The Russian Military’s Failure in Ukraine Is No Surprise

The Russian Military’s Failure in Ukraine Is No Surprise

Assumptions of Russian military dominance were largely based on the belief that Moscow’s military reforms since 2008 had fixed the institutional problems seen in Chechnya and Georgia.

 

During the five-day war, command and control proved to be a critical shortcoming for Russian forces. Makarov had been appointed to his post weeks before the invasion, and the Main Operations Directorate of the Russian General Staff, a key position in direct control of the Georgian operation, did not have a commanding officer during the war. District-level commanders did not have complete control of the air force. Instead, the air force was directed by Gen. Alexander Zelin, the air force’s commander, using a cell phone from his office in Moscow. Communication systems were obsolete, with many being from Soviet-era stocks. During one of the battles on August 8, it was reported that  General Anatoly Khrulyov, the 58th Combined Arms Army’s commander, had to use a journalist’s cell phone to communicate with his forces because communication with his units was unavailable. Russia was so surprised by the timing of the attack on South Ossetia that the Russian General Staff was in the process of moving to a new location on August 8.

Intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance were equally dreadful for Russian forces in the Georgian campaign. Russia was both blind and deaf during the conflict. For example, on the afternoon of August 9, a Russian convoy of thirty infantry fighting vehicles encountered elements of the Georgian 3rd Infantry Brigades reconnaissance company. According to the book The Tanks of August, both the Russians and the Georgians were taken by surprise, and the ensuing firefight killed three Russians and eight Georgian soldiers, destroyed twenty-five out of thirty vehicles, and seriously wounded Khrulyov, along with several Russian journalists.

 

Conclusion

Poor command and control, reconnaissance and intelligence, logistics, force employment, and training have led to a weak showing for the Russian military in Ukraine. Military analysts failed to see the Russian military for what it is: a military that still lacks basic military training, suffers from crippling manpower shortages and inadequate Soviet-era equipment, and, at times, is poorly led. Assumptions of Russian military dominance were mainly based on Russian capabilities vis-à-vis Ukraine and the belief that most of Russia’s military reforms since 2008 had fixed institutional problems that manifested in Chechnya and Georgia. This turned out to be false, and Russia is suffering from the same mistakes today as it did in 1995. We should not have been surprised by Russian performance in this conflict, and it seems that Russia cannot escape its history.

Jorge L. Rivero is a Foreign Area Specialist concentrating in Europe and Eurasia for the U.S. Marine Corps and is currently stationed in Quantico, Virginia. Jorge focuses on the Russian military and Russian information operations.

Image: Reuters.