On February 4, 2026, the New Start Treaty (NST) will expire. When it does, there will be no formal restrictions on either the American or Russian nuclear arsenals. Due to the NST’s framework, the treaty cannot be extended or renewed again; therefore, if Russia and the United States want a follow-on arms control agreement, then they will have to renegotiate. So far, the Russian government has rejected all U.S. proposals for new negotiations. For this reason, the fate of any follow-on arms control remains uncertain.   

The Biden Administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review articulates a desire to engage in arms control agreements to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy and enhance strategic stability. Recently, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan emphasized that arms control helps limit arms races, manage escalation, and ensure the safety and security of the American people from nuclear threats. While these are noble intentions, they may be impractical given the emerging two-peer problem. The United States should evaluate whether arms control is a useful way to secure U.S. national interests. 

The Emerging Two-Peer Challenge

The 2022 National Defense Strategy identifies the People’s Republic of China as the “most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S. national security” with good reason. China is projected to deploy up to 1500 nuclear warheads by 2035—a significant increase from their present nuclear arsenal. Furthermore, China’s leaders refuse to engage with U.S. officials regarding nuclear arms control and demand the United States continue to reduce its nuclear forces. While this argument may seem reasonable given the disparity between China and U.S. nuclear forces, the United States has significantly reduced its nuclear stockpile despite China’s intention to do the opposite. China also refuses to establish formal crisis communication channels and is not transparent about the size and types of its nuclear weapons like other P5 nations. Considering this, the United States needs to consider how future arms control agreements absent of China could impact U.S. interests. 

Additionally, the 2022 National Security Strategy recognizes Russia as a “persistent threat to international peace and stability.” Russia’s military invasions of Georgia and Ukraine violated international law and led to an increase in tensions among nuclear powers. Also, Russia has been an unreliable strategic partner, having violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and having recently suspended its participation in the NST due to American support for Ukraine. Moreover, Russia has up to 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons in its stockpile. The Russian government refuses to be transparent about its non-strategic nuclear weapon systems. President Biden should consider all of this before engaging in arms control with Russia and rewarding nearly two decades’ worth of bad behavior. 

Both Russia and China view the United States as a threat to their security interests. President Xi has accused the United States of attempting to contain and suppress China’s development. President Putin has gone even further in stating that the “West” seeks to erase Russia from the map. These views have pushed Russia and China closer. Over the past decade, these two nations have expanded cooperation in a variety of areas, such as economic trade and military operations. The United States cannot turn a blind eye to this growing challenge. The time has come to assess whether arms control is a useful tool to address the current security environment. 

Going Forward with Arms Control

The Biden Administration’s inclination toward arms control is understandable, especially when you look at its enduring legacy as a part of the U.S. Cold War strategy. There is no doubt that arms control helped navigate one of the most tumultuous relationships to ever exist in international politics. However, the security environment we face today is remarkably different than that of past decades. While arms control may have protected us in the past, it may not serve our interests now. During the Cold War, the United States only had to deter the Soviet Union. Now, the United States and its allies must strengthen deterrence simultaneously against two adversaries in multiple theaters under a variety of complex conditions. 

To determine if arms control is feasible and advantageous, the United States should examine the following questions as a starting point before pursuing further arms control agreements with our adversaries:

Is the United States better off in an unconstrained or constrained security environment? This question must account for U.S. adversaries’ capabilities and capacity if unconstrained. It should also assess what capabilities and capacity the U.S. military should possess to ensure flexibility, credibility, and leverage if unconstrained.  

Under what conditions should the United States constrain itself, and in what ways? This question should identify more than just mutually beneficial agreements. It must also examine the political will of our adversaries and what steps are needed to get them to engage in arms control with seriousness. This analysis should also identify possible strategies the United States could consider when negotiating with two nuclear adversaries.

Has arms control contributed to U.S. nuclear modernization challenges? While there are many reasons why the United States is struggling with its current nuclear modernization efforts, new analyses that investigate how arms control impacts U.S. nuclear force developments may be necessary.

How should Washington use arms control to manage strategic stability in the new era? U.S. efforts to bolster strategic stability relative to either China or Russia, whether through arms control outreach or enhanced deterrence, could paradoxically undermine strategic stability with the other. Neither country is presently willing to engage in formalized strategic stability dialogue either. U.S. leaders need to fundamentally reassess whether legally binding arms reduction or limitations treaties, non-binding tacitly-agreed-upon norms, or other methods of arms control are viable and beneficial for ensuring stability in the emerging three-party balance.  

The point in asking these questions is not to dismiss arms control or argue that it has no place in U.S. national strategy. If arms control is a realistic option to address U.S. security concerns, we should pursue further arms control agreements. But more questions need answering before deciding whether arms control should remain a focal point of national strategy. 

Cody Kennedy is a Program Analyst at Systems Planning & Analysis, supporting naval nuclear modernization efforts. He holds an MA in Security Studies from Georgetown University. The views expressed are his own and do not represent the opinions of his employer. 

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