What Napoleon Can Teach Western Land Forces About Winning Hybrid Wars

November 27, 2018 Topic: Security Region: Europe Blog Brand: The Buzz Tags: Napoleonic WarsNapoleonHybrid WarfareManeuver WarfareRussia

What Napoleon Can Teach Western Land Forces About Winning Hybrid Wars

To strengthen the resilience of European and U.S. armies, further restructuring and realignment of land forces at the operational level in order to create a disruptive new force structure built around autonomy— akin to what Napoleon Bonaparte achieved in the early nineteenth century with his corps system—will be required.

Consequently, more emphasis needs to be placed on the creation of lightly armed units (e.g., modelled after existing ranger units), capable of operating independently at the company level or below, to engage an opponent, in particular in an urban environment. The main objective of these units is not to deny passage to an aggressor but to delay him, wear him out, until heavy brigades, held in reserve, can engage. (Elements of these units, trained in non-lethal combat, could also be deployed as military police in cities to help quell disturbances, for example, caused by enemy disinformation campaigns.)

Indeed, these lightly armed units would need to fulfill similar missions on the battlefield as French voltigeurs and skirmishers in the nineteenth century, in harassing the enemy but also be capable of limited offensive operations while providing a protective screen for heavier units that partially shield the latter from enemy action. These light units would also increase the escalation dominance posture of European and U.S. land forces, vis-à-vis, for example, Russia in Eastern Europe.

Applied to the modern multi-dimensional battlefield, classic light infantry tactics could be merged with networked swarming, defined by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt as “engaging an adversary from all directions simultaneously, either with fire or in force.” This would require superior situational awareness paired with the traditional stealth capabilities of light infantry units to achieve a swarming effect that is divided by RAND’s Sean Edwards, into four stages: locate, converge, attack and disperse. Notably, this would perhaps also entail a reform of existing linear command structures. “Just to survive, our formations, whatever the wire diagram looks like, will likely have to be small,” Mark A. Milley, as the U.S. Army chief of staff, said in 2016. “They will have to move constantly. They will have to aggregate and disaggregate rapidly.”

However, networked swarming will not be enough. These units, similar to the lighter elements in the French corps, would also need to be able to support heavy formations in holding territory and assume traditional light infantry roles such as helping secure the flanks of advancing armored forces. The key to battlefield success in that respect will be how to best achieve interoperability and coordination between the light and heavy forces.

The Hybrid Force in Practice in Europe:

What would the practical implementation of such a new force look like were it ever to become reality in Europe?

European and U.S. land forces along NATO and the European Union’s (EU) eastern flank could begin a more aggressive rotating deployment schedule of heavy brigades, combined with lighter elements. In an ideal scenario in Europe, the countries that constitute the eastern flank would primarily emphasize the creation of autonomous lighter armed units whereas countries to the west would focus on the creation of autonomous heavy brigades.

While every member country of the EU and NATO should independently develop the capability to operate at least one autonomous heavy brigade that is capable of operating on the twenty-first century battlefield, current political realities in Europe will make budgetary allocations for such an endeavor unlikely. Lighter forces may be more palatable to some European policymakers across the continent as they are cheaper and, in all likelihood, politically less controversial than standing up more expansive heavy formations. The key to battlefield success for both lighter and heavy formations will depend on their ability to operate autonomously independent of one another.

However, only the creation of a true hybrid force operating in the same battlespace can lead to a more rapid achievement of escalation dominance and conventional deterrence. In embryonic form, this operational concept already exists on both sides of the Atlantic. To strengthen the resilience of European and U.S. armies, further restructuring and realignment of land forces at the operational level in order to create a disruptive new force structure built around autonomy— akin to what Napoleon Bonaparte achieved in the early nineteenth century with his corps system—will be required.

Franz-Stefan Gady is a senior fellow at the EastWest Institute and senior editor with The Diplomat. He can be followed @hoanssolo.

The essay is a summary of the authors remarks delivered at the ‘Fifth Forum of Commanders of European Land Forces’ which took place in September in Graz, Austria.

Image: Flickr.