Editor's Note: Please also see our other “weapons of war” articles such as: Five Russian Weapons of War NATO Should Fear , Five Chinese Weapons of War America Should Fear , Five American Weapons of War China Should Fear , Five Japanese Weapons of War China Should Fear , Five Best Weapons of War from the Soviet Union and Five NATO Weapons of War Russia Should Fear .
The initial response to an article titled “Five Taiwanese Weapons of War that China Should Fear” would be to ask why such weapons would be necessary in the first place. After all, relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait since 2008 have been, at some level at least, the best they’ve been since the conclusion of the Chinese civil war in 1949. Over that period, many agreements have been signed between Taipei and Beijing; millions of Chinese tourists flock to Taiwan every year; and interactions between Chinese and Taiwanese politicians—including the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party—have reach levels that would have been unthinkable just a few years ago. Why, then, should Taiwan seek to develop or acquire weapons that would strike fear in Beijing?
The answer to that question lies in the extent to which rapprochement can continue, and the prospects that an end to this trend could result in a decision by China to resort to martial measures to resolve the “Taiwan question” once and for all . Recent developments in Taiwan, chief among them the Sunflower Movement’s 21-day occupation of the Legislative Yuan in March and April this year, have highlighted the formidable ideological divide that exists between the two societies and the deep fears that are felt by Taiwanese even as their country normalizes relations with China. To be succinct: the majority of Taiwanese are all for economic exchanges with China, and most understand the futility of ignoring the elephant in the room; but parallel to that realization is the deeply ingrained aversion to seeing a reversal of Taiwan’s liberal democracy and way of life. Ongoing events in Hong Kong , tensions that were in part exacerbated by Beijing’s release of its white paper on “one country, two systems,” have further awakened Taiwanese society to the huge costs that are to be paid in sovereignty transactions with China.
How Beijing responds when it realizes that normalization will not go on forever or in the direction hoped for by the Chinese Communist Party is anyone’s guess, but current trends under President Xi Jinping, whose leadership style is perhaps best described as daring and impatient, signify that the military option—which was never taken off the table—remains possible, especially if the civilian and military leadership in Beijing believes that this could be accomplished quickly and, just as important, at minimal cost to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
Taiwan’s answer to that possible future is to convince Beijing that a quick, “clean” and relatively cost-free war would be anything but (they rarely are anyway, but hubris tends to cloud otherwise perceptive minds). The nature of our five weapons stems from one simple truth: The time has long passed when the Taiwanese military could hope to meet the PLA on symmetrical terms and defeat it in a conventional way. In fact, the definition of military victory itself must be altered to reflect reality. For the PLA, victory is, in its maximalist form, the annihilation of the Taiwanese armed forces; in a less extreme form, it is the subjugation of the island through coercion or limited kinetic action. Conversely for Taiwan’s military, victory is neither the total destruction of the PLA nor occupation of China, two objectives that are as infeasible as they are unpractical. Instead, victory for Taiwan lies in deterrence—the promise of pain; and failing that, the imposition of substantial costs to the PLA for an attempted invasion. The five weapons, to which we shall turn in a second, must also be practical. In other words, their acquisition or indigenous development must be within the realm of the possible but at the same time must not threaten the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait to such an extent as to provoke preemptive action by Beijing. For example: Nothing would strike fear in China more than a Taiwanese nuclear program and the means to deliver one or several nuclear-tipped warheads against Chinese military installations, industrial centers, or cities. And yet, nuclear weapons do not make the list, as they would be impractical. Given the scope of Chinese intelligence activity in Taiwan, such a program could not remain covert long enough to ensure its completion and would be considered casus belli among the Chinese leadership, inviting aggression rather than deterring it. Another example would be the procurement of many more PAC-3 air-defense systems, but the aggregate costs would be prohibitive, and furthermore no amount of air-defense batteries would be sufficient to counter the 1,500-plus ballistic missiles currently aimed at the island (not all 1,500 missiles can be launched at once, as volleys are limited by the amount of launchers, but nevertheless, China could with relative ease overwhelm Taiwan’s air defense capabilities should it choose to do so).