On June 28, Iranians went to the polls to vote in a snap election to determine who would succeed former President Ebrahim Raisi, who died in a helicopter crash on May 19 while returning from a diplomatic visit to Azerbaijan. In the aftermath of the crash, Vice President Mohammed Mokhber assumed interim powers until elections could be held. Six candidates were eventually approved by the country’s Guardian Council, which is responsible for supervising elections and approving candidates for national and regional elections. Five candidates were hardliners, and one was a reformist, Masoud Pezeshkian. In the first round of voting, neither side won a majority, leading to a runoff. Pezeshkian won by a significant margin. 

While ultimate decisionmaking power lies with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the president oversees the government’s day-to-day affairs and can influence domestic and foreign policy. As such, Pezeshkian’s victory could signify the potential for gradual, limited, but still significant reforms within Iran.

Before his presidency, Raisi rose through the ranks of Iran’s theocracy to become the country’s chief justice and was seen as the leading favorite to succeed Khamenei. However, this was not guaranteed due to the country’s opaque politics. Raisi’s ability to cultivate good relations with all branches of government—the legislature, military, and clergy—made him a powerful figure. His total alignment with the establishment allowed him to act as an “effective executor, rather than a formulator, of policy.” His election solidified the hardliners’ control of the political system. Yet, his time in office was marked by multiple crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic, a stagnating economy, high inflation, a devaluing currency, and protests over the death of Mahsa Amini in the custody of Iran’s morality police.

Raisi’s death came as a shock to the country’s theocratic establishment. His predecessor, Hassan Rouhani, was a moderate and negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The agreement bound Iran to curb the development of its nuclear weapons program for ten years in return for a gradual alleviation of sanctions. When Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA and reimposed sanctions on Iran, Tehran’s hardliners used the decision to sideline their moderate rivals.

Raisi’s passing also raises uncomfortable questions about who will succeed Khamenei. Potential candidates are Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba, and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s grandson, Hassan Khomeini. However, their election is unlikely since the regime likely wishes to maintain the image of meritocracy and is hesitant to be seen endorsing a dynastic succession. In any case, Pezeshkian’s win means that should Khamenei pass away or resign, then he would have a strong role in influencing the outcome of who would succeed the Supreme Leader. While hardliners dominate the system, they are split into multiple competing factions with differing views on domestic and foreign policy. While these factions temporarily set aside their differences in the aftermath of Raisi’s death, the elections exposed and aggravated those rivalries, something that will work to Pezeshkian’s advantage. 

When it comes to foreign policy, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is thought to be the primary decisionmaker. However, the president can influence policy, even relations between the United States and Iran. Pezeshkian’s electoral victory comes amid escalating fears of a wider regional war due to the conflict in the Gaza Strip. Before Raisi’s death, the United States and Iran fought a proxy war in the Middle East while also engaging in diplomatic efforts to manage the conflict. Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, who was killed alongside Raisi, played a crucial role in these efforts. While more hardline than his predecessor, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Amir Abdollahian was a career diplomat, a fluent Arabic speaker, and had considerable diplomatic experience in the Middle East. His deputy Ali Bagheri Kani took over as interim foreign minister and continued indirect talks with the United States to avoid further attacks. Amir Adollahian’s death, however, has halted the expansion of these talks until after the elections in the United States.

The conflict in Gaza has also brought the long-running shadow war between Iran and Israel into the open when an Israeli attack on the Iranian embassy in Syria led to retaliatory strikes by Iran. The situation was more or less resolved when Israel launched a symbolic, targeted strike on Iran, but the potential for escalation remains high. While the situation remains fluid, there is little immediate concern that Raisi’s death would have a larger security impact. Despite supporting groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, who are part of the “Axis of Resistance” against Israel, Iran has repeatedly stated that it wants to avoid a wider war and instructed its regional proxies and allies not to provoke the West. It is against this backdrop of regional tensions that Iran has been maneuvering to increase pressure on the West. Shortly after Raisi’s death, Iranian officials met with delegates from the “Axis of Resistance” to coordinate plans to escalate their attacks, with the objective of forcing the United States to convince the Israelis to accept a permanent ceasefire without triggering a regional war. In the aftermath, Hezbollah has increased the number of missiles fired at Israel, while the Houthis have managed to sink two ships passing through the Red Sea.  

