THE OBAMA administration has reached out to the Muslim Brotherhood, talking to its leaders and otherwise recognizing that it will be a power, perhaps the power, in a democratic Egypt. Handling the Salafis, however, will be trickier as they are less organized and more radical.

Nevertheless, the United States is right to engage the Salafi political parties. As the Obama administration noted on the Muslim Brotherhood, engagement means dialogue, not agreement. Engaging with Al Nour, as with other Egyptian political parties, will allow the United States to express its red lines as well as learn the group’s intentions. Engagement now is particularly important, as the political agendas and priorities of the Salafi groups are still in flux. U.S. influence will be limited at best, but Washington is far more likely to have influence now than in the years to come. In this engagement, the United States should voice the same objectives and demands it uses when talking to the Brotherhood and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which has ruled Egypt since it pushed Mubarak aside over a year ago. Continued U.S. aid depends on Egypt remaining a U.S. ally on counterterrorism, not breaking the peace treaty with Israel and other important strategic issues.

A particularly nettlesome concern will be how to handle Al Gamaa al-Islamiyya and its Building and Development Party. The GI is a small minority party within the Salafi current, so by itself it can be ignored. However, encouraging ostracism of the GI or demanding that it be outlawed could easily backfire, making the group a magnet for anti-American sentiment and forcing other Salafis to come to its defense against the despised United States, all of which would increase its popularity and influence. Indeed, Washington’s goal is to convince groups like the GI to further distance themselves from terrorism. If it engages in peaceful politics, the GI will become a living refutation of Al Qaeda: a Salafi party using the political system, not violence, to advance its agenda. Conversely, banning the GI, if it remains peaceful, would reinforce a narrative that violence is the only path to power. The United States should make the GI’s designation status based on whether or not it supports terrorism and violent extremism. If it does support violence, then the Egyptian government should be pushed to outlaw it, but if it doesn’t, delisting it would send a powerful message.

When in doubt, the United States should move quietly and avoid having its own policies become the news story. The Salafi parties so far have focused primarily on domestic issues. This will not necessarily continue, however, because many members and supporters are hostile to Israel and the United States. Keeping any cooperation out of the headlines is vital to avoid giving demagogues a target for their rhetoric.

Setting priorities is essential. The United States wants many things from Egypt, but it cannot have them all. For groups like the Salafis, which do not control the government, realism is in order. Military access to the region via Egypt, counterterrorism cooperation and a constructive Egyptian relationship with Israel are particularly important. Conversely, Egypt’s role in containing Iran is limited, and the Salafis are more likely to oppose Iran if the United States does not make Iran into the cause for anti-Americanism in the region.

Human rights will be a delicate issue. The role of religion in society, and what this means for Egypt’s minorities and women, will be the biggest and most important area of disagreement. Given the political sensitivity of these issues, the United States has little influence. Thus, while Washington should make its views known, taking a strong and combative stance would further undermine Egypt’s already weak liberals.

The problem the Salafis pose for U.S. policy reflects a broader challenge for the United States in Egypt—and in the new Arab world in general. The Salafis represent an important strand of public opinion in Egypt and elsewhere, and public opinion in general is anti-American and often opposes U.S. positions on Israel, women’s and minority rights, and the use of force in the region. Thus, even if the United States wins over a particular Salafi leader, the political impetus for various anti-American policies will remain strong.

Daniel Byman is a professor at Georgetown University and the research director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. Zack Gold is a senior research assistant at the Saban Center.

Image: Jonathan Rashad

Image: Pullquote: As the largest and most politically vibrant alternative to the Brotherhood, the Salafis will project their influence at least indirectly in all parliamentary action.Essay Types: Essay