Trump and the Impending Foreign-Policy Crisis

July 24, 2017 Topic: Security Region: Europe Tags: Trumpforeign policyDonald TrumpWhite HouseCrisis

Trump and the Impending Foreign-Policy Crisis

Imagine a foreign-policy crisis in which the president must rally U.S. allies. Will they listen?

It is now six months into the Trump administration and, thankfully, the United States has not yet faced a foreign-policy crisis . In no other area does a president have more responsibility and power than in such a crisis. Any president, but particularly this one, must welcome and respect expert advice, choose quickly and wisely from a difficult set of options, consult with Congress and involve U.S. allies in the common cause. The United States must deal from a position of strength but be open to negotiations.

Unfortunately, we have seen much in Trump’s conduct as president that raises serious questions as to how he will respond when that inevitable crisis comes. Perhaps none more puzzling or concerning is his attitude toward Russia. Rebuilding cooperation with Russia where possible in areas such as antiterrorism and arms control is in the U.S. interest, but not at the expense of indifference to Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Syria or dismissing the investigations of Russian interference in recent U.S. elections.

Russia will be a key player in any crisis that erupts over Ukraine, Syria, North Korea or Iran. It must therefore be asked whether the president’s ability to lead in a crisis is being weakened by the investigations into Russian meddling and the president’s continuing refusal to accept fully that the Russians did it. This combines with other worrisome trends such as the falling international prestige of the United States, the troubling relationship with key allies such as Germany and France, the withdrawal from leadership on climate change and international trade and the seeming preference for authoritarian, nationalistic regimes rather than friendly democratic states that respect human rights.

Numerous analyses have examined whether Trump can adjust to the international situation he faces or whether the first six months of his presidency show that his basic policy instincts are set.

At this point, it is difficult to understand what the Trump foreign policy is—beyond “America First,” anti-ISIS and a form of economic nationalism that disdains international cooperation. In his first few months, he has disparaged the international order that the United States has built and led since the end of World War II. There are good reasons to criticize aspects of this order—including the meager spending on defense by some of America’s partners—but NATO and U.S. alliances in Asia are absolutely essential to U.S. security and economic well-being. And, they will be especially critical in a crisis.


If the United States does not lead in a crisis, it will ultimately lose. Perhaps not right away, but U.S. power, security and influence will suffer. Others will step in and will act in their interests, not ours.

The president’s leadership standing is weak at the moment at home and abroad. Recent polls indicate declining approval for him in the United States and worse overseas. Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany has made clear that the Europeans can no longer rely on U.S. leadership and must consider acting without us.

Imagine a foreign-policy crisis in which the president must rally U.S. allies. Will they listen? If he has to provide U.S. intelligence to them, which is standard practice, will they believe it after he has repeatedly said he is not convinced that that Russians interfered in the 2016 elections? For that matter, will the American people believe him?

But the most disturbing aspect of his conduct is his relationship with Russia and Putin. His two-and-half-hour meeting with Putin (and Secretary Tillerson and Russian foreign minister Lavrov and two interpreters) and the subsequent revelation of a second meeting joined only by a Russian interpreter leave many serious questions.

To professional diplomats, the lack of Russian expertise on the U.S. side and the absence of a “note-taker” in the meetings is dismaying. Presumably Secretary Tillerson wrote a memorandum of the discussion he sat in on, but he was also a participant, so the notes he took cannot be complete. A memorandum of the meeting—written entirely from memory—is likely to be inaccurate in important ways.

So, what did they discuss and what understandings were reached beyond a limited ceasefire in Syria? Where there were differences, what did the Russians hear him say? Trump has said he asked Putin twice whether they had interfered in our election. But what did he say after Putin’s denials? Since we don’t know, it is possible that Putin heard whatever the president said or didn’t say as an absolution.

History is replete with examples of foreign leaders misreading what was said by U.S. officials. Clarity must be the hallmark of diplomacy. Two frequently cited examples are the North Koreans believing that a speech by Secretary of State Dean Acheson signaled that we did not regard the Korean Peninsula as within our area of concern—leading them to invade South Korea. Similarly, Saddam Hussein reportedly believed that U.S. ambassador April Glaspie’s remarks to him about the border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait implied it was not a matter of concern to the United States, leading him to invade Kuwait.