The Bush administration argued however that none of these indicators mattered. His potential to cause unimaginable disorder stemmed from his potential to develop and use weapons of mass destruction. Yet, this was a speculative and later disproven basis for perceiving him as a threat. Moreover, the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 caused disorder itself because it created a power vacuum in Iraq that led to a civil war and insurgency. It alienated the international community and showed contempt for the United Nations and international law. While it might have eliminated a potential source of disorder, in practice it actually created greater disorder.

American grand strategy in the post-Cold War era has to show a strong commitment to international order and stability. This is not to argue that Washington should tolerate injustice, tyranny, and human rights atrocities, but that the exercise of American power should generally be governed by the desire to maintain order rather than live with disorder. This remains the fundamental difference between Hitler and Saddam. Hitler sought to destroy the old European order and remake it as the Third Reich, while the Allies stood for the idea of stopping this radical, violent change to the system. Saddam, by contrast, sought to stay in power but lacked the means to remake any significant political or economic aspect of the system. He was not a source of disorder because he preferred to maintain the status quo.

This leads us to the issue of authoritarian great powers. Iraq under Saddam Hussein was a middle-tier regional power, which could pose a threat only if it possessed WMD, notably nuclear weapons. Russia, China, and to some extent Iran, are first-tier regional authoritarian powers, which have the capability to become major sources of disorder in their regions, if not the world. One indicator of whether the second principle is being applied is whether the authoritarian great powers are rising in power. Are their spheres of influence expanding or contracting? Are their militaries deploying farther afield and overseas? Are they coercing smaller, weaker neighbors, or supporting such states in ways that undermine security? If the answer to most or all of these questions is “yes,” then American grand strategy has to rebalance in favor of the second principle.

Building on the first principle, policymakers must contemplate defining American grand strategy in terms of actively restraining the forces, actions, and ideas that contribute to instability, insecurity, and chaos. Since the world remains dangerous and unpredictable, it is strategically necessary for the United States to remain engaged—to lead on occasion, so to speak, “from the front.” This principle of American grand strategy must rest on more than simple rhetoric. Its purpose should be to make the world safer, freer and more prosperous, and secure as Washington exudes strength, purpose, and commitment. By ‘strength,’ I do not mean in the classic military sense, but strength in the depth and extent of using all the nation’s tools—political, economic, technological, and diplomatic—to help defend the nation’s interest in building a peaceful and free world. For its grand strategy to succeed, the United States must demonstrate in word and deed a sense of vision as well as the judgment and power to use its strength to promote a just and peaceful world.

Simply put, America needs to stand for and defend principles that promote human rights and dignity, equality for all peoples—men and women—freedom of expression, free enterprise, and fair elections. These values are consistent with the historical principles that existed in American foreign policy well before the Cold War and will endure well beyond this and subsequent generations. This principle of America’s leadership role emphasizes just how essential it is to discourage states or actors from taking actions that harm the interests of the United States or other free societies. In promoting these values, American grand strategy has many tools at its disposal. It can withhold political or economic support from, use military power against or build alliances to confront, actors whose behaviors undermine peace, security, and prosperity.

The Third Principle: Forging alliances and partnerships to confront the most pressing threats to global stability

For political and economic reasons, this is precisely the moment when the United States faces a new imperative in its grand strategy. Its challenge is to articulate a grand strategy that reinforces the nation’s influence and ability to exercise a leadership role, but without going so far in the opposite direction that the nation effectively disengages from the world—or creates the impression that it is doing so. If its inaction creates a leadership vacuum, the United States will face all manner of risks, challenges, and dangerous outcomes. While some argue that the United States is in decline and must scale back its involvement, my own view is that an enduring element of American grand strategy must be to reinforce the role of alliances and partnerships. This powerful and enduringly positive principle should be central to and wholly enshrined in every facet of the nation’s grand strategy. The failure to do so encourages others to believe that the nation is in decline or that it is simply disinterested. Both conclusions will contribute to a more dangerous world.

A new American grand strategy must reinforce alliances and partnerships—both old and new—in order to confront global challenges with a sense of shared responsibility among nations. The nation’s grand strategy must proceed from the realization that Americans do not have unlimited power—the nation cannot do everything, and cannot be everywhere, all of the time, for the rest of the world. Americans willingly carried the mantle of global leadership for decades—from winning in World War II and the Cold War to strengthening security against extremism after 9/11. But they may be reluctant once again to carry that burden once again, especially considering the nation’s current economic difficulties. The baby boom generation has been as active as its predecessor—and as generous in spirit when asked to help.

The two extremes—where America engages less as expressed by “leading from behind,” or where America takes the lead on all issues—are unacceptable.[20] Now is the time for other states in the West to rise to the occasion and to share the burden of leadership rather than criticizing from the sidelines. We can hope for a new bipartisan consensus on foreign policy, but if Washington fails to lead, then it must be prepared for the consequences if other states, whose interests may be radically at odds with its own, take the lead. Consider the case of Syria’s use of chemical weapons in August 2013, when Britain voted against using force and Russia sided with Syria.[21]

The United States must also commit itself to building a world in which other states contribute to regional leadership, while working collaboratively toward common goals. These principles of reinforcing the domestic foundations of power, exercising strong leadership, and practicing greater collaboration often exist in tension. However, it is vital for the nation to develop a framework that guides how it deals with competing challenges at home and abroad. Neither the public nor their policymakers should assume that America’s supposed preeminence is guaranteed to exist in perpetuity. In the end, the United States needs a strategy that encourages positive American leadership and maintains security, while balancing the need for all states to work together to rebuild and reinforce the foundations of peace, security, and prosperity. It did so before, and can do so again.

Thus, one indicator of the strength of the third principle is whether the U.S. shares the burden with allies and partners. In Afghanistan, how much of the work of nation building is done by Afghans themselves? In principle, it should always be proportionally more than what America is doing because the United States cannot shoulder the full burden of developing a state economically, politically, and socially. Such an approach is both unrealistic and unwise. As for allies, the question is how capable are they of acting alongside the U.S.? The de-militarization of Europe is deeply problematic for U.S. grand strategy because this translates into a fundamentally weaker NATO. It also implies that the United States will have to pay the costs of military interventions. Over the long-term, this will lead to a decline in relative power, which suggests that it might be useful to consider a new Marshall Plan for the European global security capabilities. A similar proposal for a Marshall Plan for states in the Middle East was raised.[22]

The second indicator of the health of the third principle is America’s diplomatic standing. By diplomatic standing, I mean its ability to interact with key interlocutors in other states and societies and its ability to mediate conflicts. In the past, especially under Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Jimmy Carter, America had the diplomatic standing to mediate great conflicts. For now, it seems to have lost that ability and image, while American embassies and consulates seem to be fortresses rather than places for the conduct of diplomacy. Dangerously, this practice continues to isolate the United States.

In practice, Washington’s credibility and influence increase when it willingly demonstrates its support and encouragement for other states to exercise leadership. Washington only gains when it shows greater support for multilateralism. It must learn to use existing international institutions, while building new ones, as part of its strategy for encouraging states and actors to work together to restrain the dangers to international security. One corollary to the principle of greater multilateralism in American grand strategy is that Washington should no longer view challenges as essentially “American problems.” The new lens through which to view American grand strategy is to strengthen alliances and partnerships so that more nations are helping to solve the world’s problems.