The Politics of Human Suffering

The Politics of Human Suffering

Mini Teaser:  Less than a year ago, United States marines landed on the beaches of Mogadishu to the acclaim of its citizens.

by Author(s): James C. Ingram

In terms of volume and value, food and its transport are usually the preponderant part of the cost of emergency humanitarian responses. So much of the justified criticisms of too scanty or excessive food aid, and its untimely delivery in emergencies, is due, first, to donor insistence on independent decision-making and, second, to their slowness in giving data on their decisions and actions to the coordinator. The situation in Somalia in October 1992 illustrated dramatically how dangerous the effects of individual donor decision-making can be. Not only was the port of Mogadishu clogged with unscheduled ships (a routine occurrence in any major famine, no matter how much warning lead-time has been given to donors) but some donors were shipping commodities such as dates, wheat flour, rice, and sugar that were highly prized on the black market. Their relatively high value inevitably led to intervention and theft by armed looters.

The provision of the kind of data sought by donor aid ministries leads to centralization of coordination at United Nations headquarters, whereas an effective United Nations intervention requires leadership at the country level, by a person experienced in disaster management but having the kind of personality able to persuade the parties involved to work together under his broad direction. The country coordinator needs considerable autonomy and cannot discharge his task efficiently if subject to a burdensome reporting requirement to headquarters--reporting which, in turn, inevitably leads to undue intervention from the center. At best, the consequence is to slow down decision-making; in the worst cases, something approaching paralysis can result.

Measures to Improve UN Performance

The institutional structure of the United Nations that has grown up and which deals inter alia with disasters is inherently cumbersome and ponderous in action. Without root and branch changes in structure, which so far governments have shown little willingness to tackle seriously, marginal improvements at best may realistically be expected.

Creating an effective United Nations disaster response mechanism has been a vexing problem for many years. Twenty years ago the General Assembly set in place a comprehensive framework or "architecture" for the organization of the United Nations humanitarian response. However, the system introduced made little real difference to the generally haphazard way in which the United Nations disaster agencies went about their business. Over the years, donor governments and the principal NGOs concerned with humanitarian aid had become increasingly critical of the United Nations' overall performance in emergencies. The United Nations' perceived shortcomings in 1991 in relation to the Kurds and a catastrophic cyclone in Bangladesh gave every appearance of being the last straw.

The stage therefore seemed to be set for real advance. The General Assembly debated the issue at length that year. After intense negotiations, a comprehensive resolution, 46/182, was adopted in December 1991. The new arrangements, however, were deeply flawed and only peripheral problems were addressed.

Every important element embodied in the resolution passed twenty years earlier (2816 (xxvi)) found its place in Resolution 46/182, though there were, of course, differences in detail and emphasis. Thus Resolution 2816 (xxvi) called upon the secretary-general to appoint a disaster relief coordinator at the under secretary-general level to report directly to him. Resolution 46/182 called for a "high level" official to be appointed as emergency relief coordinator and having "direct access" to the secretary-general. As it happened, the actual appointee is also at the under secretary-general level. However, the new resolution does place great weight on the leadership role of the secretary general, which is rightly said to be "critical." In the earlier resolution this had been more implicit. Putting the responsibility fairly and squarely on the secretary-general is critical because of the structure of the United Nations system, in which, as already noted, even the secretary-general is only primus inter pares. Some of the heads of specialized agencies (and programs) do not readily accept leadership from United Nations officials they do not regard as peers.

On the other hand, on paper 2816 (XXVI) gave the disaster relief coordinator clear-cut power. He was authorized on behalf of the secretary-general "to mobilize, direct and coordinate the relief activities of the various organizations of the United Nations system," though in practice he was never able to do so. In Resolution 46/182 the powers of the new senior official are rather fuzzy. He is to "process" requests for assistance, to "systematically pool and analyze early warning information," to "organize" joint inter-agency needs assessment missions, to "serve as a central focal point" with governments and inter governmental and non-government organizations, to provide "consolidated information" to interested governments, to "actively promote" the smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation, and to prepare an "annual report" for the secretary-general. The most substantive tasks he is given include "coordinating and facilitating" (but not managing or directing) the United Nations emergency response; "managing" a central emergency revolving fund; and, as noted above, "actively facilitating" access by humanitarian organizations to people in need.

