Last Thursday, Iraqi prime minister Haider al-Abadi shared the good news about Mosul. “The fighting forces are currently pushing forward toward the town more quickly than we thought,” he began, “and more quickly than we had established in our plan for this campaign.” Such statements, while encouraging to his nation, are deceptive. The real fighting has yet to start. It is also vitally important to realize that if ISIS chooses to fight to the death in Mosul—like the Texans’ historic Alamo fight—it is not inconceivable that ISIS could achieve strategic victory even if it is eventually defeated in Mosul.
It is important to understand that Islamic State fighters, while frequently derided as mindless thugs, heartless terrorists and common criminals, pose a formidable tactical threat. They benefit from fifteen years of lessons learned during insurgent operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria. Many of their leaders have significant experience battling against traditional military forces and are experts in the conduct of guerrilla operations and city fighting.
ISIS has experience of fighting in Kobani, Raqqa and now years in Aleppo. Its forces are the most experienced and expert urban fighters in the world right now. ISIS’s members have become masters of crafting elaborate defenses, digging interlocking tunnels, and sowing complex and multilayered minefields. The attacking Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) also have experience in city fighting, as they’ve ejected ISIS from Fallujah, Tikrit and Ramadi. But in each of those battles, ISIS has fought what is essentially a fighting withdrawal.
It has created improvised explosive devices (IEDs), mines and other booby-traps, which it’s hidden in buildings, cars, roads and under sidewalks. ISIS has avoided becoming decisively engaged in its previous city fights, withdrawing when the situation got too hot and it was in danger of being cut off. Whether that was an intentional strategy or not is hard to determine, as reports following the Fallujah battle claimed that ISIS executed scores of its fighters who escaped. This time, however, early evidence indicates that Islamic State leaders have decided to make a fight-to-the-death stand in Mosul.
Some might be tempted to consider this a good thing, thinking that if ISIS makes a stand here and is destroyed, the manpower and leadership gash to the organization will hasten its ultimate demise. That is not a safe assumption; the situation is not as dire for ISIS as might appear.
Mosul is a massive city, similar in size to Philadelphia. Even at the upper end of its estimated numbers, ISIS cannot possibly defend the entire city. Its early actions indicate that in the initial stages of the battle it withdrew numbers of forward-deployed observation posts, designed to give its leadership intelligence on where the liberating force is making its main thrusts. As the attackers continue their drive, ISIS troops will probably conduct harassing fires against them, planting IEDs on the routes of advance, and utilizing snipers to slow the advance, but still not becoming decisively engaged.
They’ll likely continue falling slowly back until finally occupying the main line of defenses they’ve chosen. These are areas they have no doubt prepared over many months for the decisive battle. It will have thorough and elaborate defensive works.
In all likelihood, it will have interlocking tunnels that allow men to move from one position to another without exposing themselves to hostile fire. Snipers will likely occupy key high points in buildings, providing interlocking fires against main routes of advance. Barricades will have been placed roads at multiple points to further slow ISF attacks. Mortars, rockets and possibly some tanks will be placed at strategic locations on and behind the main line of defense.
Regular riflemen will be scattered throughout the battle area and only concentrate for specific actions, otherwise dispersing to increase survivability. They probably have small mobile units to act as local counterattack forces to harass ISF and coalition troops as they move through the city. If ISIS fights with discipline and launches brazen attacks, it is possible to use the urban terrain to exact a high toll on the liberating force and hold out for an extended period.
If the Islamic State has adopted the “Alamo” strategy, it may be willing to suffer 50, 60 or even up to 75 percent casualties, yet still tenaciously fight on. “There is no chance” that ISIS is going to retreat from the city, according an October 23 dispatch published by Mosul Eye, the most authoritative source of information from within Mosul for the past two years. “There is no safe heaven [sic] for them anywhere in Iraq either; it is just impossible for them to blend,” Mosul Eye wrote, and also pointed out that there is no known program for the reintegration of ISIS members.
Meaning that there are few places where ISIS’s Iraqi members can flee, and no motivation to surrender. The chances that Mosul represents the Alamo for ISIS are substantial. There is great risk for the coalition if this turns out to be the case.
First, it will test the mettle of ISF troops in particular. They are two years from their horrific defeat during ISIS’s initial swamp of Iraqi territory. Iraqi troops have been numerically rebuilt, they have been re-equipped with modern weapons, and they have been retrained by U.S. and other allied guides. Today’s ISF is definitely better than the 2014 version, but it has not yet been tested in sustained, difficult combat. It is uncertain what will happen if Baghdad’s troops start suffering high casualties.
Second, the longer the tactical battle for Mosul lasts, the greater the chance ISIS could wear down the tenuous bonds holding coalition forces together and succeed strategically. In an Alamo case, its main intent would likely be to hold out for as long as possible, inflicting as much harm on ISF troops as possible. ISIS has shown it is willing to die for its cause and endure enormous hardships. At least up to this point, the ISF has not shown itself willing to make such sacrifices. ISIS knows it has no hope of actually defeating the liberating force, but it probably realizes it does have a chance to split the coalition and sap its will to fight. Here’s how.
The coalition force is composed of Iranian-backed Shia militia, various Sunni tribal militias, small numbers of Christian and Turkmen militias (many drawn from those who previously lived in Mosul), the Kurdish peshmerga, the Iraqi national troops, and U.S.-led coalition troops providing advisor, artillery and air support. This cobbled-together coalition does not have natural cohesion. In fact, many of these groups are known to deeply distrust one another, with some of the leaders of the Shia militia being on record as promising to kill American troops they find on the battlefield. If this fight drags on and casualties begin to mount among the various militias, the chances for intra-coalition conflict rises.
For example, if the fighting ability of the ISF begins to weaken and Shia militiamen have to take up the slack, fighters in the Shia Popular Mobilization Units might stop cooperating with Baghdad and launch off on their own plan, going where they deem most advantageous. Under a worst-case scenario, they could even battle against other coalition militias, such as Sunni tribal militias and Christian groups. It is also possible that rogue elements of the PMU might make good on their threats and kill American advisors or other support troops in ostensibly “blue-on-blue” attacks.
It is also possible that as the battle progresses, some of the non-Sunni groups might decide to freelance from an agreed-upon campaign plan and try to capture quarters of the city they have not been designated to free. If Shia troops, for example, were to move into Sunni enclaves of Mosul without agreement, the Sunni residents or even the erstwhile allied Sunni militia might turn their guns on the Shia. In such a case, the coalition could actually begin to consume itself.
The odds that Shia, Kurdish, Christian and Sunni armed groups—some of whom take orders more from outside powers than from Baghdad—will work together cooperatively and effectively aren’t the highest. The longer ISIS is able to hold out, and the more casualties it is able to inflict on the coalition, the greater the chance that religious, sectarian and political differences between the liberating forces will bubble to the surface.
This combustive tinderbox of unstable allies doesn’t even include the considerable destabilizing possibilities that might arise if the Turkish armed forces decide to make good on President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s promise to take part—with or without permission—in the fight on the ground.