Such a partnership, it should be stressed, does not represent an endorsement of the Iranian government or its foreign policy. When it comes to Iraq, however, there is a narrow, but important, convergence of interests between Tehran and Washington. We may not like the outsized influence of Iran on the Iraqi government. But it is a fact of life—and one, moreover, that the United States created when it invaded Iraq in 2003.

It is plainly in the interest of the United States to conclude a nuclear deal that substantially extends the amount of time it would take Tehran achieve “breakout” nuclear capacity. The provisional arrangement announced in April 2015 is an important step in this direction. The opposition to any final agreement will be fierce. But the question is not whether any such agreement is the best we could have achieved; it is whether any such agreement is preferable to the alternatives. To insist on an arrangement that would permit Iran no enrichment capacity is, under current circumstances, to forego any chance of a deal at all. From Washington’s perspective, a complete failure in talks would a) lead to calls, here and abroad, for further U.S. action against Iran, up to and including a military strike; b) worsen the United States’ already troubled relationship with Iran at a time when Tehran is a critical, if informal, partner in confronting the ISIL threat in Iraq; c) undermine the government of moderate President Rouhani  and strengthen the hands of hardliners; and d) delay any possible medium-to-long term progress toward normalization of relations with Iran.

The United States must of course be sensitive to the concerns of its allies in the region, notably Saudi Arabia and Israel. But we cannot permit those alliances to define U.S. policy when U.S. national interests are at stake; to do so would be to outsource U.S. foreign policy to Riyadh or Jerusalem. The idea that striking a nuclear deal with Iran would somehow represent “abandoning” Israel or Saudi Arabia is risible, given the United States’ long and tested track record of support for both countries. The United States should, however, be prepared to give additional assurances—including the possibility of a formal nuclear umbrella should nuclear talks fail and Iran accelerate its nuclear program—to both Israel and Saudi Arabia. In the case of Turkey, the United States should reiterate that its commitment to defend Turkey under NATO’s Article V includes a response in kind should Iran use nuclear weapons against it.

Joe Barnes is the Bonner Means Baker Fellow at the Baker Institute for Public Policy and a former member of James Baker’s Policy Planning Staff at the State Department. Andrew Bowen is a Senior Fellow and Director of Middle East Studies at the Center for the National Interest. They are the co-authors of the new report, “Rethinking U.S. Strategy in the Middle East.”

Image: Andina