Last month’s failed coup attempt prompted numerous questions about Turkey’s relations with the West, and especially with the United States. At the heart of those questions lies a phenomenon that a New York Times editorial has dubbed “Turkey’s new anti-Americanism.” This “new” anti-Americanism found its voice in countless articles and opinion pieces recently published in Turkey that hold the United States directly responsible for orchestrating the failed attempt, as well as many government officials who have made comments about U.S. involvement in the failed coup.
Western spectators are caught unprepared. The intensity of the anti-American sentiments have convinced many that the failed coup will eventually trigger a “break-up” between Turkey and its long-time NATO ally, the United States. The narrative is simple. Turkey blames the cleric Fethullah Gülen—who lives in the United States in self-imposed exile, and whose green card application included a reference from a senior CIA official—for the failed coup, asking for his extradition. The United States so far remains unconvinced by the presented evidence that ties the failed coup to Gülen, a denial that in fact fuels anti-Americanism in the country. Widespread and rising anti-Americanism, so the narrative goes, will eventually force the Turkish government to sever ties with the United States, probably pushing Turkey into alliances with Russia and even Iran.
Such thinking is misleading, and follows from an acute inability to make sense of Turkey’s new anti-Americanism. It is true that U.S.-Turkish relations may deteriorate even further. However, even then, anti-Americanism will be a mere venue for such deterioration (to be employed by Turkey’s controversial president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan), not the cause or the driving force behind it. Put bluntly, present-day anti-Americanism in Turkey is harmless and will not lead to a breakup between Turkey and the United States all by itself—that is, unless President Erdoğan consciously decides to sever ties with the United States. If he ever makes such a decision, then anti-Americanism will be his way of convincing Turks that it is time to turn away from the West, not a force compelling his behavior.
That being said, the question remains: how can we make sense of Turkey’s new anti-Americanism? Making sense of the recent anti-American trend in Turkey requires coming to terms with three dynamics. First, anti-Americanism in Turkey is not “new”—not by a long shot. Second, anti-Americanism is best understood in terms of Turkish people’s penchant for (or addiction to) conspiracy theories, which neither relies on substantive logic and facts, nor has traditionally had significant political effects. Third, President Erdoğan can certainly control this “new” wave of anti-Americanism, and will not let it determine the course of Turkish foreign policy. Combined, these three dynamics suggest that while anti-Americanism makes for sensational headlines in the Western media, its real-life relevance to Turkish foreign policy is negligible.
To begin with, the “newness” of Turkey’s anti-Americanism is, to a large extent, in the eye of the (Western) beholder. Despite being a long-time NATO ally, anti-Americanism has been strong in Turkey for almost half a century. Put simply, anti-Americanism has been a constant in Turkey, which Westerners have only recently chosen to see.
That anti-Americanism has been very strong in Turkey for a long time is not just a claim; it is a fact. In a study published in American Political Science Review in 2012, political scientists Lisa Blaydes and Drew Linzer established that Turkey ranks first in the Islamic world for its anti-Americanism, with 90 percent of the population self-identifying as anti-American. The same study, joining many others, also points toward another fact that usually escapes Western spectators: it is not a particular group—say, Islamists—that professes unfavorable opinion of the United States. Anti-Americanism is shared by all ethnic, religious and political groups, and cannot be explained by differences in education or income levels.
Similar trends also apply to Turks’ perception of NATO: while Turkey has been a key member of the alliance for more than sixty years, a Pew Research study from 2014 found that only 19 percent of the population has a favorable opinion of NATO. In other words, Turkey has not discovered anti-Americanism in the aftermath of the failed coup; it is the Westerners who are discovering what has been out there for a long time.
Of course, this long-term trend itself begs the question: why would Turks, even the most educated and Westernized ones, dislike (or even abhor) the United States? From a historical point of view, anti-Americanism has its roots in the Cold War. Backed and inspired by the Soviet Union’s communist regime, Turkey’s leftists failed to exert decisive influence on almost every front but one: their anti-U.S. and anti-NATO propaganda (which was in fact the Soviets’ main concern and target, more so than “America” per se) had staying power, eternally branding the United States as a greedy and near-omnipotent “imperialist.”