A better approach would involve rediscovering strategic MacGyverism. The United States should dramatically raise the costs of a Chinese invasion by using tools it has now, or can quickly access, rather than banking on big tech breakthroughs that may not happen until it is too late.

This approach would entail prepositioning missile launchers, armed drones, and sensors at sea and on allied territory near the Taiwan Strait. Instead of waiting for the invasion to start and then surging vulnerable aircraft carriers into the region, the Pentagon could use what is, in essence, a high-tech minefield to decimate China’s invasion forces as they load in mainland ports or putter across the Taiwan Strait. These diffuse networks of loitering munitions would be difficult for China to eliminate without starting a region-wide war. They would not require large crews, logistics tails, or the procurement of fancy platforms. 

Instead, they could be installed on virtually anything that floats or flies, including legacy platforms and repurposed cargo ships, barges, and aircraft. This approach would rapidly shore up the local military balance and capitalize on a fundamental asymmetry in war aims between the United States and China. Whereas China needs to seize control of Taiwan and its surrounding waters to win the war, the United States just needs to deny Chinese forces that control, a mission that modern missiles and drones are well suited to perform—particularly when a large body of water separates the attacker from the defender. If the United States needs to forego some long-term, big-ticket projects to dramatically increase its inventory of loitering cruise missiles, lethal drones, smart mines, and satellites and sensors, then that’s a trade worth making.

Powerful domestic players might resist this approach. The Navy wants big warships, not missile barges; the Air Force favors manned aircraft, not drones; defense contractors want to build expensive carriers, not cheap munitions. But there are some encouraging signs. 

The U.S. Army is adapting its ground-based fires to sink ships in the Western Pacific. The Marine Corps is undertaking its most sweeping transformation in a generation, pivoting from fighting insurgents in the Middle East to developing the ability to hop from island to island and clobber the Chinese fleet. Defense experts across the political spectrum have endorsed a strategy that floods maritime East Asia with sensors and shooters and disperses and hardens U.S. bases there. The Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy prioritizes preparations for high-intensity war with China, and getting tough with Beijing—now, not later—is one of America’s few bipartisan initiatives.

Admittedly, Biden’s defense plans remain hazy at this point. But the new team has bought into MacGyverism in other areas of the U.S.-China rivalry.

Confronted with the fact that America had been missing in action in the world’s most important soft-power fight—the race to deliver coronavirus vaccines to the developing world—the administration turned to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Although the Quad’s original purpose was to regulate maritime security, it will now combine U.S. biotechnology, Indian production, Japanese financing, and Australian logistics to provide one billion doses of vaccine to Southeast Asia.  Meanwhile, there are rumblings about an initiative to repurpose the Group of 7—a democratic forum focused on macroeconomic issues—as a tech coalition to deal with the pressing challenge of Chinese hegemony in the world’s telecommunications networks. That’s the sort of dexterity the United States needs.

New administrations often take months to methodically review policies and lay out long-term plans. That approach makes sense for a “superpower marathon” that won’t be settled for decades. But the pivotal phase of U.S.-China competition is arriving now. America needs a farsighted strategy to stay ahead of China throughout this century, but first needs to avoid losing crucial battles this decade. 

Fortunately, the United States has the power and the historical precedent to turn things around. In the early-1980s, at the climax of the Cold War, Americans relied on a B-list actor to blunt a surge of Soviet aggression and carry the United States to victory. Now as a second cold war heats up, the United States should look to another subpar celebrity for guidance. The MacGyver Doctrine is ugly and uninspiring, the geopolitical equivalent of duct tape. But it is fast, effective, and quintessentially American.   

Michael Beckley is Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University, Jeane Kirkpatrick Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and the author of Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower. 

Hal Brands is the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins-SAIS, a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and a Bloomberg Opinion Columnist.  

Image: Reuters