Indian diplomats, obsessed with the doctrine of “strategic hedging, entirely focused on attaining the highest levels of subtlety and refinement in New Delhi’s balancing between the United States and China, resulting in an absolute failure to see through China’s expansionist game-plan. Finally, India’s “defensive wedge strategy,” a variant of strategic hedging, practiced by alternatively approaching China and Pakistan to drive the wedge between the two, also failed, as China-Pakistan ties have transformed into a strategic partnership.

A critical examination of India’s foreign behavior shows a superficial understanding of the concept of “strategic hedging.” There is nothing new in it. Tactical in nature, it is used by most state and non-state actors in diplomacy. However, India made it equivalent to its grand strategy, a fundamental underlying principle of its foreign policy. Yet even at a conceptual level, there are glaring inconsistencies. If India is hedging its bets against the United States and Israel by befriending Iran, then it seems that New Delhi has a weak understanding of its long-term foes, friends, and strategic interests, as it’s evident that India’s strategic interests lie with Israel and the United States.

Further, if India was hedging against the United States by befriending China, it again shows that New Delhi failed to correctly read China as a long-term threat. Between Russia and the United States, India is not placed so that it has to hedge one against the other. Hence, New Delhi’s perception of “strategic hedging” lacks long-term geostrategic objectives. At best, it seeks to achieve some short-term and immediate goals. At worst, it comes out of the desire to keep every state entity in good humor even at the cost of hard national security interests, indicating deep-rooted and systemic strategic ambiguity and confusion. Finally, the lack of vibrant think-tank culture, the overwhelming influence of career diplomats resisting external expertise, and the lack of intellectually capable political leadership have also led to stagnation and the continuation of such static positions like strategic autonomy and hedging as the bedrock of foreign policy planning and implementation.

The Galwan stand-off in June 2020 has forced India to wake up and confront the harsh reality of China’s revisionist ambitions and desire to alter its boundaries. Furthermore, the threat is multifaceted, extending into the cyber, information, and economic domains. Moreover, Pakistan’s strong ties with China present a real-time threat of a two-front war. Hence, post-Galwan, India’s strategic hedging has come under duress. Despite its historic discomfort, reluctance, and uneasiness with bilateral and multilateral strategic and military alliances, India will have to shed its inherent pessimism and indifference and accept them. The most crucial ones for India are the Quad and its ties with the United States. It is time India emerges as a confident, rational, equal, and enthusiastic player in the Quad.

Abhinav Pandya is a founder and CEO of Usanas Foundation, an India-based geopolitical and security affairs think-tank, and the author of Radicalization in India: An Exploration. His second book, Terror Financing in Kashmir will be released soon. He is an MPA from Cornell University, USA. His work has featured in Economic Times, Fair Observer (USA), Haaretz (Israel), South Asia Democratic Forum (Brussels), The Print, HW News, Sunday Guardian, Quint, Vivekananda International Foundation, Policy Perspectives Foundation, Perspectives on Terrorism, Huffington Post (USA), Express Tribune (Pakistan), Pak Tea House (Pakistan), First Post and Swarajya. He also appears as a panelist on India's national TV debates on security and strategic affairs. He tweets @abhinavpandya​.

Image: Reuters.