Aftermath: Preparing for a Post-ISIS Middle East

April 24, 2015 Topic: Security Region: Middle East Tags: ISIS

Aftermath: Preparing for a Post-ISIS Middle East

Age-old rivalries will resurge. Is America prepared to mediate them?

There are no easy answers here, but to start, American policy makers should try to mitigate their predicament by decreasing the coalition’s dependence on Iran. By stressing the danger posed by Tehran’s extensive militia network, Washington should be able to secure a more serious commitment against ISIS from Arab allies, who have shown their willingness recently to commit men and material when faced with a perceived Iranian threat. That backing should be matched with increased American support to Iraq’s central government, which is straining uneasily under Iran’s influence and would appreciate the added independence offered by having alternative options on the table. Prime Minister al-Abadi is asking the United States for help; he should get it, conditional on decreasing his country’s reliance on its eastern neighbor. Ongoing attempts to sideline the Shia militias in the campaign to retake the Anbar province are a step in the right direction.

In terms of its effect on the balance-of-power quandary, President Obama’s deal with Iran has come at a bad time and may need to be modified. True, it aims to scuttle Tehran’s nuclear ambitions—a key part of any American balancing strategy. But the deal has also raised the prospect of an Iranian-American rapprochement that accentuates the security dilemma faced by Arab allies (not to mention Israel). Therefore, President Obama must offset the security dangers posed by an Iran deal with conventional support to American allies throughout the Middle East. He must also try to condition the deal on limits to Iran’s regional adventurism. After all, a nuclear deal matters only insofar as it can contain Iran’s expansionist activities, and if Tehran can win regional primacy by conventional means at the cost of eschewing its nuclear ambitions, then the United States has failed to meet its objectives and might, instead, have laid the groundwork for regional conflict.

Allies of Convenience

This is not the first time in history that a common threat has united erstwhile enemies—think of World War II, with the Soviet Union and the West waging war against Nazi Germany, and Mao’s Communists and Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists battling together against Imperial Japan. But these examples underscore the danger: once the common enemy faded from view, allies of convenience became bitter enemies once again.

This risk is readily apparent to many, and that gives Washington some additional leverage. Kirkuk’s Kurdish governor, Najmiddin Karim, has commented that Iraq needs visionary leadership to avoid a sectarian collapse. “If it’s amicable and everyone agrees, that’s fine,” he warned. “But I think it’s going to be very dirty.” President Obama must demonstrate that visionary leadership now, when a stable balance of power is still possible.

Sean Mirski is a third-year student at Harvard Law School, where he is Supreme Court Chair of the Harvard Law Review.