Little Red PRCs: Could China Conquer Taiwan Without Fighting?

Little Red PRCs: Could China Conquer Taiwan Without Fighting?

As America considers how to defend Taiwan against conventional forms of invasion, it must also pay significant attention to attack along non-traditional vectors.

 

To be sure, this fictional scenario has some limitations: It downplays what a motivated people might do to defend their country, as in Ukraine. It assumes Beijing could flawlessly execute a complex, unrehearsed plan. It assumes unity of command and a high number of forces being committed without effective resistance. And, of course, Beijing does not use its full military weight initially, giving Taiwanese forces a better chance to hold them off.

Actions Needed by Taiwan, Neighbors, and the United States

 

Taiwan faces numerous challenges. Societal attitudes towards military service have until recently indicated a high level of apathy, reluctance, and ineffectiveness—not to mention Taiwan’s susceptibility to disinformation. Even the recent sale of U.S. F-16V fighter jets to Taiwan begins to look irrelevant because modern armaments cannot stop the “Little Red PRCs” described above. However, the onslaught of a totalitarian power against a smaller neighbor in the Russo-Ukrainian War has inspired 70.2 percent of Taiwanese citizens to be willing to defend their country against Beijing, compared to 40.2 percent in a December 2021 poll. Taiwan must make hay while the sun shines.

Strategically, Taiwan lacks the geographic depth of Ukraine. On the one hand, its largely mountainous terrain could make progress along all but a few avenues difficult. On the other, it leaves little area to fall back to and a slim margin between maintaining a conventional defense and being forced into guerilla warfare. It is not connected by land to its enemy, but this is true for its supporters as well, which are much further away to begin with. Thus, its ability to harden itself against both conventional and irregular attacks is critical.

The last time China fought a conventional war was in 1979, and as a retiring PLA general lamented in 2018, “My one big regret is that I never had a chance to fight in a war.” This lack of experience may actually free PRC strategic thought from the mental constraints that come with prolonged conflict. Indeed, the PRC’s traditional reliance on political warfare, need for Taiwan’s unification, and currently unfavorable environment for a conventional campaign could make irregular tactics more attractive to Chinese decisionmakers. The asymmetric military operation described above—maximizing the fog and friction of war, minimizing casualties and collateral damage, and creating the illusion of disorder and chaos—is one defenders should not ignore.

Taiwan’s supporters should strengthen their messaging to add an extra layer of deterrence. This could include verbal support from U.S. leaders and sending more security cooperation missions to Taiwan. Besides demonstrating resolve to PRC leadership, the latter would enhance Taiwanese forces’ effectiveness, capabilities, and interoperability with U.S. and partner military forces. Despite certain PLA views to the contrary, if the United States or other partners had troops killed in action, it would spur them to provide greater support to Taiwan, undermining Beijing’s strategy of preventing a broader intervention.

A 2021 Center for a New American Security report called The Poison Frog Strategy further suggests pre-coordinated “whole-of-government deterrent measures” between Taiwan and its partners to make aggression as unpalatable and difficult as possible for the PRC. However, more is needed. Based on the scenario above, a key line of messaging might be a threat to deny the PRC the use of key Taiwanese facilities, hindering invasion or occupation. This also requires increased signaling and messaging throughout the American public for why defending Taiwan is so critical to the future of American success and the international order.

Finally, this “Little Red PRCs” scenario gives American and Taiwanese military planners a basis on which to consider an imaginative approach to the multi-domain defense of Taiwan. This means rethinking what total defense and resistance might look like in Taiwan. Note that any future crisis scenario involving a strategic competitor could include a non-kinetic attack on the U.S. homeland as a way of undermining American political willpower and gumming up the mobilization of U.S. forces. A doctrinaire belief in an adversary adhering to “the rules” in a future conflict is precisely how Russia pulled off its “Little Green Men” occupation of Ukraine and might similarly influence a future “Little Blue Helmets” occupation of the Baltics. China is no different: Its People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (or “Little Blue Men”) do the “dirty work” in the South China Sea region, harassing non-Chinese vessels.

Ultimately, China may go to extremes to seize Taiwan, or slyly toward “winning without fighting.” American strategists and planners must wargame innovative and pragmatic options to counter and deter a possible “Little Red PRC” scenario in Taiwan. And while leading Taiwan expert Kharis Templeman is right to critique those that link the fate of Ukraine to Taiwan, those wishing to win in future conflicts are now adapting their militaries and strategic priorities based on Russian failures and Ukrainian successes.

Lt Col Jahara “FRANKY” Matisek (Ph.D.), (@JaharaMatisek) is a senior fellow for the Homeland Defense Institute (HDI), associate professor in the Military and Strategic Studies Department at the U.S. Air Force Academy, and Fellowship Director for the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). He will be a Military Professor at the U.S. Naval War College this Fall and his 2022 book, Old and New Battlespaces, shows how everything is becoming weaponized as everyone becomes a combatant in the era of strategic competition.

Ben Lowsen is a specialist in Chinese political and security affairs working as a China advisor for the U.S. Air Force's Checkmate office.

John Amble (@JohnAmble) is the editorial director of the Modern War Institute at West Point and co-director of the Urban Warfare Project, having recently been part of a Homeland Defense Institute research mission to Ukraine.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect those of the U.S. government, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, or U.S. Air Force Academy – and was cleared for release (PA#: USAFA-DF-2021-409).

Image: Reuters.