of opinion between Washington and its Latin American counterparts. But even a fair amount of public friction is a sign that relations are increasingly mature and frank, devoid of the paternalism that characterized earlier eras.

Washington can point to Colombia as an example of successful U.S. engagement in the region. Starting under the Clinton Administration in 1999, Washington embarked on an aggressive and costly effort to support Colombia's fragile democracy and eradicate drugs. Known as Plan Colombia, the program first focused on the drug war, but by 2002 the Bush Administration expanded it to help the Colombian government defend its citizens against pernicious narco-insurgencies.

For many, the term "Plan Colombia" quickly became a symbol for U.S. imperialism. Human rights groups and European governments immediately concluded that Plan Colombia would further "militarize" Colombia's domestic conflict. A veritable library of academic work outlined the ills of Plan Colombia, and numerous experts predicted that the United States was blindly heading into another Vietnam.

But once Plan Colombia was being fully implemented in 2002 and 2003, the situation in Colombia improved dramatically. Kidnappings dropped by 60 percent, many key roads are free of insurgent roadblocks and a critical state presence has been established in many parts of the country that until recently were in a state of anarchy or controlled by insurgents. Thousands of judges, prosecutors and criminal investigators are working to bring justice to areas of the country where impunity reigns. Moreover, while controversial in the United States and Europe, U.S. assistance to Colombia is backed by an overwhelming majority of the Colombian people. Plan Colombia did not magically save Colombia, but it did provide vital support to Bogota at a critical and lonely time in its war against narco-terrorists and drug traffickers.

Despite continued eradication failures, the broader Plan Colombia represents a resounding policy success for Washington, one that has enabled Colombians to gain more control of their country and has set the stage for future success. And all of this has been accomplished without sacrificing adherence to human rights principles, as happened at times during the Cold War. For one, aggressive U.S. engagement with the Colombian military has made it less abusive, not more. Colombia is still an extremely violent place where injustice is common, but prolonged support from Washington has made the situation significantly better. Compared to Colombia's even more precarious situation prior to Plan Colombia, human rights and other peace groups should be relatively encouraged about what has occurred over the past few years.

There are some areas where Washington has made critical errors, however. Perhaps the most glaring mistake has been the application of the American Service Members Protection Act (2002), which bans U.S. security assistance and most military cooperation unless a country rejects the International Criminal Court (ICC) or signs a bilateral immunity agreement with the United States. Meant to protect U.S. service personnel from politically motivated prosecution at the ICC, the net result has been that Washington has been cut off from its normal engagement with its Latin American military counterparts.

Training of Latin American officers in U.S. schools has dropped precipitously. What makes this development especially worrisome is that China has moved to fill this void by offering Latin American militaries both training and hardware. And, unlike the United States, China has a "don't ask, don't tell" policy on human rights and civil-military affairs issues.

The Bush Administration's Venezuela and Cuba policies are its most controversial. And there is no question that these policies are far from perfect. In particular, Washington's hesitation in condemning the coup against Chavez severely weakened its credibility on the democracy front. Even more damaging was that the coup episode occurred at a time when Washington was making serious and significant gains on helping push the democracy agenda through hemispheric organizations such as the OAS.

As for Cuba, the Bush Administration's policy is essentially an extension of the same economic embargo and political isolation employed by Washington for the past half century. And there are certainly worse policies than ones intended to expedite the removal of a dictator. Yet the argument is often made that this hard-line policy is ineffective because it provides Castro with a convenient bogey-man with which he can justify his repression. This is likely the case--and the argument that liberalizing our policy toward Cuba might expedite the transition to democracy is a strong one. But, the efficacy of the policies aside, we must not somehow conclude that current Bush policies toward Cuba are particularly radical or represent a departure from previous approaches.