The Sudanese offered to keep bin Laden boxed in and under continuous surveillance in Sudan, an offer that was rejected by the American side. The Sudanese made a counteroffer to send bin Laden to Somalia. That offer was rejected, as well, and any suggestion of handing bin Laden over to the Saudis was quickly dismissed. The Saudis had no intention of allowing him back in the kingdom where he might become a north star for other troublemakers. Similarly, the American side turned down the Sudanese offer to hand bin Laden over to the United States, because at the time there was no U.S. crime for which bin Laden could be prosecuted. Ultimately, it was agreed that bin Laden would leave Sudan for Afghanistan. After all, it was apparently thought, what kind of trouble could he get in there?

Osama bin Laden arrived in Afghanistan in the summer of 1996, before the Taliban had taken full control of all of eastern Afghanistan, including Jalalabad. He was welcomed by the former Mujaheddin party leader, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a fluent Arabic speaker who studied at the Al-Azhar University in Cairo. After the Taliban victory swept through the east, bin Laden remained their welcome guest. But there was one historical footnote—a few days before the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom in early October 2001, I was asked to call the office of then-Taliban foreign minister Mullah Wakil Ahmad Mutawakkil. During that brief conversation, I received what seemed at the time a mysterious, almost coded message: “that man is no longer under our protection.” My interlocutor repeated that message twice more, asking each time if I understood the precise meaning. I said I did. I then telephoned the NSC official responsible for Afghan matters in the White House at that time and relayed to him the message I had received from the Taliban. I added my interpretation, “they are telling you that bin Laden is no longer under their protection. In Afghan culture, the meaning is clear: you know precisely where bin Laden is, just go get him, take him away, and let’s be done with this problem. We’ll just look the other way.” The response from the White House advisor was equally clear: “Well, that’s a good start.” They clearly had other plans.

Operation Enduring Freedom launched on October 7, 2001.

SO NOW we are back where it started in Afghanistan. There may be no rush by other than a few regional players to open formal diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime any time soon, though informal intelligence contacts between the Taliban and its neighbors may already be underway. There was also at least one reported contact between CIA director Burns with the Taliban leadership in Kabul. All of the relevant intelligence services seem to be engaged, either directly, or through the Pakistani ISI. These intelligence contacts should continue, as much can be accomplished quietly and out of the glare of headlines. The United States should not disengage and simply leave the Afghan game to others. It needs to stay in this new Great Game, wherever it might lead. And what better way than with the CIA, once again, handling the account.

Milton Bearden is a Distinguished Non-Resident Fellow at the Center for the National Interest. His highly decorated thirty-year career at the Central Intelligence Agency included service as chief of the Soviet and East European Division in the Directorate of Operations, and as head of the CIA’s covert support to the Mujaheddin fighting against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. 

Image: Reuters.