What surface vessels would be involved in such a conflict? On May 12, 2015, a PLA Navy Type 054A frigate tracked the USS Fort Worth. As the second vessel of the U.S. Navy Freedom-class littoral combat ship (LCS) and the third vessel in the LCS fleet, the USS Fort Worth and her sister ships would be among those most likely involved in a surface battle with China.

In China's inventory, the Type 054A frigate and/or Type 056 corvette would make appearances. There will be four LCSs deployed in Singapore by 2018. For now, the PLAN South Sea Fleet has eight Type 054A and five Type 056.

The LCS fleet and its upgraded version, Small Surface Combatant (SSC) vessels, will be put at a disadvantage in a conflict with Chinese counterparts. This assessment is based on my calculations using the mathematical model of the Salvo Equation. The model helps figure out and compare how many ships are left on each side after modern naval surface battle. Consistent with the way the U.S. Navy codes variables, my calculation extends the existing conflict simulations such as the one involving LCS against China's Type 022 missile boat.

According to the calculations, when the LCS/SSC fleet consists of no more than two vessels (a reasonable assumption based on its deployment plan), the Type 054A frigate risks no devastating damage. Two 054A frigates can eliminate a single LCS/SSC. A fleet of three 054A can sink a pair of LCS/SSC ships. When China sends Type 056 corvettes, one LCS/SSC will almost be sunk by two Type 056 corvettes. If the LCS/SSC fleet consists of two vessels, a single 056 corvette will be destroyed, and it requires four or five Type 056 to eliminate these two LCS/SSC.

Both U.S. and Chinese naval researchers use the Salvo Model to make conflict simulations. Although it is not the only model developed for this sort of task, the above result can serve as a baseline assessment. This result is also in accordance with recent general assessments on China's military modernization, its near-seas capabilities and implications for the U.S. Navy. With a DDG or CG involved in such a surface combat, the United States’ winning opportunities will increase dramatically. But again, the U.S. navy cannot afford to rely on those high-value units to carry out routine patrol in areas like the SCS. This is in fact the very reason that LCS was developed.

If Chinese military planners get similar simulation outcomes, it may be safe to say that on the military tactical dimension, Chinese decision makers will not be deterred by the United States’ increasingly tying-hand actions.

No More “Gulf of Tonkin”

In recent years, the United States has been reinforcing its credibility by sinking both military and diplomatic costs to convince China to stop acquiring military dominance in the SCS. Now, it seems that the United States might be switching its persuading strategy from sinking costs to tying hands.

Beijing will take action if Washington sends warships across the 12-nm line. The former's hands are already tied as territorial reclamation goes on. The latter's frustration is understandable. But tying hands and provoking China does not seem to be the best rational option. I would not go so far as to say that some escalation scheme similar to the Gulf of Tonkin is being made inside the beltway. Nevertheless, there is a similar danger of escalation as real as in Vietnam in the August of 1968.

Some American pundits believe that more assertive actions by American forces should be taken and praised. They urge the U.S. government to act decisively in supporting such actions, because the longer the White House waits, the more entrenched China's positions becomes. This entire discussion was based on the assumption that a sharp and short militarized conflict would not escalate into a major regional warfare. There are lots of reasons for us to be confident in this, and it is hardly the worst scenario. However, if a war breaks out, no one will truly know what follows.

Haotian Qi is a PhD candidate in International Relations at Georgetown University. His research areas include crisis bargaining and management, major power relations, military strategy and technology, and arms trade.

Image: Flickr/U.S. Navy