Several factors will combine in the coming weeks to inflame this discord. One source of heat is, literally, the heat—record high temperatures that spark wildfires and desiccate agriculture—the bill for which had topped $30 billion by June. Intense heat also increases the demand for gas, both to power a proliferation of air conditioners and to replace hydropower lost to drought. Europe’s dwindling rivers also interrupt nuclear power generation (due to lack of cooling water) and leave cargo as well as cruise ships high and dry (costing the transport industry billions). Another economic hit comes from coronavirus lockdowns in China that disrupt supply chains. Meanwhile, illegal immigration to Europe is surging again–up some 80 percent over last year. Many migrants from Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and other North African countries are driven by food insecurity exacerbated by grain shortages caused by war. The potential for renewed friction between migrant-friendly North European and Islamophobic East European states—with the latter already overwhelmed by Ukrainian refugees—is great.

Most American coverage of the war’s burdens ignores the energy- and conflict-related costs slamming Europe, focusing more on military aid to Ukraine where the United States outspends the EU two-to-one. But if all types of economic aid for Ukraine are counted—including indirect costs, such as supporting over five million war refugees—then the European contribution is much greater. Europeans also recently learned that their bill for Ukraine’s eventual reconstruction will be at least $1 trillion. All told, Europe’s Ukraine burden could approach 10 percent of the EU’s entire annual GDP. This would cause major economic and political disruption, even absent a severe energy crisis.

Can Western Solidarity Weather a War of Attrition?

European public opinion had shifted toward an “antiwar” majority even before Russia began cutting gas deliveries. A region-wide poll in May showed that while most blamed Moscow for the conflict, a majority also thought it was more important to negotiate a settlement than continue efforts to defeat Russia. While no similarly authoritative EU-wide polls have been published since, evidence from individual countries—Greece, Spain, Italy, and even Germany—suggests that growing numbers disagree with their governments’ policies of arming Ukraine instead of pushing Kyiv toward a ceasefire.

To date, EU and NATO officials mostly ignore these fissures and urge patience in efforts to defeat Russia. What’s rarely considered is that these policies have never been put to an electoral test. Many grumble that they were imposed by well-paid “Brussels bureaucrats” answerable to no popular constituency, creating a “fake solidarity“ likely to crumble under more economic pressure. A test will come when Italy votes for a new parliament in September, an election necessitated by the collapse of the previous government because of a split over funding for Ukraine. Polls predict victory for a right-wing coalition whose leaders have a long record of Putinophilia.

It is easy to mock Silvio Berlusconi or Matteo Salvini as “Putin’s puppets,” but this distracts from the economic hardships that are propelling them into office. It is vital to study the impact of sanctions on Russia, yet inadequate as a basis for exhorting “increase pressure on Putin” absent similar scrutiny of sanctions’ collateral impact on Europe. It is true that Russian efforts to replace European with Asian buyers for its petroleum are hampered by a shortage of pipeline and port facilities, but is also misleading as grounds for optimism without similar recognition of Europe’s shortage of tankers and terminals required to replace Russian gas with other sources. Who can build the missing infrastructure fastest—the democratic West and its profit-based private companies, or autocratic Russia and China via state-directed projects?

Perhaps Russia’s resilience is illusory—with Putin’s hold on power less secure and his army more fragile than they appear—so that if Europe can just hang on through a tough winter it will be rewarded with a Ukrainian triumph. But it seems equally likely that, even with battlefield reversals, Russia will retain a major swath of Ukrainian territory while squeezing Europe through months of high inflation with severe energy and commodity shortages. Angry workers have already staged disruptive strikes from the UK and Norway to Germany and Spain, and mounting hardships could lead to a wave of social unrest exceeding even that caused by Covid-19 shutdowns. Aggravated by immigrant tensions, surging nationalism and fights over burden-sharing could undermine some European governments and sour relations among others, fraying transatlantic ties and eroding support for Ukraine.

This may be a worst-case scenario, but not so unlikely as it seemed just weeks ago. While we focus on Russia’s weaknesses, it is vital to appreciate the West’s own vulnerabilities and threats to the EU’s political as well as economic health. As recognition grows that war will only end with a negotiated settlement, a proactive policy could maximize Western leverage before months of turmoil erode it. More and more weapons might lead to a Ukrainian victory, or they might cause more and more destruction that imposes devastating burdens not only on Ukraine, but on a fragile European Union as well.

Robert English is Associate Professor and Director of Central European Studies at the Univ. of Southern California. A former Pentagon analyst, he specializes on the end of the Cold War and post-Soviet politics.

Image: Reuters.