These issues highlighted the potential futures that Iran faced during the elections. Pezeshkian ran as a moderate reformist who supported the rule of the Ayatollah but wanted to liberalize the economy, decrease repression, and possibly expand relations with the West, all of which would be appealing to Iran’s urban youth who are frustrated by curbs on political and social freedoms. He also adopted symbols of previous reformist campaigns, such as by making his campaign slogan “For Iran,” echoing an earlier campaign slogan by former President Mohammad Khatami, as well as trying to associate himself with the 2009 Green Movement protests by wearing green scarves.

Pezeshkian’s former opponent, Saeed Jalili, is a zealous ideologue and a staunch defender of velayat e faqih (“rule by supreme jurisprudence”), the political ideology that forms the basis of the system that enables the Supreme Leader’s paramount position of power. Jalili’s hardline platform advocated rigidly adhering to the ideals of the Islamic Revolution to resolve the country’s social, political, and economic problems. This ultra-conservative approach was designed to appeal to Iran’s conservative lower-income and rural voters but offered little to young and urban Iranians. So, while Pezeshkian has won a presidential mandate, he will have to be careful in balancing the interests of his electorate without alienating the elements of Iranian society who voted for Jalili and support the theocratic establishment. This is especially true since Pezeshkian is relatively inexperienced in foreign policy and national security matters. Nonetheless, by accepting the results of the election, the regime has shown some willingness to accept reforms. How far they will go along remains an open question.

When it comes to foreign policy, the main difference between Peseshkian and Jalili was on Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Pezeshkian made resuming negotiations with the United States and the wider West a central pillar of his campaign platform, with the hope that a revised version of the JCPOA would reset relations between the two countries and alleviate sanctions. This would go a long way to improving Iran’s economic growth and reduce the power of the IRGC, which has monopolized swathes of the economy. While a new government has not yet been formed, it is expected that Pezeshkian will appoint either former foreign minister Mohammad Zarif (who led the discussions toward the JCPOA) or Abbas Araghchi (Mr. Zarif’s deputy and a member of the team that negotiated the nuclear deal) to the post of foreign minister. 

This stands in contrast to Jalili, who advocated continuing the late Raisi’s strategy of not linking the economy with nuclear talks, a position that the IRGC shares. In other areas, Pezeshkian shares many of the same viewpoints as his opponent. He is a supporter of the IRGC, has reaffirmed Iran’s anti-Israel policies, and expressed his support for the “Axis of Resistance.” Until Pezeshkian is able to reach a new agreement with the United States that will enable him to implement economic reforms, Iran will likely keep expanding its military capabilities.

Pezeshkian has also stated that he intends to continue Raisi’s policy of fostering closer ties with Russia and China. To soften Iran’s diplomatic isolation and improve its economic situation, Raisi pushed Iran to join the Shanghai Cooperation Council and BRICS+ earlier this year. He also signed a Chinese-sponsored agreement with Saudi Arabia to restore diplomatic relations and reduce tensions. Iran has also provided material support to Russia in its war with Ukraine and signed a free trade agreement with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). This strategy, however, did not deliver for the economy, which means that Pezeshkian will have to strike a balance in its foreign policy.

So, what are the chances that Pezeshkian will succeed in turning things around? While it is still too early to tell, it will not be an easy road. Pezeshkian will have to navigate a system where power is concentrated in the hands of the Supreme Leader, as well as a hardliner-dominated legislature that is deeply skeptical of his agenda. It is also no secret that Khamenei favored a hardliner like Jalili for president, so Pezeshkian is starting at a disadvantage in terms of how much he can maneuver. This antagonism could also curtail Pezeshkian’s foreign policy ambitions. During the elections, Khamenei issued a thinly veiled warning to Pezeshkian, saying that anyone who “thinks that all ways to progress pass through America” should not be supported. While this can be interpreted to mean that the moderates should not expect too much support for any resumption of talks, it could also be seen as advice that Pezeshkian should temper expectations.