In addition to the GI, the Salafi movement has come to be associated with Al Qaeda and violent jihad. Though the Salafi Call is part of the “quietist” Salafi trend, Salafism also has an activist current: groups that go beyond preaching to call for the overthrow of non-Muslim—or, in Salafi eyes, not properly Muslim—governments and encourage or carry out actions to such ends.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the Mubarak regime fought (and won) a brutal war with domestic terrorist actors such as the GI and the Egyptian remnants of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Islamic Jihad Organization. Violent, or sometimes simply politically active, Salafis were imprisoned under brutal conditions. Many Egyptian jihadis fled the country, some of whom—like al-Zawahiri and his followers—joined forces with Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. In prison, many other Salafis—particularly those associated with the GI but also some connected to al-Zawahiri’s organization, including the group’s top ideologue Sayyed Imam al-Sharif, known as Dr. Fadl—recanted. They published several books criticizing their own use of violence and Al Qaeda. Though al-Zawahiri blasted those who repudiated violence, claiming they did so under torture, their criticism dealt a huge blow to Al Qaeda’s narrative.

After the revolution, some violent Salafis who escaped prison took shelter in the deserted Sinai, where Egyptian security forces were less active and where they could seek protection from the tribal bedouins. On February 7, 2011, well-armed fighters attacked security and government institutions in Rafah, on the border with Gaza. A week earlier, the pipeline in El Arish, which exports Egyptian gas to Israel and Jordan, was bombed for the first of what would be ten times in 2011. Another Sinai police station was assaulted on July 30, 2011, when a hundred armed men streamed through El Arish waving black Islamic banners and calling themselves Al Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula.

Sinai-based radicals are also active against Israel. A deadly cross-border raid on Israel on August 18, 2011, which was initially blamed on Palestinians, increasingly appears to have been planned and executed at least in part by Egyptians. That December, a new Egyptian jihadigroup announced its founding and claimed credit for the attack. Calling itself Ansar al-Jihad (Supporters of Holy War) in the Sinai Peninsula, the group swore fealty to bin Laden and decried the treatment and suspicion of Salafi Muslims under the Mubarak regime.

LIBERAL EGYPTIANS fear the Brotherhood and the Salafis, which together control over 70 percent of the People’s Assembly, might team up to dominate both legislating and writing the constitution, ignoring the interests and concerns of secular parties, women, Christians and other minorities. Although both the Salafis and the Brotherhood want Egypt to be an Islamic state, they have differing visions for achieving this goal.

The Salafis tend to be far more anti-institutional than the Brotherhood. In power, Salafis likely will emphasize more bottom-up solutions that focus on society. Another issue concerns the pace of Islamicization. One FJP spokesman claimed that his party “sees the state as a civil state with an Islamic background. All rights to all citizens would be preserved, guarded by the law and the constitution, not by religious beliefs of citizens.” Al Nour, he argued, would rush to implement Islamic law before society is prepared for it. So far, this has led to disagreements and even limited clashes over the future of Egypt. Reportedly, Brotherhood youths had to be chastised for their harsh dealings with Al Nour.

Despite the Muslim Brotherhood’s claims that it will work with secular parties, its monopolistic behavior has driven the Salafis to cooperate with modern liberal Islamists at times—demonstrating that it isn’t only in America that politics makes strange bedfellows. However, as the largest and most politically vibrant alternative to the Brotherhood, the Salafis will project their influence at least indirectly in all parliamentary action. In addition, they have the potential to capture many current Brotherhood supporters by using the same arguments for Islamicizing Egypt that the Brotherhood itself has long used. A revealing, if somewhat humorous, event interrupted one of the first sessions of the new parliament. Asala Party MP Mamdouh Ismail stood in the back of the chamber and chanted the Muslim call to prayer at the top of his voice. This led to a shouting match with the Speaker and FJP parliamentarian Saad el-Katatni, who reminded Ismail that he was no more a Muslim than anyone else.

For now, the Brotherhood has shown itself to be pragmatic, and it might work more with liberals to reassure international audiences. But it could also try to move in both directions simultaneously, offering liberals concessions in some areas while reasserting religious credentials to rally its conservative base in others, as happened when the Brotherhood’s presidential candidate promised Salafi clerics a role in ensuring laws comply with Islamic law, for example. At the same time, wary of the Brotherhood’s monopolization of power, Al Nour and Al Gamaa al-Islamiyya backed rival Islamist candidate Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh in May’s presidential election, though both quickly threw their support behind the Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi when their candidate did not make the runoff.

