President Donald Trump announced his energy strategy for the United States on June 30, breaking from previous administrations’ calls for “energy dependence” with a message of a new U.S. “energy dominance.” Among the objectives of the Trump agenda appears to be an attempt to deregulate energy markets where possible to free up resources for both domestic consumption and large-scale exports. While Trump’s policy on energy may not, in fact, differ much from that of President Obama, its messaging is clearly more celebratory of the natural gas and oil production surge brought about by the shale boom.
Europe, however, continues to contend with critical supply questions. Russian Gazprom’s ongoing position as the major supplier of natural gas to part of Europe has drawn considerable concern from EU policy makers. Diversification of natural gas supplies has been one of the aims of EU energy policy, even though it is debatable whether that means swapping one dominant supplier for another.
Given that the goals of Washington and Brussels could provide mutual benefits, it is worth examining how an “energy dominant” U.S. policy could fit into Europe’s desire for diversified natural gas supply.
EU Natural Gas Market Liberalization and Supply Diversification—an Inconvenient Truth
Inspired by the experience of the United States natural gas deregulation in the 1980s, European countries started liberalizing regulated energy markets in the 1990s. For Europe, the takeaway was that companies are best equipped to make investment decisions, facilitate consumer choice, and deliver products and services at competitive prices. Price should be the key driver of investment decisions.
Over the past decade, Europe has suffered a couple of major gas-supply disruptions following commercial disputes between Russian and Ukrainian companies. While Russia was—and remains—the lowest-cost supplier of gas to Europe, the interruptions revitalized concerns about dependence on natural gas from Russia, in particular in countries in Central and Eastern Europe (who had just joined the EU). It also raised alarms in Washington, where concerns about Europe’s dependence on Soviet natural gas date back to the early 1980s, where is when they were largely ignored.
Europe’s strategy to deal with gas-supply risk rests on a number of key pillars, i.e. market integration, strengthening the legislative and regulatory framework, and supporting market functioning and supply diversification. Even though it remains a work in progress, this strategy has clearly provided substantial benefits to Europe. By better interconnecting national markets, facilitating the free flow of gas across borders, investing in additional infrastructure to create access to various sources of supply, streamlining national regulatory regimes, and creating and strengthening a European regulatory authority, Europe has become a resilient and, largely, a more liquid gas market. With over four hundred million consumers, it is a market that attracts competitive companies, and those who do not play by the rules end up in court, as Russian state-owned Gazprom has discovered on multiple occasions.
However, not all has worked out as hoped. One of aforementioned key pillars, that Europe would become some sort of playground where dozens of suppliers would compete for clients, akin to the United States, has not materialized. Instead, EU gas demand is still catered by domestic supplies and supplemented by a couple of major external suppliers, most notably Russian Gazprom, but also Algerian Sonatrach and Norwegian Statoil. This expectation was never realistic, given the liberalized market structure. Price dictates the preferred suppliers and the most competitive suppliers, hence, feature prominently. With dwindling domestic production—especially after the Dutch decision to scale down production following a series of earthquakes and public opposition—this trend will likely be reinforced in the coming years.
These trends have put some European policymakers in an awkward position given Russia’s forays into Ukraine and other external activities over the past three years. However, despite that growing wedge between the EU and Russia at the political level, and regardless of how many policy memorandums and research notes call for supply diversification, these will not change the actual flow of natural gas. All realistic scenarios for the EU’s future gas supply include significant volumes of Russian gas. Despite the security concerns, the Russian price is just too competitive for the conceivable future, and a substantial share of demand continues to be tied up in long-term contracts.
U.S. Natural Gas Goes Global
So, what does this reality mean to the energy goals of the Trump administration, specifically the goal of exporting more U.S. supply to overseas markets? First of all, it is worth remembering that it was not always well advertised, but the U.S. natural gas sector flourished under President Obama. Domestic production skyrocketed, two dozen LNG export licenses were approved by the Department of Energy, permitting processes were streamlined, and the clear majority of proposed transmission pipeline projects were approved and constructed. In 2016, for the first time in decades, natural gas was exported in the form of LNG again. At the same time, shipments of gas by pipeline to Mexico skyrocketed. In the coming years several additional export projects will come to market, turning the United States into one of the world’s global LNG players. While the current administration could try to take credit for these additions, effectively it had no influence on them. But there are issues that go far beyond which administration takes credit for the boom in natural gas production. As the first eighteen months of Sabine Pass—the first LNG project to ship gas from the lower forty-eight states—have shown, U.S. cargoes of natural gas can end up anywhere in the world where the right price is paid. At the moment, however, given the current price environment, there are some questions about the competitiveness of U.S. LNG overseas.