In December 2018, the Commander of the Strategic Missile Force Colonel General Sergei Karakayev stated that “…the nuclear potentials of the sides have [been] reduced more than 66% since the signing of START I.” This is a major departure from the standard Russian position which claimed it had made an 85% reduction. If one uses the late Soviet declared number of over 10,000 deployed strategic nuclear warheads for the calculations, the difference between an 85% reduction and a 66% reduction is almost 2,000 strategic nuclear warheads above the supposed New START Treaty allowed level of 1,550. This is much higher than any previous unclassified Western estimate of currently deployed Russian strategic nuclear warheads. For example, in 2018, Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris estimated that Russia has 2,522 deployed strategic nuclear warheads.

While the New START Treaty warhead limit is not real because of the Treaty’s many loopholes, a force of over 3,300 Russian deployed strategic nuclear warheads (a two-to-one and growing Russian advantage in strategic nuclear weapons) is very significant and could impact Putin’s future decisions regarding war or peace. To deploy more than 3,300 strategic nuclear warheads today, it takes more than simple exploitation of the New START Treaty bomber weapon counting rule which counts a bomber load of nuclear weapons as one warhead. The Kristensen and Norris number already does this. A current level of over 3,300 warheads requires a substantial covert force of heavily MIRVed mobile ICBMs and/or cheating on warhead numbers on declared delivery vehicles

There is evidence of a covert Russian mobile ICBM force. In December 2014, Colonel General Karakayev said, “There are currently around 400 missiles [ICBMs] with warheads on combat duty.” General Karakayev has repeated his claim that Russia has deployed about 400 ICBMs several times. Yet, Russia’s declared strategic force numbers make it impossible for Russia to have more than about 300 ICBMs legally “with warheads on combat duty.” Interestingly, in 2011, the Russian Space Agency published a request for proposals for eliminating ICBMs including the Kuryer, a late Soviet-era small mobile ICBM.  This missile should have been declared under the START Treaty and the New START Treaty but it was not. This is a violation of the New START Treaty.

Deployed Russian strategic nuclear weapons numbers will almost certainly increase. According to Bill Gertz, “A U.S. intelligence official said Moscow is expanding its nuclear arsenal and is expected to deploy a total force of 8,000 warheads by 2026 along with modernizing deep underground bunkers.”        

There is evidence in the Russian state media that the Backfire bomber is now a non-declared heavy bomber under the New START Treaty which is a violation of the Treaty. If the Backfire has become a heavy bomber, it counts against the New START Treaty limit. This may put Russia above the New START limit of 1,550 accountable warheads, and, hence, in violation of the Treaty. The New START heavy bomber definition (The New START Treaty, Protocol, Part 1, definition 23) states:

The term “heavy bomber” means a bomber of a type, any one of which satisfies either of the following criteria:

(a) Its range is greater than 8000 kilometers; or

(b) It is equipped for long-range [600-km] nuclear ALCMs.

The Backfire bomber is an extremely important system because it is the subject of a very  substantial upgrade (the Tu-22M3M) and will reportedly be operational this year. TASS reports the new NK-32-02 engines to be put on the Backfire are the same engine to be used in the new Tu-160M2 heavy bomber, which Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yury Borisov said will increase its range 1,000-km+ (about 600 miles). The improved version of the Backfire (Tu-223M3), according to noted aviation journalist Alexander Mladenov, has a range of “5,000 nautical miles (10,000-km)….” This would be well beyond the heavy bomber range threshold.

The Backfire reportedly now carries new nuclear-capable cruise missiles that alone would turn it into a heavy bomber under the New START Treaty definition. It carries the new Kh-32 1,000-km range cruise missile, according to TASS. The Kh-32 is described in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review report as being nuclear capable. State-run Sputnik News confirms this saying, “…the Kh-32 can carry either conventional or nuclear munitions.” State-run Russia Beyond the Headlines also says its range is 1,000-km and it can be armed “…with a nuclear or conventional 500-kilogram (1,102 lb) warhead and hit targets within a few yards.”

