Threatening Military Attack on Iran Is Against the U.S. Interest
Nothing would be more likely to strengthen the arguments of hawks in Tehran who believe Iran needs a nuclear deterrent—which in the past it had taken some steps toward acquiring—than threats of foreign military attack against their country.
It is appropriate to step back to reflect on the context of all this. Iran is conducting nuclear activities to which it is, under the international regime governing atomic energy, as “entitled,” to use Ross’s term, to conduct as any other country. In signing the JCPOA, Iran committed itself to more severe restrictions and more intrusive monitoring than under that international regime, in return for relief from economic sanctions that had been applied only to Iran. As the JCPOA makes explicit, Iran was relieved of those additional commitments once the United States reneged on its obligations.
Iran does not have nuclear weapons and disavows any intention to develop them. A military attack on Iran would be an act of aggression. If performed by Israel, the aggression would be carried out by a state that has conducted its own nuclear activities completely outside any international scrutiny or control and that, in the assessment of outside observers, long ago introduced nuclear weapons to the Middle East.
Paul Pillar retired in 2005 from a twenty-eight-year career in the U.S. intelligence community, in which his last position was National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Earlier he served in a variety of analytical and managerial positions, including as chief of analytic units at the CIA covering portions of the Near East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. Professor Pillar also served in the National Intelligence Council as one of the original members of its Analytic Group. He is also a Contributing Editor for this publication.
Image: Reuters.