Second, restarting the F-22 production line would be costly, even if the U.S. government still owns the tooling. This argument is accurate but better framed in terms of value for money. With air supremacy necessary for successful military operations involving a near-peer adversary, what is the cost of failure? What is the value of defeat? Other airpower tasks rely on friendly force air supremacy. To extend General Hostage’s earlier quote: If America does not keep the F-22 fleet viable, the other aircraft fleets will be irrelevant.

Third, even if the F-22 restart argument is strong there is no ready money. There is money though for large-scale F-35 buys, developing a new bomber and acquisition of a new tankers, among other purchases. The question returns to the questionable value of these purchases without air supremacy. In such matters of combat aircraft relative cost-effectiveness the number of F-35s comes under scrutiny. General Hostage also noted that with the F-22 having higher performance than the F-35: “I’m going to need eight F-35s to go after a target that I might only need two F-22s to go after.”

In trying to keep costs manageable, exports might help. The world has changed significantly since the 1998 Obey amendment banned F-22 exports that could have notably reduced aircraft unit price. The Obey amendment means that today America’s allies are without a leading-edge fighter superior to the latest Russian and Chinese fighters or able to equal the new stealth fighters both nations are flight-testing. In the 1950s, Eisenhower shared nuclear weapons on the logic that refusing allies access to weapon systems that adversaries possessed was morally flawed. This argument now holds in the F-22 export case.

Fourth, restarting the F-22 line will take time. The first new-build B-1B took three years from Reagan’s go-decision to first flight. New F-22s may not enter fleet service until 2020 but any upgrades of the current F-15 fleet or redesigns like the F-15SE will also take at least as long while still being costly. And at the end of it, such upgrade options will still not be as capable as the F-22 nor as sure as remaining operationally relevant until 2040.

America has a significant fighter gap looming that the F-35 does not convincingly fill. In trying to deter or win any conflict with near-peer competitors China and Russia before 2040, America’s fading air supremacy is particularly worrying. Restarting F-22 production would retain unquestioned American global air supremacy and help reverse the shift in the Asia-Pacific military power balance.

Peter Layton is a Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University. He has extensive Australian defence experience including in the Pentagon, and a doctorate on grand strategy.

Image: Flickr/U.S. Air Force.