Syria: Deterrence Defanged
Whether or not President Obama actually enforces his “red line” by attacking Syria, his decision to seek authority to act from Congress, after his administration already conveyed its intention to strike, has seriously undermined American credibility. The Syrian regime and its Iranian backers – and U.S. friends and foes alike – have surely taken note.
After the Assad regime’s alleged use of chemical weapons outside Damascus on August 21, the administration quickly created the impression that it would respond with force, and soon. Following the House of Commons’ vote against any British involvement in a potential military action against Syria, the administration announced its willingness to even take unilateral action against Syria.
These declarations to back U.S. threats with actual action seemed commendable at the time, although Obama’s irresolution has since become increasingly apparent.
On August 31, Obama bowed to calls from members of Congress – Republicans and Democrats – that he obtain congressional approval before taking action in Syria. Any notions that the U.S. would intervene decisively, in a manner that might tilt today’s military balance in the rebels’ favor, were quickly dispelled: a limited, three-day strike employing only stand-off weaponry was envisioned. It would be, in the words of one U.S. official briefed on the administration’s options on Syria, "just muscular enough not to get mocked.” Nonetheless, mocked this proposed use of limited force certainly was.
In the face of these criticisms, reports on Thursday indicated that President Obama has ordered the Pentagon to develop an expanded list of targets in Syria. This order was prompted by intelligence reports suggesting that the Assad regime has been relocating troops and materiel as Congress debates authorizing action; common sense would also suggest that the regime would react in this way. Now, the regime has even more time to ready itself for the increasingly uncertain prospect of limited American intervention, because the Senate is expected to vote sometime this week and another one-week delay is expected on the House side.
Understandably, Obama punted to Congress in order to obtain political cover to act, given the significant potential for events and American involvement in Syria to go horribly awry and expand considerably in scope. An even more cynical reading is that Obama sought political cover to not act: if Congress refuses to authorize force, which is certainly possible – and, as matters stand now, likely – Obama does not intend to act, Deputy National Security Adviser Tony Blinken said Friday.
This uncertainty concerning whether Congress will “allow” the president to act makes his threats to potentially employ force elsewhere – against, say, Iran – difficult to take seriously. Setting the precedent of seeking congressional support once fosters the impression that Congress will have a say – and potentially a veto – next time. There is a qualitative difference between the president conveying that he will use force in response to a given contingency, and declaring that he might act if Congress grants him permission to do so.
The president declared in his 2010 State of the Union address that “as Iran's leaders continue to ignore their obligations, there should be no doubt: they, too, will face growing consequences. That is a promise." This might have been taken seriously by Tehran then. Now, however, the Iranian regime would likely interpret Obama’s statement thusly: “…there should be significant doubt: they, too, might face growing consequences. That is a hope."
Israeli officials have argued that enforcing the president’s red line on Syria is essential to deterring Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Secretary of State John Kerry and other U.S. officials have argued similarly that a ‘no’ vote from lawmakers would embolden Iran and North Korea. Yet this is a problem of the administration’s own making. This lame attempt to pass the buck to Congress is the antithesis of strong leadership.
Beyond obtaining political cover for action – or inaction – Obama certainly had many other reasons to go to Congress. An NBC News poll released on Friday found that nearly 80 percent of Americans believe the president should obtain congressional approval before acting in Syria. Only 36 percent of respondents in a new Gallup poll also released on Friday support using force in Syria, the lowest level of popular support for any U.S. military intervention in the last 20 years. If he had chosen to bypass Congress, these factors alone would provide ample ammunition for Obama’s critics on the right. Additionally, bypassing Congress would have also left him vulnerable to criticisms from the left for acting unilaterally, à la George W. Bush.
If Obama intended to seek congressional approval to act in Syria, he should have discreetly put out feelers on Capitol Hill well before publicly creating the impression that he planned to use force. If obtaining sufficient support seemed unlikely, then the administration could have still announced that it intended to act, and settled for cobbling together a bipartisan group of congressional supporters to provide at least a sheen of political support and cover. Opponents of using force could have been urged to dampen or mute their subsequent public criticisms of the administration’s actions in Syria.
It is not necessarily always a problem for this or any president to seek congressional authorization to use force. (Of course, presidents are often able to use force abroad independently of Congress, and have done so more often than not.) Indeed, the president should, when practicable, attempt to solicit congressional support for launching military action. Ideally, he or she should try to achieve an at least somewhat consultative and cooperative relationship with Congress when it comes to employing military force.
However, sound statesmanship, encompassing the imperative of maintaining a credible deterrent capacity, necessitates that the president should never create the impression that he is beholden to the whims of Congress in acting as commander-in-chief. Unfortunately, this administration has indicated that this is exactly the case.