As Syrian opposition forces, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), establish a transitional government, the implications of the fall of Bashar al-Assad extend far beyond Syria. There, Russian president Vladimir Putin has made a series of strategic miscalculations that will undermine Russia’s influence, not just in the Middle East but also across Africa.

The first miscalculation Putin made was eliminating Yevgeny Prigozhin, the previous head of the paramilitary Wagner Group and the architect behind the security infrastructure that enabled Russian mercenaries to operate effectively in Syria. While he had little choice but to rid himself of the unsuccessful coup plotter, Putin lost not only a valuable tool for military operations but also an essential intelligence-gathering asset. Prigozhin was the mastermind behind the Kremlin’s disinformation campaigns in the Middle East and the Sahel, which were critical in shaping Russia’s influence across these regions. He also devised financial schemes to help Russia evade sanctions. In April 2022, it was reported that Prigozhin orchestrated two loans to the Assad regime totaling $1 billion for supplies, benefiting oligarchs sanctioned by the United States and the EU.

Since 2023, Putin has attempted to safeguard Russia’s foothold in Syria, but his efforts have manifestly failed. The ecosystem Prigozhin built and sustained in Syria proved challenging to replicate. It has been reported that the profitability of oil and gas holdings plummeted once the Russian Ministry of Defense took over Wagner’s operations. Moreover, they failed to anticipate the repercussions of Israel’s operations against Iranian targets. Given Russia’s reliance on Iran to sustain its activities in Syria after over a decade of collaboration and coordination to sustain the Assad regime, this oversight has significantly undercut Moscow’s strategic posture in the region.

Putin’s second strategic mistake was turning Syria into the centerpiece of Russia’s regional logistics operations. While this reliance may have arisen out of necessity, it has exposed critical vulnerabilities. Russia depends heavily on Syrian military bases to facilitate its arms trafficking, gold smuggling, and the illicit operations of its mercenaries. Notably, a CNN investigation revealed that a military aircraft conducted at least sixteen gold-smuggling flights from Sudan to Latakia—a Syrian port city hosting a Russian military base—serving as a financial lifeline for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Under Bashar al-Assad’s rule, Syria has transformed into a full-fledged narcostate, flooding the Middle East with Captagon—a highly addictive drug responsible for countless deaths. By anchoring its regional strategy to a deeply compromised state, Russia has aligned itself with a regime defined by corruption, inefficiency, and a perilous reliance on illicit economies. Gulf nations—central to Moscow’s diplomatic outreach amid escalating Western sanctions—have made normalization with Assad contingent on his efforts to dismantle Syria’s role in drug trafficking, a condition his regime has failed to meet. This shortcoming not only exposes Damascus’s resistance to reform but also emphasizes the risky nature of Russia’s partnership with a fragile and failing state. 

Third, the most staggering and critical strategic mistake Putin has made, particularly after invading Ukraine, is underestimating Turkey’s posture and its capacity to respond decisively to threats against its national security interests. Ankara has demonstrated a remarkable ability to organize, mobilize, and counteract actors that challenge its strategic priorities, both within the region and beyond.

By underestimating Ankara’s resolve in coercing Assad to reach a deal that includes dealing with the Syrian opposition and welcoming back refugees, Russia has miscalculated the balance of power in Syria and the broader region. It was, in fact, only a matter of time before Turkey confronted Assad’s regime. As Turkish foreign minister Hakan Fidan declared on December 2: “At the point we have reached, the reason for widespread clashes starting again in Syria is that interlinked problems have not been resolved for more than 13 years.” This oversight has not only complicated Russia’s operations but also allowed Turkey to assert itself as a dominant regional player, further eroding Moscow’s influence.

While it is impossible to know Putin’s exact thoughts, he likely miscalculated by viewing Syria as a frozen conflict. He believed time would improve the situation, that the United States would gradually accept a degree of normalization with Assad, and that this would shift the game in his favor. He was wrong.

Finally, a glaring flaw in Putin’s strategy lies in his inability to address the risks that accompany his strategic gains. While he has adeptly capitalized on opportunities—such as securing a foothold in Syria, expanding Russia’s air defense network through an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) zone in the Eastern Mediterranean, and gaining a strategic position to pressure NATO’s southern flank—he has neglected to mitigate the inherent vulnerabilities tied to these accomplishments.

Foremost among these risks is Russia’s overreliance on Iran. Though Tehran serves as a pragmatic partner in countering U.S. influence, destabilizing U.S. allies, and pressuring states not to normalize relations with Israel, it is an inherently weak regime. Indeed, Israel has demonstrated exceptional resolve, capability, and consistency in targeting Iran’s proxies, particularly Hezbollah. Russia has depended heavily on Iran’s proxies, such as Hezbollah, to continue its operations. By systematically assaulting these proxies, Israel indirectly exposed the fragility of Putin’s dependence on Tehran.

The fallout from these miscalculations is unmistakable. Russia’s years-long effort to position itself as an alternative security guarantor has unraveled in just a matter of days. Viral videos showing anti-Assad rebels swiftly capturing cities, villages, and military bases have shattered Moscow’s carefully cultivated image. Putin can no longer tout his role in “saving” Assad from the Syrian Civil War—a narrative he has often used to bolster Russia’s influence abroad. Once a key asset in Russia’s efforts to woo military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, Russia’s image as a protector of global authoritarians has lost much of its credibility.

Considering the significant investments Russia has poured into Syria, Putin faces a critical crossroads. Unless he seeks a compromise with Syrian rebels and the opposition to secure Russia’s foothold, the strategic ambition of pressuring NATO on both its eastern and southern flanks risks slipping through his fingers.

More importantly, Syria is not the only country where Turkey has direct national interests and where both Russia and Iran have been meddling. Libya, where Russia has established multiple military bases to support Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA) in the country’s civil war, could also fall from Putin’s grasp. As the legitimate Libyan government begins to sense that Russia is increasingly unable to sustain its mercenaries or back its factions effectively, Moscow’s influence in Libya could swiftly diminish.

Israel’s decisive strikes against Iran’s proxies have triggered a domino effect, which Turkey has adeptly leveraged to destabilize the Russian-Iranian alliance in Syria, further threatening Russia’s regional foothold.

As Ukraine continues to resist Putin’s onslaught, the United States stands at a pivotal juncture. This moment offers a unique opportunity to bolster U.S. deterrence, not only in the Middle East but also in the Sahel, where regional stability is increasingly at stake.

Forging strategic cooperation with Turkey in Syria and Libya could prove transformative. Such a partnership would yield mutual benefits by further weakening the Iran-Russia security axis and realigning the regional balance of power. Moreover, it would position the United States and its allies to play a decisive role in shaping the future of a democratic post-Assad Syria.

Additionally, it would enable the United States to regain a strong posture in North Africa and the Sahel, countering the influence Russia has invested significant time and resources in cultivating. By acting decisively, the United States can reclaim leadership in these critical regions and safeguard its long-term strategic interests. It’s now or never.

Zineb Riboua is the Research Fellow and Program Manager at the Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East at the Hudson Institute. Follow her on X: @zriboua.

Image: Orlok / Shutterstock.com.