On the other hand, a hardline victory, especially a stolen one, would continue the regime coalition’s narrowing. Proregime reformists were kicked out in the Khatami era and after the 2009 protests; secularists, Communists, and liberals, after the revolution; leftists, over the course of the 1980s. Even many in the clerical class have been pushed to the margins. Elections, which can serve as a safety valve and which can offer warnings of brewing crisis, have become less valuable. The growth of the IRGC has expanded one corner of the coalition, but even so, there is a real danger that the regime will get too narrow, that it will be unable to hear or redirect dissent, that it will create internal enemies too strong to liquidate. This is more or less what happened to the Shah, who neglected some of his friends and made enemies of many others. The Islamic Republic seems to have a more loyal security apparatus than its predecessor, so a fundamental crisis in the system might be very bloody.

The struggle between Khamenei and Rouhani, in other words, is taking place on a tightrope.

John Allen Gay, an associate managing editor at The National Interest, is coauthor of War with Iran: Political, Military, and Economic Consequences. He tweets at @JohnAllenGay.

Image: Wikimedia Commons/Public Domain.