Rossiyskaya Gazeta, the official newspaper of the Russian Government, reports the new version of the Backfire (Tu-22M3M) can carry the Kh-101 and the Kh-555, both long-range air-launched cruise missiles. The Kh-101 is nuclear capable, according to Putin and the Russian Ministry of Defense. The Kh-555 was long reported to be the conventional modification of the Kh-55 (AS-15) nuclear air-launched cruise missile. However, Sputnik News says it is dual capable: “Second, in addition to the nuclear option, the Kh-555 can carry up to 410 kg of conventional munitions.” It also noted that it was five times as accurate as the Kh-55.

Russian Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons

Russia has thousands of tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons. According to General Paul Selva, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Russia is “…developing new nonstrategic nuclear weapons…” Russian press reports indicate that Russia has retained virtually every type of Cold War tactical nuclear weapon capability. The Nuclear Posture Review confirms this: "These include air-to-surface missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, gravity bombs, and depth charges for medium-range bombers, tactical bombers, and naval aviation, as well as anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-aircraft missiles and torpedoes for surface ships and submarines, a nuclear ground-launched cruise missile in violation of the 1987 INF Treaty, and Moscow's antiballistic missile system." The Obama administration stated that Russia had a ten-to-one advantage vis-a-vis the U.S. in non-strategic nuclear weapons (thousands vs. hundreds).

During the Cold War, we had thousands of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe to deter attack. They are now almost completely gone and dismantled. Empowering Putin in this manner increases the risk of war in Europe and Russian nuclear escalation.

Putin’s Nuclear Strategy

As noted Russia expert Dr. Steven Blank has pointed out, “…since 1993 Russia has changed its posture from no first use [of nuclear weapons] to first use, and now to preemption.” Putin personally developed Russia’s year 2000 nuclear strategy which allows for the first use of nuclear weapons in conventional war when he was Secretary of the Russian National Security Council Staff. Like real Soviet nuclear doctrine, as distinct from Soviet declaratory policy, it allowed for first use of nuclear weapons. However, there were differences. Planned Soviet first use was massive and in support of a rapid invasion of Western Europe with little concern over collateral damage. In Russian doctrinal literature, Russian first use of nuclear weapons is limited and designed to produce low collateral damage, but it still risks massive escalation. The effect of this, as NATO Secretary General Jen Stoltenberg stated in March 2018, has been “blurring of the line” between nuclear and conventional warfare which “lowers the threshold for Russia’s use of nuclear weapons.” Senior Russian officials have talked about nuclear pre-emption as far back as 2006.

In 2009, Secretary of the Russian National Security Council Nikolai Patrushev said that Russian nuclear doctrine allows for the first use of nuclear weapons in “regional or even a local” war and noted, “In situations critical to national security, options including a preventative nuclear strike on the aggressor are not excluded.”

In June 2015, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work and then-Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral James Winnefeld observed, “Russian military doctrine includes what some have called an ‘escalate to de-escalate’ strategy—a strategy that purportedly seeks to deescalate a conventional conflict through coercive threats, including limited nuclear use,” a policy they categorized as “playing with fire.” In 2017, then-DIA Director Lt. General Vincent Stewart said Russia has built nuclear de-escalation “…into their operational concept, we’ve seen them exercise that idea…”

In April 2018, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg declared, “Russia…has invested heavily in new military equipment, modernized their forces, which are exercising more including with nuclear forces, integrating exercises with nuclear capabilities with conventional capabilities…”

In 1999, Colonel General Vladimir Muravyev, Deputy Commander of the Strategic Missile Force, said, “…the deterrent actions of strategic forces…[involve] strikes with both conventional and nuclear warheads with the goal of de-escalating the military conflict,” and Russian forces “…should be capable of conducting ‘surgical’ strikes…using both highly accurate, super-low yield nuclear weapons, as well as conventional ones…”

Russia has reportedly introduced low-yield, precision low-yield and low-collateral damage nuclear weapons in large numbers. A now declassified CIA report from 2000 states, “Moscow’s military doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons has been evolving and probably has served as the justification for the development of very low-yield, high-precision nuclear weapons.” Russian press reports, including the state media, say that low-sub-kiloton yield warheads are now deployed on Russian SLBMs and there are reports of dial-a-yield on the missile warheads on Russian ICBMs. Dr. Philip Karber, President of the Potomac Foundation, has stated that roughly half of Russia’s 5,000 tactical nuclear weapons have been modernized with new sub-kiloton nuclear warheads for air-defense, torpedoes and cruise missiles.