Notwithstanding the U.S.-Iranian rift over the Obama’s administration refusal to grant Iran’s New Permanent Representative to the United Nation in New York a visa due to his role as translator during the 1979-1981 U.S. Embassy hostage crisis, the Iranian government is meeting the demands forwarded in the Joint Plan of Action. The IAEA reported in its April 17 report that Iran remains committed to the timetable and conditions set out in the plan and that Iran had diluted 75 percent of its stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium. In exchange, the U.S. Treasury has released $ 450 million of frozen Iranian funds. As the Obama administration (with the unprecedented support of Congress) and President Rouhani (with the backing of the Supreme Leader) are giving diplomacy a chance, an emerging détente between both countries appears a distinct possibility.

Although it may be premature to envision normalization of relations, the Iranians’ verified compliance with the conditions set out in the Joint Plan of Action coupled with a mutually acceptable long-term nuclear agreement between the P5+1 and Iran would eliminate a number of coercive and hostile actions in Tehran’s and Washington’s respective foreign-policy tool kits.

Rapprochement between the United States and Iran relaxes a dominant source of regional imbalance as Middle Eastern countries with close ties to the United States no longer need to mirror the United States’ hostility towards Iran. Moreover, this regional reconciliation may alleviate fears that Iran will once again strive for regional hegemony, leading to a possibility for a loose regional-security framework.

Needless to say, this is no easy task. Saudi Arabia fears abandonment and favors not only continuous balancing against Iran but also a more heavy-handed American and international response against the Syrian government. The Saudis are circling the wagons and reaching out to fellow kings in Morocco and Jordan, as well as pouring money into Cairo to strengthen the military regime. A potentially emerging Egyptian-Saudi alliance is meant to defend the status quo ante. The Saudis are also busy keeping their fellow Persian Gulf allies together. This week, the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain proclaimed the end of tensions with Qatar; Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain had recalled their ambassadors from Qatar in March, accusing the government in Doha of meddling in their internal affairs and supporting the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and essentially framing the political narrative by means of Doha-hosted al-Jazeera. However, the growing possibility of a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement in conjunction with the evolution of political systems throughout the region are making the manipulation of Middle Eastern relations by any single regional state rather difficult. Alignments and alliances are in a state of flux. Qatar, Kuwait and Oman are pursuing increasingly independent foreign policies and are likely to accommodate themselves with the U.S.-Iranian thaw of relations. Likewise, the Shi’a government in Iraq, which has been experiencing renewed, large-scale political violence, openly accused Qatar and Saudi Arabia of seeking to destabilize Iraq through their support of Sunni terrorist groups.

Middle Eastern states, for the first time in recent memory, are beginning to define their relations vis-à-vis one another on the basis of their individual interests and ambitions rather than those foreign-policy orientations being delivered unto them from afar. To facilitate a self-regulated and stable Middle East, the United States as the most intrusive of the external powers should trade in its hat as master of puppets in favor of that of a lifeguard, willing and able to lend assistance when it is needed, but not intruding unless intrusion is necessary.

Strategic reassurance to traditional U.S. regional allies may be difficult but not impossible. The “ironclad” U.S.-Israeli relations should be able to withstand Washington’s farewell to arms vis-à-vis Iran. A potentially emerging, inclusive regional concert based on equilibrium means stability for Iran and Saudi Arabia as much it does for Israel. Riyadh’s fear of an emerging Shi’a dominion in the region and an ugly divorce with the United States has no historical precedence in U.S. foreign policy. The United States will not abandon its strategic partner; it has never done so before, during, or after the Cold War. Moreover, U.S.-Saudi relations have weathered far worse: the 1973 Saudi-led oil embargo was a retaliation against U.S. support for Israel during the Yom Kippur war and let’s not forget about the impact of 9/11. Few other governments in a similar situation would have weathered this American trauma unscathed.

When the U.S. government recognized the People’s Republic of China following Nixon’s visit in 1972, the United States undertook a great diplomatic leap away from Taiwan towards mainland China without abandoning its security commitment to the former. Likewise, U.S. diplomacy towards India and Pakistan has so far mastered a nuclear-charged and often very tense triangular relationship.

The concert system that avoided major conflict in Western Europe between 1815 and 1870 worked because it was fluid. Relations were not fixed or externally imposed. States could realign to contain rising threats, and recognized that diplomatic solutions were often better and cheaper than those uncovered on the battlefield. Likewise, the immediate incorporation of a defeated France into the Concert of Europe in 1818 demonstrated that productive cooperation with yesterday’s adversary could be fruitful (the integration of Germany and Japan into the post–World War II order was similarly successful), and regardless, it is easier to keep an eye on a potential source of instability from within than from outside. The main barrier to this possibility remains external ties that render the regional interests of Middle Eastern states subordinate to the foreign-policy goals of external patrons, locking in patterns of amity and enmity different than those which would emerge organically.

Once all preeminent sources of external and internal imbalance are either removed or greatly weakened, a new regional balance-of-power concert could emerge from the ashes of the Arab Spring. Today, violence in Syria reminds us of scenes from Dante’s Inferno. Like previous major junctures in international relations, the Divine Comedy’s Hell was followed by Purgatory and then Heaven. History’s most recent, major post-war junctures of 1815, 1919, and 1945 have shown us that order after conflict requires statesmen to purposefully swim against the stream rather than merely muddle through. Let us hope that leaders inside and outside the Middle East can move away from dominion towards equilibrium, and that they don’t run out of gas mid-voyage.

Bernd Kaussler is Associate Professor Political Science at James Madison University where he teaches U.S. foreign policy, international security and US-Middle East relations. He is the author of: Iran’s Nuclear Diplomacy: Power Politics and Conflict Resolution.

Keith A. Grant is assistant professor of Political Science at James Madison University. He teaches courses and conducts research focusing on interstate conflict, international organizations, American foreign policy, and research methodology. He is the co-editor of Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics.

Image: Wikimedia Commons/Jonathan Rashad/CC by 2.0