The blame, however, should not only rest on European shoulders. Of course, the rise of illiberalism across the world has a lot to do with the end of illusions concerning the possibility of building the stable, prosperous world Europeans had bet on, but it is not only Europeans who have been naïve about the continent’s security architecture. Indeed, the United States has taken for granted the stability (and loyalty) of the other pillar of the West for a very long time now. Here, the 2008 financial crisis, which crippled for a long period of time Western states capacity to act inside and outside of their own borders to uphold the peace, served as a turning point. While the rest of the world actively prepared for a post-Western world, the West divided itself: continental Europe blamed “Anglo-Saxon greed” for an economic crisis that was transatlantic in nature, while America took the transatlantic relationship for granted, while blaming Europe’s few commercial successes into the U.S. market and unresponsiveness on security as a free-riding dangerous for American interests.

This is forgetting that, for all its successes and its faults, the Europe that the United States is dealing with now is probably the construct that is the most aligned to its security and commercial interests. Indeed, this Europe has been shaped by the United States more than any other continent apart from North America. The idea of a Europe whole, free, and at peace was not only inspired by the U.S. example after World War II, it was articulated as such by President George H.W. Bush in his Mainz speech. This European security architecture—shaped by the affirmation of self-determination following World War I, Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, and the 1945 postwar settlement corrected by the enlargement of the West following the collapse of the USSR—is the Europe that America made. Indeed, should the United States disappear from that security architecture, the future Europe would have a very different shape and form, and one that would be much less favorable to America’s interests. Had Russia’s attack on Hostomel Airport in late February been successful, had the Ukrainian government been decapitated in the half-cooked commando operations Putin had ordered in Kyiv, and Americans would have woken up in a drastically different, much more threatening world, not only in Europe but also in the Persian Gulf and the South China Sea.

America continues to have a vested interest in upholding Europe’s security architecture because it serves its interests as well as those of its allies. True, it is not an easy task, and at times it is a frustrating one. But the benefits for the U.S. economy and its security far outweigh the costs. This is why it needs to continue to invest in the continent’s security, and to nurture its relationship with European elites, the other stakeholders in the transatlantic relationship—those have doubted America’s strength and its commitment to European security, and they have at times felt that their American ally did not treat them with respect,  which has led some to explore other friendships that seemed at the time more promising, notably with Russia and China. In the words of Ralph Waldo Emerson, “the only way to have a friend is to be one,” and reinvesting in those relationships, may that be by youth exchanges and leadership programs or by propping up American diplomatic presence in Europe’s capital cities, will be crucial to keep a strong link between both sides of the Atlantic. This is even more so as Europe and the United States will probably continue to diverge culturally in the coming years, for demographic as well as structural reasons.

This is not to say, of course, that the United States should not push the Europeans to do more to uphold the transatlantic relationship, in particular to for their own defense. It must be made clear to NATO members that blatant free riding cannot continue and that members must contribute more to their defense. But American elites should also understand that, if they really want Europeans to be able to take care of themselves and uphold the Europe that Americans made, this presupposes that they build a common defense policy inside the European Union, and this, in turn, implies a European pillar of a NATO, as well as some form of strategic autonomy for the EU. Rather than opposing it, the United States should, on the contrary, encourage it, on the condition that this strategic autonomy is built as an autonomy “to do” rather than an autonomy “from.” Americans should be constantly reminded that whenever the going gets tough in international relations, it is not the governments of Europe, nor their concert gathered inside the European Council that is their best ally, but the European Parliament, the closest thing to a federal Congress that Europe can produce.

As war has come back in Europe, it is in America’s national interest to continue investing in the security and unity of a continent it has helped shape for more than a century. After all, the vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace only took shape under American leadership, and so it seems only right for the United States to defend the Europe America made. It is not only in Europe’s interest but also in the United States’.

Thibault Muzergues is author of War in Europe? From Impossible War to Improbable Peace.

Image: Reuters.