Against this disturbing backdrop, the question must be asked: If there were a complete breakdown of order and the Palestinian factions lost control of Ain el-Hilweh as they did in Yarmouk, how would the LAF and Hezbollah respond? This question is not merely theoretical. The historical animosity of many Lebanese toward the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon – seen by some as an alien population that saps resources and presents unnecessary security risks to the country – could foment a popular movement to take the camps through force of arms if things were to spiral out of control. Amal’s siege of Palestinian refugee camps during the War of the Camps demonstrates a historical precedent in this regard. The 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacre, in which a Lebanese Christian militia conducted the wholesale slaughter of innocent Palestinians in the Sabra neighborhood and adjacent Shatila Palestinian refugee camp, is also illuminating in that it illustrates the tenuous nature of life as a Palestinian refugee in Lebanon and the willingness of the Lebanese to turn their arms against this exposed populace.

Perhaps most revealing is the precedent established by the 2007 conflict between the LAF and Fatah al-Islam in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp. Fatah al-Islam is a Sunni Islamist group with ideological ties to al-Qaeda. After an arrest of one of their members in Tripoli, Fatah al-Islam militants carried out deadly reprisal attacks against the LAF and then retreated into the Nahr al-Bared camp. What followed was an intense 105 day siege of the camp and a ground and air campaign waged by the LAF to oust the militants from their positions within Nahr al-Bared. After months of heavy fighting, Lebanon declared victory. Forty-seven Palestinian civilians were killed in the conflict. Interestingly, while the LAF had no issue with entering the camp in violation of the “defunct” Cairo Agreement, Hezbollah all the while called for a political solution. Hassan Nasrallah did not mince words when he stated: “The Nahr el-Bared camp and Palestinian civilians are a red line. We will not accept or provide cover or be partners in this.”

Hezbollah’s restraint during the Nahr al-Bared conflict, in combination with its pro-Palestinian position during the War of the Camps and its current status as the “resistance” against Israel – a pro-Palestinian role that provides the organization with legitimacy as an armed militia within Lebanon – supports the view that it would not directly involve itself in a military incursion into the camps. Moreover, Hezbollah is losing popularity in an increasingly destabilized Lebanon, and is stretched thin as it takes heavy losses in Syria while simultaneously being pounded by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Finally, Hezbollah’s role as a mediator between Syria and the Palestinian factions at Yarmouk shows that it is has no desire to be seen as a party to the siege, but rather as the party that brought about reconciliation and an end to the siege. Hezbollah’s logic in Yarmouk would be just as, if not more, successful were the LAF to enter the camps with its weapons drawn. While Hezbollah has a vital interest in stemming the tide of Sunni jihadists flowing into Lebanon, it is likely Hezbollah would prefer the role of arbiter and symbol of rapprochement in a scenario in which the camps were overrun.

Having said that, Hezbollah’s relationship with influential Palestinian factions such as Hamas is at an all-time low considering their antithetical views on the fate of Syria. In fact, Hezbollah’s heavy casualties in the Battle of Qusayr in May 2013 may have been due to Hamas’ logistical and operational support of the Syrian rebels during that bloody skirmish. The tension between Hezbollah and the Palestinian refugees of Ain el-Hilweh in particular is exemplified by the burning of humanitarian aid provided by Hezbollah to the camp’s residents in May 2013. Notwithstanding this tension and Hezbollah’s rift with Hamas over the former’s existential fight in Syria, it seems unlikely that Hezbollah would take part in any military action that would put innocent Palestinian lives at risk within the camps of Lebanon.

By contrast, the 2007 siege of Nahr al-Bared shows the LAF’s willingness to confront Palestinian camps within Lebanon should they be overrun by extremists presenting a threat to Lebanese national security. Its military capacity now bolstered by billions of dollars in external funding from Europe and Saudi Arabia, the LAF will be better equipped in the near future to tackle a crisis in the camps without resorting to antiquated siege tactics that would invariably harm the civilian Palestinian population, tactics like those now being used by the depleted Syrian army in Yarmouk.

Should a true crisis emerge in the camps, or a mass-casualty event be traced back to a camp such as Ain el-Hilweh, no last-minute patchwork memorandum-of-understanding between the Palestinian factions, the Shi’a organizations, and least of all the LAF, will preserve Palestinian sovereignty in the camps. Hezbollah will likely only play a background role in terms of its involvement in the official Lebanese response. In such a scenario, it will be up to the LAF to assert itself as the singular army of Lebanon, a modern and moral military capable of achieving its objectives in accordance with internationally accepted principles regarding the laws of war. In a conflict in which one side purposely hides, recruits, and operates in densely populated refugee camps where resources are scarce, the LAF’s task will be no less than herculean. Just this past weekend, as aid resumed in besieged Yarmouk, up to nine people were killed when an aid distribution center was hit by Syrian artillery, a dismal reminder that if and when the LAF does act, it must do so in coordination with international humanitarian aid groups such as the International Red Cross and UNRWA. Let us hope for the innocents of Ain el-Hilweh that the LAF is up to the challenge.

Nicholas Saidel, JD, MA, is the Associate Director of the Institute for Strategic Threat Analysis & Response (ISTAR) at the University of Pennsylvania.

Image: Wikimedia Commons/Lannie Naas. CC BY-SA 2.0.