WHAT THE Salafis want from the United States remains unknown. The broader Salafi current (like most Egyptians) has long been critical of Washington and its policies in the region, with many seeing the United States as a power bent on subjugating Muslims. Shortly after President Barack Obama’s election in 2008, a popular Salafi preacher on Egyptian television, Hassan Abu al-Ashbal, called on the president-elect to convert to Islam “and to withdraw your huge armies and military bases from the lands of the Muslims.”

Yet the Salafis may be tempered by the realities of power. Since there is no Salafi hierarchy, outlandish clerics are able to tarnish the image of all Salafis, but Al Nour spokesman Mohamed Nour suggests the Salafi movement is evolving: “As we interact with the community, . . . our views on many issues are becoming more inclusive.” And indeed, Al Nour initially spoke up for the American democracy-promotion organizations that the Egyptian government pursued, though party leaders said they were misquoted when it became clear that public opinion was on the other side.

Perhaps more importantly, it is possible that despite the genuine hostility the United States will sink below other Salafi priorities. On the topic of U.S. security cooperation, an issue one would assume would raise the ire of Salafis, Al Nour chairman Emad El-din Abdel Ghafour instead waffled, claiming “it is necessary for the various political forces to consider this and make a decision consistent with the popular will in this matter.” This was not exactly an endorsement but neither was it the vehement rejection that might have been expected. Historically, Salafi figures have focused first and foremost on individual behavior rather than on bigger strategic and political issues. For now, their thinking on these broader issues lacks coherence.

The Salafi position on the United States is particularly important because Washington has long valued Egypt as one of its most significant partners against Al Qaeda and its allies. Because Egyptian jihadis helped found and played an important role in Al Qaeda in the 1990s, Washington and Cairo were natural allies. The United States rendered suspected terrorists to Egypt, and the two countries shared intelligence on the threat. The likelihood of a conviction—and thus the ability to easily get suspected terrorists off the streets—made Egypt a valued partner. As Michael Scheuer, former head of the CIA’s bin Laden unit, avers, “It served American purposes to get these people arrested, and Egyptian purposes to get these people back, where they could be interrogated.”

Mubarak’s fall and the subsequent rise of the Salafis could challenge this partnership. Some of the Salafis represented by the Islamist bloc, including members of the GI, were imprisoned under Mubarak in part due to U.S. efforts. While many have no love for bin Laden, it is a big jump to favor cooperating with the same U.S. agencies that helped imprison their members before the revolution.

In addition, in the Salafi community the U.S. “war on terror” is associated with killing Muslim civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan, prison abuses at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, and other unpopular measures. The Salafi movement embraces the causes of Muslims worldwide and would be reluctant to help in their perceived oppression—or be seen as doing so. Indeed, Abboud al-Zomor (released from prison with his cousin Tareq) told the newspaper Asharq al-Awsat, “I have no problem with al-Zawahiri returning to his country in safety and with honor.”

Even beyond the risk of jeopardizing direct cooperation, U.S. counterterrorism efforts could suffer as many experienced jihadis are now on the streets or hiding out in the Sinai. An even bigger problem relates to the promotion of violent extremism. Peddlers of propaganda critical of the U.S. military in Afghanistan and of Israeli actions will find the new Egypt a far freer environment in which to operate, even if their materials are blatantly false and encourage violence. The strains of Salafism stressing that non-Muslims (or even non-Sunnis or non-Salafis) are unbelievers and that jihad is a pillar of faith are likely to find it far easier to preach and disseminate religious materials. Some vitriolic rhetoric is inevitable, but a strong Salafi role in Egypt could worsen the tone and increase the frequency. None of these activities in isolation leads to terrorism, but together they create an atmosphere where attacking the United States, Israel and Western countries is considered legitimate and the people who do so are seen as heroic.

Image: Pullquote: As the largest and most politically vibrant alternative to the Brotherhood, the Salafis will project their influence at least indirectly in all parliamentary action.Essay Types: Essay