In short, we have a situation extending over a period of twenty years during which governments have been dissatisfied with the coordination system that they have established but at the same time are unable to agree on anything significantly different. The problems of efficient United Nations disaster management are much more deeply rooted than can be addressed by further detailed changes. They go back to the way in which the United Nations system has been constructed and how in practice it functions.

An Alternative Relief Regime

If the humanitarian goal of saving lives and reducing suffering in situations of armed conflict is best assured by keeping distinct the function of peacekeeping, in all its guises, from humanitarian action; and if, as well, the United Nations structure for humanitarian relief is irredeemably flawed, as I have argued--then the conclusion is inescapable: the time has come for the United Nations to vacate the humanitarian relief field. A thoroughly professional humanitarian agency, which itself plays a significant front-line relief role and has the authority, standing, and competence to be acceptable as coordinator of the international relief effort, is required.

The International Committee of the Red Cross is the obvious body on which to build. Indeed, in some situations it virtually plays the leading role already, and with considerable success. The bravery and competence of ICRC staff are beyond reproach and justifiably have aroused great admiration. On the other hand, the multiplying of conflict situations has imposed strains on the organization.

The ICRC is not an international organization but remains a private, independent Swiss institution subject to Swiss law. Its governing bodies are composed of Swiss nationals. Given Switzerland's neutrality policy and the fact that it is not a member of the United Nations, its Swiss character has brought many advantages. On the other hand, my own experience has convinced me that the multicultural, multinational composition of United Nations organizations does promote a great sensitivity to the values and concerns of other nations and cultures. In WFP's dealings with governments involved in conflict, we sometimes found suspicion of the ICRC as an arrogant European organization lacking appreciation of the aspirations and concerns of developing countries. Given the concern of developing countries about infringement of sovereignty, an internationalized ICRC would almost certainly enjoy more confidence from developing countries and therefore be more effective in negotiating access to all victims of internal conflict.

Internationalization of the ICRC in a way that avoids the defects of United Nations organizations ought to be feasible. A possible model could be the international agricultural research organizations grouped within the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). Minimal changes in line with that model would be for membership of the supreme governing body of twenty-five members, i.e. the Committee, to be co-opted world-wide by the existing Committee of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement among outstanding persons known for their international experience and devotion to humanitarian values. The president could continue to be elected by the Committee. However, the pool of nationalities from which delegates are chosen would need to be progressively widened.

In the event an internationalized ICRC decided that a humanitarian crisis could no longer be satisfactorily managed by the family of humanitarian organizations it could so advise the secretary-general of the United Nations in a formal report. The secretary-general in turn could inform the Security Council. Taking account of that report and other relevant criteria the Council would decide what action, if any, should be taken including the most appropriate form of intervention. Under such an arrangement, the developing countries could be reasonably assured that if the Security Council decided to authorize the use of force, then the humanitarian argument would not be an excuse to disguise political or other motives. In situations akin to that covered by Resolution 688, action could continue to be initiated by the Security Council without a prior report by the ICRC, i.e. the Security Council would remain master of its decision-making on questions of peace and security.

The Swiss Government and the ICRC may not welcome attempts to confer such a role on the ICRC, seeing in internationalization a derogation in some way from its unique situation derived from the neutrality of Switzerland. Moreover, the ICRC recognizes that it can barely cope with its present responsibilities and does not wish to expand them. It wishes to focus less on humanitarian operations and more on its role as custodian of international humanitarian law and to related functions such as the protecting of war victims.

Essay Types: Essay