Editor’s Note: TNI has teamed up with Japan-ROK Working Group at the Pacific Forum CSIS in order to preview its upcoming report focused on improving bilateral relations through targeted engagement on a range of areas. The “Japan-ROK Series” will feature five timely articles summarizing these recommendations in fields such as cooperation on North Korea, missile defense, counterpiracy, energy security and inter-parliamentary ties. This is the first article in the series.
Given the complex strategic environment that South Korea and Japan face, with a belligerent, unstable North Korea and a stronger, more assertive China, foreign-policy elites in Seoul and Tokyo should be eager to move past divisive historical issues and build a more cooperative security relationship. However, the latest attempts at institutionalizing security cooperation—the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and the Military Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)—were put on hold in June 2012. Both sides were ready to sign the agreement, but former Korean President Lee Myung-bak encountered significant domestic opposition. Any future attempt to move toward a cooperative security relationship will likely be a political minefield, but leaders on both sides could improve their chances by narrowing the initial scope of cooperation and improving the message they sell to the public.
Even with lingering mistrust, there have been signs of an improving security relationship between Japan and Korea over the past decade. Following the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, the United States, Japan, and South Korea released a trilateral statement declaring that they would oppose North Korean provocations and work to enhance regional stability through coordination, consultation, solidarity, and partnership. And in a sign of further thawing relations, Japan and South Korea agreed, beginning in June 2012, to participate in annual trilateral naval exercises with the United States. Moreover, in August 2013, South Korea and Japan participated in a sixty-aircraft multinational training exercise that was described by Korea’s Yonhap News as “unprecedented for the U.S. allies.”
Moving beyond the current impasse would benefit Japan and Korea and potentially open the door for a formalized U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateral security relationship. The Japan-Korea GSOMIA was a relatively standard agreement, similar to intelligence sharing accords that South Korea has with twenty-four other countries. It proposed sharing classified information on threats and would have helped both sides to better assess North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles programs, Chinese military modernization, and other potential threats to regional stability. Japan and Korea would also benefit from an ACSA that would establish the framework for bilateral logistical cooperation for humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Such an agreement would likely be less controversial than intelligence sharing and would allow the two countries to more seamlessly respond to humanitarian emergencies in the Asia-Pacific.
But for Seoul, an emphasis on general strategic value is not sufficient. Korean historical memory of colonization and comfort women will not fade anytime soon, making any publicized effort to increase cooperation with Japan politically very risky. Given the respective family histories of Park Geun-Hye and Shinzo Abe, Park is especially prone to accusations of being soft on Japan, making resumption of GSOMIA talks a political gamble. In order to move toward a more robust security relationship with Tokyo, Seoul must highlight the concrete benefits of cooperation while deemphasizing historical grievances and the ongoing territorial dispute. By pursuing more narrow security cooperation and reframing the public narrative—emphasizing the North Korean threat and clearly articulating how cooperation with Japan would make the Korean people safer— Seoul could improve the chances of obtaining sufficient domestic support. At the same time, South Korea could work to pass ACSA by emphasizing the humanitarian importance of the agreement. Indeed, successful passage of the less controversial ACSA could pave the way for later passage of GSOMIA.
First, the Korean government should emphasize the strategic necessity of increased military exercises and information sharing with Japan. Rhetorically, the government should present GSOMIA and improved military cooperation as key elements of an effective North Korea deterrence strategy. Seoul must frame this as a strategic necessity, arguing that increasing interoperability and demonstrating a more united front would help deter North Korean provocations. Furthermore, any resumption of negotiations on an intelligence sharing agreement must be conducted in a very public and transparent way. Polling in 2012 showed that while 61 percent of Koreans were against the agreement, 44 percent saw it as necessary. In September 2013, 60 percent of Koreans believed GSOMIA was necessary.
Second, if Japan and Korea cannot find a way to make a bilateral information sharing agreement work, they should explore possibilities for a more robust trilateral arrangement with the United States. Under this framework, the three countries would set up procedures for exclusively trilateral data sharing, including some type of data fusion center. Given the recent expansion of trilateral cooperation and that the respective alliances with the United States are relatively popular in South Korea and Japan, such an arrangement would likely garner more popular support than a Tokyo-Seoul bilateral arrangement.
Third, the Korean government should make it clear that it is not seeking a formal alliance or defense treaty with Japan, nor is it even committing to collective defense. During the June 2012 domestic debate on GSOMIA, the message that the agreement had a limited scope was not emphasized enough. Publicly it was excoriated as a form of submission to Japan and even compared to Japan annexing the peninsula in 1910. For the time being, Seoul must push for public acceptance of Tokyo as a security partner, not as a friend.
Fourth, Japan and Korea should pursue an incremental approach. Instead of a full-scale intelligence cooperation agreement, they should instead work toward an agreement on one or two issues of mutual concern, picking off the low-hanging fruit before moving to more difficult issues. Trilateral and multilateral military exercises should be expanded beyond the limited number conducted predominantly in the naval sphere (as long as training is not carried out on the Korean Peninsula). The countries should focus on expanded naval drills, increased air force training, and Special Forces exercises. The Korean public seems to have paid relatively little attention to the military training drills with Japan over the past several years, making it a notable way to accelerate cooperation without significant domestic political impact.
Another area that the two countries should emphasize in a narrow agreement is missile defense. In Northeast Asia, missile defense is becoming an increasingly important part of the defense architecture. The United States is strengthening extended deterrence by enhancing and expanding its regional missile-defense capabilities, and both Tokyo and Seoul are developing and deploying capabilities of their own. While there is robust missile cooperation between the United States and, respectively, Japan and Korea, there has, unfortunately, been no progress in completing the triangle. Both Japan and South Korea are developing missile defense in order to counter the North Korean missile threat—either by introducing the possibility of operational failure or defeating a missile launched—but the challenge is enormous. Cooperation between the two countries could improve the capabilities of both. Most obviously, the two countries should begin to share real-time radar data, allowing both to have a better operational picture. Given the short flight time between North Korea and each country, early and accurate warning is essential. If initial data exchanges succeed, the two countries could move toward greater operational integration and perhaps make arrangements where Japanese missile defenses would shoot down missiles launched at Korea and vice versa.
Last December, 61 percent of Koreans wanted to see improved relations with Japan and 60 percent supported signing a GSOMIA. Bilateral tension has since increased after Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine, yet 50 percent of Koreans still support a Park-Abe summit and 51 percent are in favor of a GSOMIA. Tokyo and Seoul must acknowledge the reality of the situation and work to find ways to make security cooperation politically palatable. If they control the narrative and adopt a gradual approach, focusing on several key areas of likely to be the most publically acceptable, Korea and Japan should be able to build a mutually beneficial security relationship.
Ashley A.C. Hess is a nonresident James A. Kelly Korean Studies Fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS.
John K. Warden is a master’s candidate in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and the editor of the Georgetown Security Studies Review.