Nor is this all. In late November, the G20 ostracized President Putin over his refusal to own up to the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17; in response, he decided to leave the summit early. Later that month, France announced the indefinite suspension of a $1.6-billion arms deal that would have transferred two Mistral-class amphibious assault ships to the Russian navy. And in early December, Gazprom announced that European objections had torpedoed a planned natural-gas pipeline through Bulgaria; Russia has been forced to divert the pipeline to Turkey instead.

No matter what strategy it pursues, Russia will not be able to revert back to the status quo ante bellum. In the best-case scenario for Russia, Moscow can bring Kiev to its knees through sustained economic warfare and support for the separatist movement. But this scenario is improbable. Every move by President Putin can be countered by the West, at least to some degree. So Russia’s economic warfare will probably be matched by IMF commitments, and in the event that the IMF fails to act, the United States and the European Union will likely step up to the plate. 

But even if President Putin could convince President Poroshenko and Ukraine’s elite that Kiev has no rational choice but to fold in the face of Russian power, he would have difficulty making that decision stick. After all, capitulation might be the rational choice, but there has never been much rationality in the sort of nationalism surging through Ukraine. So long as Kiev remains at least semi-responsive to public sentiment, Ukrainian leaders will have little incentive to bow before Russian pressure. And even if President Poroshenko caves, there will always be some demagogue ready to denounce appeasement and ride a nationalist wave into power in the next election.

Nor does Russia really have the capacity to bring Ukraine back easily into its orbit by force. To secure the borders and occupy Donbass alone, though, Russia would need another 91,000 soldiers according to one analysis. To take and hold the rest of the country would be a daunting task, especially in the face of a disgruntled population and probable insurgency. Even a small invasion and occupation—perhaps of the more pro-Russian eastern oblasts in historic Novorossiya—would likely be beyond Russia’s capabilities.

Besides operational problems, President Putin also has political constraints at home: he has maintained an astronomically high approval rating up until now, but polls suggest that Russians are adamantly opposed to an outright invasion of Ukraine (in fact, only five percent favor deploying Russian troops). So it is unsurprising that President Putin has disavowed any interest in marching on Kiev.

Russia’s strategy over the last year can be best understood as a desperate attempt to stall its deteriorating security situation. In particular, after having lost Ukraine, Russia now seems prepared to make sure that no one else can win it, either. There is some method to this madness: a strong and united Ukraine would oppose Russian interests, but a weak and destabilized Ukraine will be too busy coping with the chaos in its innards to be able to coherently or consistently impede broader Russian objectives.

At the end of the day, though, this destabilization strategy has the feel of the second-best. This rearguard action may help Russia gain leverage in the war’s settlement negotiations, keep Ukraine out of NATO and send a warning to Russia’s other neighbors. But as noted earlier, this strategy can only blunt the damage of losing Ukraine; it cannot achieve a lasting strategic victory for Moscow.

No Winners; Only Losers

None of this is to say, however, that the West has “won” the Ukraine crisis in any meaningful sense. Russia’s blunders may have conduced to America’s advantage under the chessboard mentality of the Cold War, but today, they have instead proven an unwelcome distraction from more pressing problems, including a rising China and a burning Middle East.

Indeed, Russia and the West have instead entered a negative-sum conflict where both sides stand to lose simultaneously. By destabilizing a key neighbor and tilting it toward the West, Russia has injected a source of instability into European politics for the foreseeable future. Ukraine will continue to needle the Russian geopolitical consciousness, grafting friction onto the relationship between Russia and the West.

The United States and its allies should strive for a diplomatic solution with terms acceptable to Russia and its embattled leaders. In particular, the West must be exceedingly cautious when it calibrates external pressure on Russia to end the conflict: actions that could bring it to the negotiating table—like arming Ukraine or threatening to expand NATO—may also aggravate Russia’s strategic situation in a way that forces it to escalate.

Sean Mirski is a third-year student at Harvard Law School, where he is Supreme Court Chair of the Harvard Law Review.

Image: Flickr/snamess