One problem that Western negotiators face is that partition of Kosovo in exchange for potential UN membership for a rump Kosovo state is not a marketable proposition in Pristina. Nor can Serbia expect the West this time to pressure the weaker party—Kosovo—to accept terms that fall short of its minimal requirements. The challenge will be to determine whether there is sufficient flexibility in the Serbian position to make negotiations worth pursuing and enough for Serbia in the deal to shield the government from predictably violent criticism by opposition hardliners.

This is not to suggest that both parties have nothing to gain from an agreement. The Tadic government believes that it has little to fear from negotiations that could facilitate Kosovo’s partition, ease its entry into the EU, and rid the international community of a burden in northern Kosovo. Nor do talks present the Kosovars with solely lose-lose options. Most Kosovars prefer that their borders remain as they are, even if they don’t control them, to avoid dealing with the implications of changing them. But many would not likely mind shedding the 40,000 Serbs living north of the Ibar River, and welcome the opportunity to recover some of the ethnic Albanians living in Serbia’s Presevo Valley along Kosovo’s eastern border, that is a territorial swap. If done voluntarily and packaged as part of a normalization process with Serbia, many Kosovars might well see such a swap, whatever Western concerns of its ethnic nature, as a strengthening of their independent state rather than a betrayal by the West, but it would be controversial. All the main Kosovo Albanian political parties are on record opposing a swap. The West would also fear that Serbs in the “enclaves” further south would also flee to Serbia. Despite the controversy, a territorial swap may be the only circumstance in which loss of the north might be palatable to Pristina and thus provide the foundation for an agreement. It has often been suggested over the years since 1999, and just as often rejected by Belgrade, although there have been from time to time a few hints that it might now be conceivable. Belgrade apparently still believes that it can recover the North without any territorial swap.

Western governments will have to ask themselves what can be realistically achieved in any negotiations. After all, the promise of EU accession seems increasingly far off, and the U.S. has a pretty full plate. Political miscalculations are more the rule than the exception in the Balkans, and there is considerable risk that even sober-minded and experienced diplomats could launch a process that blows up in their faces. Even with two unfinished wars and troubles with Iran requiring continuing high-level attention, these are portentous matters for Washington to consider.

We believe that the essential prerequisite for a Serbia-Kosovo negotiating process that does not lead to regional instability is an understanding between the U.S. and the allies on a deal that fits within the following parameters:

1. Acceptance of the Helsinki principle that border changes between states cannot be imposed but are acceptable if mutually agreed. This would preempt any temptation to impose partition on Kosovo just to pacify Belgrade but leave the door open for a territorial swap should both parties conclude it meets their needs and helps stabilize relations.
2. Agreement by Serbia to allow Kosovo into the United Nation and willingness by Kosovo to accommodate Serbian insistence that it not be required to establish diplomatic relations with Kosovo presently as a reality of Serbian politics.
3. Commitment by NATO to bring Kosovo into the alliance after any negotiated settlement with Serbia. This would help authorities there resist irredentist tendencies.
4. Reinforcement of Macedonia’s security as an insurance policy against unexpected blowback from talks. This means a total Western effort to broker a settlement of the name issue with Greece and moving Macedonia quickly into NATO.
5. A unified, clear warning to Republik Srpska Prime Minister Milorad Dodik that secession from Bosnia is totally unacceptable, lest he escalate his efforts to weaken and undermine the Bosnian government into a full-fledged initiative to separate from the country and join Serbia.
6. Maintenance of Western military forces at some level in Kosovo until there is a better resolution of relations between Serbia and Kosovo.
7. An end date for Western political control of Kosovo. Whether talks produce anything or not, 2012 should be the end of the agreement for EULEX. Provision should be made for extensive technical and economic assistance to the Kosovo government.

If informal exploratory talks at an appropriate time with the Serbs and Kosovars reveal that a deal is not likely achievable, the West should halt the process before launching formal negotiations that raise expectations and do potential damage to regional stability.

If the Serbs indicate that they are not in fact interested in a deal the West should do what it has never been prepared to do: take control of the Serbian-ruled northern region of Kosovo. Belgrade should understand that failure to reach a deal means that they will lose whatever chance they may have in negotiations to recover the north, with the West then integrating northern Kosovo slowly but firmly into Pristina’s governing authority despite likely violent Serb resistance. Indeed we believe such a move should take place before negotiations begin—by arresting leaders of the Serb politico-criminal gangs that control the north—to make clear the West’s concern for partition, but we recognize it is highly unlikely that the US and its allies are either inclined or able to agree to make such a move now or later. That is unfortunate.

We are not unalloyed admirers of current Western policy toward the Balkans and do not take anything for granted about what the West does there. An unsettled Kosovo can create problems for the whole area. Resolution may not be at hand and the issue may remain a frozen conflict. Indeed there might not be any substantive negotiations. But a resolution would help strengthen all four troubled states of the former Yugoslavia and the ICJ opinion may offer such an opportunity. The West should also use any initiative on the Kosovo issue to make Bosnia a more effective state and to help enhance Albanian integration in Macedonia and persist in trying to resolve that country’s name issue.

 

Morton Abramowitz is a senior fellow at The Century Foundation. James Hooper is a managing director of the Public International Law & Policy Group.