Editor's Note : This piece was orignally published in January 2014 and is being recircualted due to popular request.
After reading Robert Farley’s December 2013 Foreign Affairs article, calling for the elimination of an independent Air Force, George Fielding Eliot’s October 1941 Foreign Affairs article, opposing the creation of an independent air force, came to mind. If the old saying, “imitation is the highest form of flattery,” is true, Eliot would find Farley’s recent article awfully flattering. What distinguishes Eliot from Farley is not that they differ in their arguments—they are virtually the same. But, Eliot did not have sixty-five years of experience to draw from.
While Farley’s critique of the Air Force is riddled with factual errors, missing context, and no distinguishable understanding of airpower, he does posit a notion that may appeal to budget hawks. To their credit, Robert Spalding and Michael Bob Starr have already discredited Farley, highlighting the glaring flaws in his work. However, in concentrating on specific factual inaccuracies, neither had the space to focus on a broader explanation of airpower and the larger purpose of an independent Air Force.
There is a mistaken belief that the Air Force gained independence because a small band of airpower advocates effectively harangued and deceived the Army leadership and Harry Truman into creating the US Air Force. In reality, the Air Force gained independence because the Army Air Forces demonstrated the need and ability to alter the outcome of conflict through the air domain.
The story of the first army and the first navy was certainly similar. Had men been born with wings, air forces would have come first, but as surface bound creatures, we began fighting on land before we developed the warship and eventually the airplane. If and when countries begin putting weapons in space, we will likely see the creation of a United State Space Force—just as we may soon see the creation of an independent cyber force.
In short, each domain (space, cyber, air, sea, and land) provides those who operate within them a unique perspective on warfare that is rarely understood by those operating in another domain. As an academic enchanted with the Navy, Farley should understand this since it was eloquently discussed by Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie more than forty years ago. Contrary to Farley, the Army Air Forces clearly demonstrated their ability to shape conflict during World War II. Thus, the creation of an independent air force was little different than the creation of an independent army or navy.
Ends, Ways, and Means
In offering a parochial critique of the Air Force, Farley fails to examine warfare from the perspective of a campaign planner, which is far more useful when discussing the role of each service in war. Prior to laying out a campaign plan, it is important to answer three questions; what are the objectives (ends) of the campaign; how (ways) will those objectives be achieved; and, what (means) tools are needed to achieve them?
It is the president who is largely responsible for answering the first question, with airmen, soldiers, sailors, and marines answering the latter two. While the joint force commander is responsible for the overall campaign plan, airmen are largely responsible for the air and space domains; soldiers the land domain; sailors the sea domain; marines the intersection of land and sea; and all services the joint cyber domain. Thus, each service offers a unique perspective on how best to address questions two and three.
Contrary to Farley’s assertion—an independent air force leads to more inter-service rivalry, therefore get rid of it—the vigorous debate that often occurs when the services present alternative courses of action and approaches to conflict is a good thing. As the old proverb says, iron sharpens iron. What would be far more detrimental for the nation is for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to always speak with one voice. Competition of ideas and approaches leads to innovation in the Pentagon, just as it does in the private sector.
A recent example comes to mind. In the fall of 2009, President Obama was approached by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates with a request for large troop increases in Afghanistan as part of the then-ISAF commander, General Stanley McCrystal’s new strategy. The President was unhappy with the strategy. Rather than offering alternative options, as President Obama sought, the services rallied behind the McCrystal plan. The President only reluctantly accepted his sole option—scaled down.
In this case, an incorrect understanding of “jointness” by the services was the problem. Joint does not mean going along to get along. It means articulating the virtues of operations in each domain and each service’s ability to operate in their respective domain. The nation should no more expect the respective service chiefs to walk in lock step than it should expect the nation’s college professors to do the same.