However, it should be remembered that past allegations of paraded North Korean missiles being nothing but “stage props” came to naught when those missiles roared skyward from their launch pads. That the July 4 test was a mere propaganda shot is not impossible, but – judging by the past record – it is a rather less plausible theory than a test of a truly global range ICBM or, at least, of its precursor.

Liquid Swords: 

One more issue needs to be addressed here: is a mobile, liquid propellant ICBM viable at all? This is denied by the proponents of the “propaganda ploy” theory on account of structural fragility and temperature limitations of high energy liquid propellants.

Mobile liquid propellant ballistic missiles have been with us ever since Second World War and abound today in the form of Scuds and their derivatives, as well as in their scaled up versions in Iran, Pakistan and North Korea.

Whatever fragility there exists is taken care of by the vehicle shock absorbers and by judicious cradling of the missile aboard the vehicle, and there is no reason to assume that the same does not work for larger liquid propellant ICBMs.

As for temperature limitations, there are ways to spice the propellants up to make them more temperature tolerant.

There is no reason to assume that North Koreans are less talented or less resourceful than their South Korean brethren

Just as one example, the giant Proton space launch vehicle which uses the same high energy propellants as the HS-12 and HS-14 is routinely launched in wintertime from Baikonur cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, where the average wintertime temperature is -10 centigrade.

The North Koreans, like the Iranians, store their loaded mobile launchers in huge, temperature controlled underground caverns from which they emerge briefly to launch their missiles (Long suspected, direct evidence on the use of huge underground caverns as missile depots has recently surfaced in footage aired on North Korean TV).

So why are there no liquid propellant road mobile ICBMs in Russia and China? The reason could be more operational than technological. Lengthy fueling up in the open renders the weapon vulnerable to enemy preemptive strikes. Besides, high energy liquid propellants are toxic. This necessitates cumbersome personnel protection measures and safety procedures during the fueling process.

Missiles could be fueled a priori in the safety of their underground caverns, but this involves a host of other problems which we lack the space to discuss here. Solid fuel ballistic missiles, tactical or strategic, are simply cheaper, safer and more convenient to operate.

This, rather than fragility or temperature limitations seems to be the actual reason for the preference for solid propellant mobile rockets. Apparently, the North Koreans have noticed this as well, as is evident from the April 15th parade, where two types of what appeared to be future mobile solid propellant ICBMs made their debut.  

The North Korean defense industry has been engaging in missile and rocket motor development and production since the early 1990s. Its leaders have been pouring a sizable proportion of the country’s meager wealth into missile programs ever since. There is no reason to assume that North Koreans are less talented or less resourceful than their South Korean brethren.

By now, a quarter of a century later, they must be as proficient as anyone else in several (if not all) key missile technologies. To dismiss their July 4 missile test as a propaganda ploy might prove a costly mistake. It will be more prudent, and probably more realistic, to treat it as advertised.

Uzi Rubin is the former director of the Israeli office of missile defense and father of the Arrow ballistic missile defense system.

This first appeared in WarIsBoring here.

Image: Reuters.