Russia Hopes the Lada-class Submarine Will Improve. It Won’t.
Russia is clearly committed to the Lada-class. But it is a submarine that does not—and will never—live up to the expectations.
The old Soviet Union was known for having a fearsome navy. Notably, the Soviet submarine force was the stuff of nightmares for many of NATO’s naval planners. And although the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 devastated Russia’s military budget, the modern Russian Navy that succeeded the Soviet Navy in the wake of the Cold War inherited much of their former empire’s naval power.
Despite their generally impressive submarine technology, the Russians can sometimes miss the mark entirely. Such was the case with Project 677, or the Lada-class. These boats were intended to be a fourth-generation improvement over the more well-known Project 636 Kilo-class submarines. Yet the Lada-class is a mixed bag. Indeed, by all rights it is probably not worth the effort. But the Russian Navy, obviously never having heard of a sunk cost, keeps expanding their commitment to the submarine.
The Lada’s Key Features
Some key features of the Lada-class include reduced acoustic signatures, very significant stealth capabilities, and they integrated new combat systems. Another aspect with the attempt to place an air-independent propulsion (AIP) system. Here was the first significant complication for the Russian Navy when designing the Lada-class. You see, the AIP system never functioned as it was advertised. So Moscow did not ultimately install this system in actual models of the submarine.
Had it worked, though, the AIP system would have significantly differentiated itself from the Kilo-class submarines that the Ladas were intended to replace. That’s because the AIP system would have allowed for the Lada-class to remain underwater longer than conventional submarine propulsion systems. Considering that the Lada-class was intended for coastal defense and operating for longer periods underwater than the Kilo-class submarines, the Ladas were nowhere near as useful as they should have been.
These submarines also feature a monohull design, a major change from the traditional double-hull construction preferred by Russia’s submarine designers since the Second World War. A monohull design reduces displacement by about 25 percent (when compared to the Kilo-class), while making the Lada-class faster and more maneuverable. Speed and evasion are two key aspects of submarine warfare that determine which side wins or loses engagements beneath the waves.
As for armaments, Lada-class submarines come equipped with six 533 mm torpedo tubes, Ladas can deploy a hodgepodge of torpedoes and cruise missiles, including the Kalibr missile system, which confer land-attack capabilities onto this submarine. Lada-class submarines are designed for a bevy of military operations, including anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface warfare (ASuW), intelligence-gathering, and patrolling coastal areas.
A Sunk Cost
Although the first submarine of its class was launched in 2004, its numerous technical woes delayed the commissioning by the Russian Navy until 2010. It has remained a work in progress since then. Regardless of these challenges, the Russian Navy has indicated its desire to build more units.
In fact, an entire export model was ready for sale to Italy, but the very public delays of the Lada-class cooled Rome’s interest in purchasing the systems. Following the imposition of international sanctions on Russia after the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, any chance of exporting the Lada to any Western nation was abandoned.
Russia is clearly committed to the Lada-class. But it is a submarine that does not—and will never—live up to the expectations. When they were first created, many Russian naval planners believed that the Lada-class submarine was the solution to many of their strategic problems. That was not the case. The Lada-class is a mess.
About the Author: Brandon J. Weichert
Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
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