I Rebuilt America's Nuclear Arsenal from Scratch. This Is What It Would Look Like

January 12, 2018 Topic: Security Blog Brand: The Buzz Tags: RussiaChinaNorth KoreaMissilesNuclear weaponsTechnology

I Rebuilt America's Nuclear Arsenal from Scratch. This Is What It Would Look Like

A thought experiment. 

When I worked for the late John Heinz in 1991 when he was the senior senator from Pennsylvania, he voted against continuing funding for the B-2 strategic bomber. The B-2 advocates came to our offices, and made no better case for the nuclear mission of the B-2 other than to say: it’s a cool weapon for fighting a long nuclear war with the Soviet Union…oh, and there are lot of subcontractors who need production to keep going. Heinz was undecided until the last minute, and then he went and voted. I was waiting for him outside the Senate chamber, and when came out, he said: “I did the conservative thing: I voted to save money.”

“If I were creating the world I wouldn’t mess about with butterflies and daffodils. I would have started with  lasers, eight o’clock, Day One.”

So said the personification of Evil in Terry Gilliam’s 1983 classic film,  Time Bandits .  If we were able to dismantle the entire defense establishment and bring it back one piece at a time with 2014’s technology, what would it look like? In the case of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent, I would start with land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles buried in silos in North America.        

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This might seem an odd choice. Why choose such destabilizing weapons? After all, ICBMs are ill-suited for very much besides killing millions of people. They only have an offensive role; they cannot be meaningfully defended; they cannot be recalled once launched; their existence cannot be hidden; their flight times are terrifyingly short. Why not start with something with a little more flexibility?

(This first appeared in 2014.) 

History and the state of technology in the 1950s did in fact lead to a different conclusion at the time. Before the invention of long-range missiles, the United States and the Soviet Union created huge bomber forces over six decades ago. All of the vices of missiles are reflected – supposedly – in the virtues of bombers: they’re slow, they can be recalled, they have human beings in them who can make real-time decisions, and they can be used for a broad array of missions. They are a prefect nuclear Swiss Army knife, suited for all kinds of missions.

That’s exactly what makes them dangerous, however. They’re tempting to policymakers who might want to use nuclear weapons while remaining in denial about the immense consequences of using nuclear weapons. If the goal is purely to deter the use of nuclear weapons against us, ICBMs (and their submarine launched little brothers, SLBMs) are adequate to the job. If the goal is to give the President all kinds of options for nuclear use – which I would seek to avoid – then by all means, buy more bombers. If the mission is purely deterrence, however, we have to rethink the accumulated decisions of a different time.

The notion of going  toe-to-toe with the Russkies in nuclear combat  made at least some sense in the 1950s. During the Cold War, we expected to fight the Soviet Union in a protracted nuclear war with far smaller nuclear weapons than we have now. The whole thing was supposed to look  like World War II, only bigger:  conventional war in Europe, naval engagements on the seas in and around Eurasia, fighter jocks once again blasting each other out of the German skies. In the midst of that war, bombers would not only have discrete missions against enemy military targets and infrastructure, they could be used for signaling, warnings, and “intra-war” deterrence (as in, “my bombers are in the air, and you now have eight hours to back off”).

ICBMs appeared at the end of the 1950s and were institutionalized as the backbone of the American strategic deterrent by 1970. Once missile technology appeared, the only real question about missiles was whether to hide them underwater, or to bury some in holes while attaching others to aircraft. The Air Force won this bitter interservice dispute, and Admiral Arleigh Burke and the Navy lost in their bid for a “minimum deterrent” of a few hundred missiles at sea. (The Air Force,  Burke later complained,  was as “ruthless as the Communists” and used the same methods.)

In the end, America split the difference three ways: henceforth, we would have a “triad” of forces, whose goal was less to create options than it was to survive a total Soviet onslaught with enough bombs left to reduce the USSR to ash. So why not just replicate this structure today? After all, that’s what we keep doing anyway.  Every revision of our nuclear policies  only ends up producing a Mini-Me of our previous force structures. We still have land, sea, and air based weapons, just in smaller numbers and tighter configurations. And it must have worked, since we’re all still here. Right?