A simplified understanding of Russia coupled with media frenzy about everything that Russia does creates self-inflicted wounds that almost force Western states to play according to rules set by Russia. For example, instead of asking which targets can be destroyed with the SS-26 within a 500 kilometers radius around Kaliningrad (the estimated range of the SS-26 missile system), we should be asking the question: so what? The same goes for the other A2/AD systems, the S-300/S-400 air defense missile systems and the Bastion-P coastal missile systems. Modern military systems do not in and of themselves translate into operational tactical success or politically desirable goals.

In addition, it would be good to notice that, for Russian military planners, the geostrategic location of Kaliningrad is a nightmare. The exclave is practically an island in the middle of NATO, located on the coast of the Baltic Sea, which is practically an inland sea of NATO and the European Union. Without going nuclear, there would be practically no way to defend Kaliningrad if a large-scale war broke out. Deploying SS-26, S-300/400 and Bastion-P systems will not change that fact.

So, should Western states be chasing around every troop deployment or snap military exercise that Russia makes? If Western states decide it is wise to do so, then they let Russia define the rules of the game. They also enhance Russia’s ability to control their thinking, actions and maybe even their narratives. Instead of letting Western media frenzy drive policy decisions, it would be advisable to finally burst the “A2/AD bubble” in Western strategic discourse that has been created by overemphasizing the effect of Russian military capabilities whether in Kaliningrad or the Black Sea. This does not mean that Western states should not change their procurement priorities after twenty-five years of cashing in the post-Cold War era “peace dividend.” There is a capability gap in the European theater—between Russian armed forces and European ones.

Western states, mostly in Europe, should start taking defense seriously. However, it is time to stop the unanalytical, slogan-based overemphasis around the possibilities that Russia has to control Western narratives. Buzzwords rarely form sound foundations for security strategy and defense posture. Hybrid warfare, information war and the misperception that Russia has the potential to alter our narratives have received way too much media coverage during the last three years. The ability to make headlines does not equate to the ability to change deep-seated Western narratives.

Jyri Raitasalo is docent of strategy and security policy at the Finnish National Defence University. Previously he served as head lecturer of strategy at the Finnish National Defence University. The views expressed here are his own.

Image: Vladimir Putin in 2015. Kremlin.ru