Why Is the White House Ignoring Its National Security Strategy?

December 19, 2017 Topic: Security Region: Americas Blog Brand: The Buzz Tags: Donald TrumpNational SecurityRussiaNuclearWar

Why Is the White House Ignoring Its National Security Strategy?

 The new National Security Strategy hints at a doctrine that is somewhat similar in concept to Russia’s 2000s-era policy in that strategic attacks—nuclear and nonnuclear—could be met with a nuclear response.

The United States does not necessarily need to match the nuclear arsenals of other nations to maintain a credible deterrent, according to President Donald Trump’s new National Security Strategy.

“The United States does not need to match the nuclear arsenals of other powers,” the NSS states. “But we must sustain a stockpile that can deter adversaries, assure allies and partners, and achieve U.S. objectives if deterrence fails.”

While the NSS makes such statements, the White House does not seem to be following its own strategy. Indeed, given Russia’s alleged violation of the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty with the development of the 9M729 cruise missile, the United States has said it will develop a similar ground-based cruise missile in retaliation. Such a move would seem to contradict the new strategy.

Moreover, there are indications within the document that the United States would consider using nuclear weapons to retaliate against a nonnuclear attack. “While nuclear deterrence strategies cannot prevent all conflict, they are essential to prevent nuclear attack, nonnuclear strategic attacks, and large-scale conventional aggression,” the document states.

Particularly, the document mentions “the spread of accurate and inexpensive weapons and the use of cyber tools have allowed state and non-state competitors to harm the United States across various domains.” Those weapons “enable adversaries to attempt strategic attacks against the United States—without resorting to nuclear weapons—in ways that could cripple our economy and our ability to deploy our military forces”—hinting at the conditions that might lead to a nuclear retaliation. “Deterrence must be extended across all of these domains and must address all possible strategic attacks,” the NSS states.

As Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, notes, the NSS seems to hint at an expansion of the role of the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal. Indeed, American policymakers have traditionally been very reluctant to adopt a nuclear no first use policy because they want to keep their options open to retaliate against a broad range of potential threats.

However, this particular development suggests that the United States might be moving to something similar to Russia’s de-escalation nuclear policy of the 2000s. The idea behind Russia’s so-called de-escalation doctrine—which was codified in 2000—is that was that rather than inflict unacceptable catastrophic damage on a potential enemy and thereby deterring them from attacking in the first place, Russian forces would use inflict “tailored damage” on an aggressor.

That tailored damage would severe enough that it would be “unacceptable to the opponent” and “exceeds the benefits the aggressor expects to gain as a result of the use of military force.” As Nikolai Sokov—a former Soviet arms control negotiator—explains the Russians hoped to deter the United States and its allies from interfering in conflicts where the Kremlin’s vital interests are at stake.

However, while the so-called de-escalation doctrine first came into prominence in the West with Russia’s 2010 military doctrine, Sokov points out that the document actually tightened the Kremlin’s nuclear threshold. As Sokov notes, while the year 2000 document allowed for the use of nuclear weapons “in situations critical to the national security,” the 2010 military doctrine only allows for the use of such weapons when “the very existence of the state is under threat.”

Thus, the new Trump NSS hints at a doctrine that is somewhat similar in concept to Russia’s 2000s-era policy in that strategic attacks—nuclear and nonnuclear—could be met with a nuclear response.

Dave Majumdar is the defense editor for the National Interest. You can follow him on Twitter: @davemajumdar.

Image: U.S. President Donald Trump delivers remarks regarding the Administration's National Security Strategy at the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center in Washington D.C., U.S. December 18, 2017. REUTERS/Joshua Roberts