At first glance, it may seem as though pondering the possibility of a European defense system that no longer relies on a partnership with the United States betrays a lack of investment in the survival of the West as a moral and strategic entity. But that is not the case. If America becomes increasingly unpredictable and Europe remains militarily weak, European countries will grow more and more vulnerable to forms of blackmail from dictatorial powers like Russia and China. Accepting that democracies in central and eastern Europe should fall under Russia’s sphere of influence—or indeed that democracies in Asia should fall under China’s sphere of influence—may then start to look like a reasonable moral price that largely defenseless western European countries have to pay for their own physical safety. Preparing for the day in which the United States might prove unreliable therefore shouldn’t be seen as an abandonment of the hope that the Western alliance might be preserved or reestablished; rather, it helps to make a radical—and deeply destabilizing—realignment of alliances less likely even if the worst should come to pass.

INVESTING IN military spending is an important first step towards becoming less dependent on domestic developments in other countries amid a decline in stability. But the greater versatility that Germany now needs should take many other forms as well.

For a start, Germany should critically rethink common defense projects that make the country deeply dependent on its neighbors. Given the considerable gaps both in the availability of sufficient military personnel and in the quality of existing military materiel, it is obvious why European countries have increasingly opted for a form of codependency. This is reflected not only in forms of joint command for specific army units, but also in a strategy that sees different nations take on responsibility for different aspects of their mutual defense: the logistics come from Sweden, the transport planes from the Netherlands, the soldiers from Italy and the medical personnel from Germany.

In calmer times, this division of labor was a sensible use of sparse resources—a way of making one plus one add up to more than two. But in the politically uncertain times we have now entered, this division of labor may only succeed in ensuring that European defense capabilities go unused in an hour of need. For if each country contributes some core function to European defense capability, then every country enjoys de facto veto power over the missions all countries can undertake. And this, in turn, means that the ascent to power of one far-right populist allied with President Putin could in effect neutralize the capabilities of all European powers. One plus one plus one plus one plus one may then add up to zero.

MILITARY VERSATILITY is key. But taking seriously the need for strategic flexibility in uncertain times will also require a radical reorientation in other policy areas. Perhaps the most obvious is that the potential rise of populist powers within western Europe vastly increases the strategic risk of energy dependence on Russia. If the United States, as well as some western European nations under populist leadership, should have friendly ties with the Kremlin, the ability of Putin (or his successors) to blackmail Europe’s remaining liberal democracies by threatening to cut off gas supplies to those countries would vastly increase.

This possibility is still widely dismissed among German foreign-policy experts. Russia, they argue, is deeply dependent on revenues from gas sales in western Europe in general, and Germany more specifically. But Russia’s ability to blackmail Germany by cutting off supplies is more robust than they admit.

First, especially in moments of crISIS, autocrats tend to prioritize short-term over long-term considerations. This is especially true in countries in which a dictator’s loss of power may well entail his loss of life. If Vladimir Putin, or some successor, should start to feel that his hold on power is threatened in the immediate future, and that ratcheting up international tension is the best way to ensure his (literal and metaphorical) survival, he may well be willing to inflict very serious economic damage on his own country. Russia’s dependence on Western oil revenue thus translates into less energy security than German policymakers usually assume.

Second, any scenario in which Russia either cuts off gas supplies, or can credibly threaten to do so, would create a huge political crISIS in Germany. If Russia should cut off gas delivery for long enough, German pensioners would start to die of cold in their own homes. This would create huge political damage to the ruling coalition, and constitute a big incentive to make painful foreign-policy concessions.

Germany thus needs to think of energy independence as an urgent matter of national security. As such, this important goal justifies an all-of-the-above approach that rapidly develops a mix of energy forms. This includes continued subsidies for the installation of clean forms of energy, as well as greater investment into research and development of technologies than can economically compete with fossil fuels in the long run. But it also includes more politically contentious measures. Germany should reassess its nuclear-energy policy, invest in the port facilities that are necessary to receive shipments of oil and gas from across the Atlantic, and even consider loosening policies on fracking.

EVEN IF the two countries should no longer share a deep commitment to liberal democratic values, Germany will continue to share some key security and strategic interests—like the fight against Islamist terror and the need to manage China’s rise—with the United States. For parallel reasons, NATO has included countries that fell far short of liberal democracy, including Turkey under military tutelage or Portugal under Salazar; similarly, even an American government that turns to the hard right should not automatically prompt Europeans to disband NATO or discontinue all forms of intelligence sharing.

But at the same time, the desire to cooperate even as things take a turn for the worse will tempt Germany to soft-pedal its criticisms of American domestic developments, or to forego whatever limited opportunities may present themselves to strengthen Americans who fight for a survival of basic democratic norms. This would be a great error, both morally and strategically. Morally, Germany should feel deep loyalty to America’s liberal-democratic tradition, not to the government of the day. And strategically, America will only return to being a reliable ally if populism is defeated in the long run. A tactical willingness to continue a long-standing alliance thus must not transform into strategic complaisance with populists.

Policymakers in liberal democracies now need to avoid two twin dangers: They cannot assume the best case, making them vulnerable should the worst case arise. But neither can they assume the worst case, needlessly damaging valuable alliances that might have proven more resilient than meets the eye. Instead, they should recognize that both outcomes are possible, charting a course that helps to maximize the likelihood that the optimistic scenario will come to pass, even as it energetically goes about the necessary preparations for the worst case.

In the age of populism, a responsible German foreign policy must thus have two concurrent goals. It must work to lessen the risk that populist governments decide to break with the values-based alliances that have been so crucial to peace and stability in the West. At the same time, it must prepare for a future in which remaining liberal democracies can defend themselves if these alliances do prove to be beyond salvation.

In the era of Ostpolitik, German foreign-policy makers famously hoped that a closer cooperation with the Eastern Bloc might pull it in a democratic direction. The slogan that Egon Bahr invented for this hope was “Wandel durch Annäherung,” or change through rapprochement. At this unexpected and rather scary historical juncture, with the United States less committed to liberal-democratic values than at any point in since World War II, the inverse slogan might help to guide German foreign policy. What the country now needs is “Annäherung durch Wandel,” or rapprochement through change. What I mean by that, of course, is not that Germany should emulate Trump’s America. On the contrary, Germany needs to recognize that, in the wake of Trump’s victory, only a willingness to rethink its foreign policy in a radical manner can preserve the possibility that the transatlantic relationship will survive the coming years.

Yascha Mounk is a lecturer at Harvard University. His latest book, The People versus Democracy: Why Liberal Democracy is in Danger and How To Save It (Harvard University Press) will be published in March 2018. The German Marshall Fund published an earlier version of this essay under the headline “Wake Up, Berlin!”

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