At a time when the need for solid analysis of developments in the Middle East has become crucial, it has paradoxically become easier to publish far-fetched and puzzling reports masqueraded as thoughtful insights generously shared with the American public by the "experts." Antony Sullivan's "Levantine Labyrinths" is a prime example of such a trend.

Sullivan's reporting, which likely relies on informal conversations in Beirut's cafes and salons, is based on repeated references to mysterious "numerous reports", or "many in the region believe", or "it is reported that", or "commentators in the Middle East." For example, one would think that Sullivan could have provided a reference to one of the mentioned "numerous reports" of thousands of Sunnis converting to Shi‘i Islam. A quick internet search found little to support such a sweeping statement. Worse, Sullivan provides no evidence that this trend is taking place in Lebanon, which is the subject of his essay.

On a more serious note, Sullivan reports, but provides no evidence, that Hizballah is paying "full-time demonstrators in Beirut's central Martyr's Square $100 daily, in addition to offering them meals and soft drinks." This amounts to over $2,000 a month, assuming a five-day work week. This is in a country experiencing "economic depression", as he writes in later paragraphs. What he does not report is that the numbers of demonstrators has dwindled to a trickle, even though unemployment is high, and the Lebanese per-capita income figures, according to the World Bank, amount to $3,990 a year, or $332 a month.¹ If Hizballah really is offering so much money, why have so few remained?

Sullivan proceeds to report on Hizballah's suicide bombers-one thousand of them-and adds: "Among these potential bombers, interestingly, are a number of females." His source: "reports have been circulating in Beirut . . ." Sullivan fails to mention the fact that the last time Hizballah used suicide bombers was in the 1980s, and they were used against the Israeli military in south Lebanon, not Lebanese civilians.

Sullivan then implicates Iran in targeting the "pro-American March 14 coalition for assassination", something that even the United Nations and its team of experts, which have been in Lebanon since 2005 to investigate the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, have yet to do. In a further display of analytical muddle, Sullivan presents the following facts: Iran and Hizballah are recruiting and training suicide bombers, including women. He then references "one observer" and his insight that "In Lebanon, it is easy for pretty women to enter the social circles of politicians and to ‘befriend' their intended targets before killing them with poison, or guns with silencers." Sullivan helpfully warns us that these "Potential female suicide bombers are reported to be circulating" in Beirut's trendy clubs, and that Lebanese politicians have been advised to stay clear of such areas, what with their habit of befriending strange women at bars and nightclubs. But Sullivan never explains why trained female suicide bombers are being sent on what really amounts to targeted assassination missions that require the use of poison and guns, not the willingness to strap explosives around one's body to detonate in a crowded area.

Sullivan concludes his paragraph on female suicide bombers turned femmes fatales by gushing that, "All of this might remind one of the memorable hotel-bar seduction scene in the movie Munich." No, this reminds me of the general poverty of political analysis when it relates to the Arab world.

Sullivan's other gaffes are too many to fully examine, but I will address the following:

First, according to Sullivan, Hizballah and the Maronites are both "distressed" by the growing presence of Sunni fundamentalist groups in Lebanon. Sullivan sees in this "a possibility for Maronite-Hizballah cooperation and a potential opening for the United States." Recent events in Lebanon have shown otherwise: In response to attacks by the fundamentalist Fatah al-Islam, the United States chose to support the Sunni prime minister, who is backed by the Maronite-led, but multi-sectarian, Lebanese military. Hizballah, meanwhile, has been sidelined and left to utter unheeded warnings to the Lebanese government not to enter Palestinian camps to root out Fatah al-Islam. Hizballah's principal Maronite ally, Michel Aoun, leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, the largest Christian party in the Lebanese parliament, has fully supported the Lebanese army.

Second, Sullivan claims that Syria has become "emboldened, having returned as a Lebanese kingmaker." He adds that for this and other reasons, "it is surely in the U.S. national interest to open a direct dialogue with Syria, as recommended in the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group Report." But if Syria is kingmaker in Lebanon, what evidence does he have to prove it? The anti-Syrian Lebanese prime minister is still in office and has proven more tenacious than many believed. The pro-Syrian Lebanese president, Emile Lahoud, even according to Sullivan's implausible sources, "is currently under intense pressure from his children to quit office and retire in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia." Regardless, Lahoud's term ends in September. Finally, the last major pro-Syrian politician holding office is Nabih Berry, the speaker of parliament. But he has been reduced to refusing to call parliament to session for fear that its anti-Syrian majority would ratify the UN tribunal on Hariri's assassination. So much for Syrian kingmakers. 

And finally, while Sullivan advises direct dialogue with Syria, he fails to provide tangible policy recommendations to the U.S. government. Syria's influence in the region is chiefly reflected in its ability to create or fuel conflict, not resolve it. Syria has been unable or unwilling to seal its borders with Iraq, cease its weapons shipments to Hizballah in Lebanon, cooperate with the UN investigation into Hariri's murder, prevent the infiltration of groups like Fatah al-Islam from its territory into Lebanon, or influence Hamas to make a meaningful gesture to the Arab-Israeli peace process. The only time Syria had a role in bringing peace was when it imposed Pax Syriana on Lebanon, ending a conflict that raged from 1975 to 1990. What "experts" rarely mention, however, was that Syria had a major hand in fueling the conflict for so long, assassinating Lebanese leaders of all sects (too many to list here), and even scuttling conflict resolution efforts that did not suit its interests. Its takeover of Lebanon in 1990 was the result of the senior President Bush's perceived need for Syria as an Arab ally in the Gulf War-James Baker was then his secretary of state; the collapse of the Soviet Union, Syria's main benefactor, which pushed the latter temporarily closer to America's orbit; and Lebanese exhaustion and fear of further Syrian ruthlessness. But the result of Pax Syriana in Lebanon ultimately culminated in 2005 in an unprecedented Lebanese show of unity, following Hariri's brutal murder, supported by international demands for Syria's withdrawal. Predictably, Syria is destabilizing Lebanon through continued assassinations and the use of fundamentalist groups that it manipulates at will. But the vast majority of Lebanese who continue to oppose Syrian influence in their country, at the risk of their lives, have decided that such brutal tactics should not be rewarded and that a newly revived Lebanese democracy must be preserved. What would Sullivan, and those who hold his views in the United States, say to them? Negotiations with Syria must not come at the expense of democratic-though weak-Lebanon.

The problem with articles like Sullivan's is not the views they present, but their lack of credibility. American foreign policy practitioners need serious analysis, not a regurgitation of coffee-house gossip from Beriut.

Pierre Habshi is an international development consultant based in Washington, DC.  

¹ The World Bank, World Development Indicators (2004). Click here.