In a War with North Korea We Might Not Be Able to Destory Kim's Nuclear Missiles

January 3, 2018 Topic: Security Region: Asia Blog Brand: The Buzz Tags: North KoreaMilitaryTechnologyWorldU.S.warHistory

In a War with North Korea We Might Not Be Able to Destory Kim's Nuclear Missiles

History tells us so--via Saddam Hussein. 

The failure to destroy the launchers highlights how easy it can be to overestimate damage inflicted upon an enemy, and how difficult it is to hunt down an opponent intent on using hit-and-run tactics. Today, North Korea maintains a far larger arsenal of mobile ballistic missile launchers than Iraq ever did—weapons which could likely survive the opening days of a conflict. Of course, U.S. air power has benefited from major advances in technology since 1991, including better sensors, more efficient communication networks, near instantaneous data-links, and drones that can scout out vast swathes of terrain far more efficiently than a jet fighter can. But the Great Scud Hunt still suggests that even outdated mobile missile launchers could prove an especially difficult threat to stamp out.

While assembling the coalition that would eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1990–1991, one thing American military planners  weren’t worried about was Iraq’s Scud-B tactical ballistic missiles. True, Iraq had flung hundreds of the Soviet-designed missiles at Iranian cities during the Iran-Iraq war. But the weapons were derived from Nazi V-2 rockets dating back to World War II, and had difficulty hitting any target  smaller than a city. The home-built Al-Hussein  Scuds developed by Iraqi engineers cut down the size of the warhead and increased the fuel to afford them greater range, at the expense of killing power and accuracy. Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of the coalition, thought of them as little more than a terror weapon that would inflict negligible military damage.

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Nonetheless, when the coalition began its devastating air campaign over Iraq on January 17, 1991, it threw everything from  B-52s to F-117 stealth fighters  and Tomahawk cruise missiles to blast twenty-eight fixed Scud sites as well as storage areas and factories.

It became clear the following night, however, that the raids had not silenced the ballistic missiles. The Iraqi military  also had a fleet of transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) trucks dispersed throughout western and southern Iraq. Dictator Saddam Hussein settled on a strategy designed to undermine the alliance’s political underpinnings. Starting on January 18, Scud missiles began to rain down cities in Saudi Arabia—and Israeli cities, injuring dozens.

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin would normally have responded to such a provocation by flattening portions of Iraq with the Israeli Air Force. But if Saddam succeeded in drawing Israel into the war, this might drive away support from the coalition’s key Arab allies. Thus, the Bush administration pleaded with Rabin to keep his strike planes on the ground and let the coalition deal with Saddam.

But that wasn’t good enough for Tel Aviv—the Israeli government wanted the coalition to demonstrate it was doing everything in its power to eliminate the Scud threat, or else it would take matters into its own own hands. After all, how difficult could it be to destroy a score of large, soft-skinned trucks toting enormous missiles?

The Great Scud Hunt Begins

While two batteries of Patriot surface-to-air missiles were redeployed from Saudi Arabia to shield Israel, American and British warplanes were redirected to hammer Saddam’s Scud force. But this was no easy task: a Scud’s TEL unit could move to a firing position, launch its missile, and then scoot back into hiding before it could be located and destroyed.

To hunt the Scud trucks down, the coalition dispatched  A-10 Thunderbolts attack jets  to scour the desert during the day, while F-15E Strike Eagle and RAF Tornado fighter bombers combed the sand dunes at night, the former using LANTIRN infrared sensor pods. Meanwhile,  high-flying U-2 spy planes  began mapping out the desert of Iraq, searching for likely Scud positions.

When a Scud launch was detected—often when a satellite spotted its launch flash—the information was relayed first to the Air Force command center in Riyadh, then to an orbiting E-8 JSTAR command plane, and finally to a strike plane orbiting the area. This process typically took at least thirty minutes.

Thirty minutes was in theory the amount of time it took for a Scud crew to start moving after launch—but Iraqi crews had streamlined the firing process to just  six minutes. Likewise, they had reduced setup time for the missiles from two hours to a half hour. Unable to catch Scuds before  or after firing, Coalition warplanes were forced to scan so-called “Scud Boxes” where planners  thought the Scuds might be hiding.

Thus, roughly 50 percent of the aerial weapons released during the Scud Hunt were targeting “possible” areas that could hide a Scud launcher, including bridge overpasses and nearby buildings. Even the 15 percent of strikes targeted at actual TEL units were not reliable. Infrared scanners had great difficulty spotting the TELs at all, and could not distinguish them from regular trucks; they were even known to confuse ill-fated goat herds for missile launchers! Even on the lucky occasions aircraft spotted Scud launches at night, they only succeeded in targeting the launchers less than 20 percent of the time.