Inside Track: Iran's Nuclear Diplomacy
by Andrew E. Title
At "Iran's Nuclear Program: Diplomacy, Deterrence, or Force?", which took place at the Nixon Center on Monday, discussants tried to shed some light on the enigma that has been Tehran's foreign policy, while also pointing out the positives and negatives of Washington's approach to the problem.
In the second panel of the day, which focused on the prospects for successful negotiation with Tehran, two Iran watchers-Suzanne Maloney of the Brookings Institution and Barbara Slavin of the United States Institute of Peace-gave decidedly mixed assessments of the situation on the ground. The Nixon Center's Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs, served as moderator.
Slavin, on leave as senior diplomatic reporter at USA Today, started off her initial remarks by flatly stating that "war would be a disaster" for the United States. Predicting dire consequences in Iraq and Pakistan, she said that bombing Iran would damage already-strained oil markets and set back political reform in Tehran for "perhaps another generation." Of course, it would also damage U.S. credibility in the Muslim world.
On the other hand, Slavin argued that "ample time" remains to pursue the diplomatic option, citing internal political developments within Iran. She also said that financial sanctions against Tehran "are working" and that domestic criticism of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is increasing, partly due to what she called his "amplification" of those measures through incompetent economic stewardship. Inflation and unemployment are on the rise as foreign investment decreases; European trade with Iran is down by 30 percent and companies are putting plans to develop Iranian oil "on hold."
Saying that recent elections in Iran have yielded success for reformers and "pragmatic conservatives", while also handing defeat to Ahmadinejad's radical allies, Slavin predicted that upcoming parliamentary elections could possibly serve as a "rebuff" to the controversial president. If that happens, Slavin said, the United States would be in a position to extend a new offer to Tehran, essentially trading acceptance of a limited indigenous nuclear enrichment capacity for tough monitoring rights.
Slavin closed her remarks by recommending steps Washington could take to move toward understanding with Tehran. Among them: "explicity recognize the Iranian government", make direct overtures toward the Supreme Leader himself and reaffirm a 1981 pledge not to interfere in Iranian's domestic politics.
Maloney, a member of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department from 2005 to 2007, then shared her own appraisal of the situation. She praised the Bush Administration for crafting a post-2005 Iran policy that deals with "all arms of the Iran problem", which include the regime's ties to terrorism, the Israel-Palestine peace process and of course the nuclear issue. Furthermore, she said, there has been "unprecedented" European-U.S. cooperation. Nevertheless, there's been no major change in Tehran's behavior since Washington adopted this comprehensive strategy. On the contrary, Maloney said, Iran's stance has "hardened."
Maloney proceeded to give a number of reasons for this failure of U.S. policy. First was the inconsistency of the Administration's approach: In the early days of the Administration, the White House operated on the assumption that the Islamic Republic was on the verge of collapse, leading Tehran to believe that the American objective was "regime change." The gradual softening of the U.S. position, especially since President Bush's second term, has signaled to Iranian leadership that its toughness has yielded results. Maloney also spoke of Tehran's belief in nuclear weapons as the "ultimate deterrent capability"-one it was loath to give up.
Another factor impeding progress on the nuclear issue, said Maloney, is the "disconnect" between Russia, China and the United States, all of whom have a differing "sense of urgency." Strong cooperation from European allies on financial curbs has been valuable, but their effect has been muted by the fact that Iran can now do business with growing economic powers like India and China. Furthermore, a lack of information on Iranian internal affairs makes it "very unclear" how this financial pressure is actually affecting Iran's economy.
Moving to internal Iranian politics, Maloney spoke of a lack of significant debate within the country over issues like Tehran's international standing or the nuclear program. Instead, she said, President Ahmadinejad's disastrous economic policy has been front and center, with his questionable use of public funds at the center of the storm. This gap between internal politics and the global perception of the Islamic Republic only underscores the difficulty of crafting Iran policy, which Maloney said relied on "splintering a regime that we know very little about."
During the question and answer session, the panelists were asked to speculate on what the regime's response to American military against Iran would be. Slavin cited conversations with Iranian officials, saying that "they will respond through their proxies" in Iraq, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories and possibly the Gulf States. She added that countering these "many levers" of Iranian power would be exceedingly difficult for the United States.
Kemp then expanded on Slavin's words, saying that smaller Gulf States were "terrified" over the possible consequences of even a small Iranian-backed attack, which could potentially poison the investment climate in places like Dubai, Bahrain, Kuwait or even Saudi Arabia. Agreeing that Tehran's options for wounding the United States would be "asymmetrical", Maloney added that bombing Iran would be the "biggest favor" the United States could do for the Islamic Republic. The resulting nationalist frenzy would almost certainly enable the regime to consolidate itself, she concluded, dealing a severe blow to Iranian democracy.
Andrew E. Title is an apprentice editor at The National Interest.
Inside Track: Iranian Unknown Unknowns
by Rebecca N. White
As we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns-the ones we don't know we don't know.
It would seem that Donald Rumsfeld's words have outlasted his run in the Pentagon.
In 2005, the U.S. government said Iran was actively trying to build a nuclear bomb. But the headline on The New York Times website following a panel discussion at the Nixon Center on Monday December 3 about the use of force against Iran was "U.S. Says Iran Ended Atomic Arms Work." Apparently, the Times reports, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) released on Monday says Iran put a stop to its nuclear-weapons program in 2003.
Does this headline offer the full story? Hardly, according to panelists Anthony Cordesman, the Arleigh A. Burke Chair on Strategy at CSIS; Michael Eisenstadt, director of the Military and Security Studies Program and senior fellow at the Washington Institute; and Shai Feldman, the Judy and Sidney Swartz Director's Chair of the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University.
All this underscores that intelligence about Iran is shrouded in uncertainty. It is difficult for commentators to fully grasp what the United States actually knows about Iran's capabilities-and how much of that information is actually correct. With such a deficiency in hard facts, any policy recommendations would be mere speculation. The panelists focused their analysis on the utility of military strikes, limiting personal commentary on their likelihood.
Cordesman offered his best view of the intelligence available so far, opening that he has "no doubt Iran is pursuing some form of nuclear-weapons program." He has no confidence in the contradictory nuclear and missile data Iran has released so far, but Iran's choice of enrichment methods casts doubt on the peaceful nature of its nuclear development. "The more you go into the detailed [IAEA] reporting, the more details you see that only make sense for nuclear-weapons programs", he said.
And much of the information the United States has remains classified, Cordesman noted. "If I knew anything, I wouldn't be here", Feldman quipped. Those with access keep quiet, and what they know probably isn't the whole story anyway.
Turning to action, Feldman noted there was no clear answer to the question of a military option. It depends wholly on the desired ends and current capabilities of the actors undertaking the strikes, the United States and Israel.
Feldman offered three potential goals of a military strike: 1) do enough damage to set the Iranian program back a few years, 2) destroy every site involved in nuclear development or 3) do all of the above while also destroying Iran's retaliatory capability-war with Iran, for all intents and purposes. Associated with each of these aims are various and specific intelligence requirements.
But all of this is hypothetical; intelligence is shoddy. And one "can't discuss this in the abstract", Feldman said.
Whatever the U.S. capabilities and designs, the panelists agreed that strikes would likely need to be sustainable, as the potential for escalation to Feldman's hypothetical number three-war-is foreseeable should Iran choose to strike back against even limited targeting of its nuclear sites.
But, as Cordesman noted, Iran's retaliatory options are limited by faults in its military and its fragile domestic economic base. Iran is in a poor position to strike back.