A subtler approach toward the Chinese people can support such efforts. Whereas an overly assertive America has in the past helped spur anti-American sentiment and a strident nationalism that the Party has been able to leverage (through its stranglehold on media and entertainment), a more tactful approach that speaks directly to the concerns of Chinese citizens could catalyze their reformist tendencies. Alongside this subtler approach, the United States should target the Party’s greatest vulnerability—the economic performance that underpins its popularity and encourages many to acquiesce to the status quo. (Though there are many protests, these are targeted at specific complaints—pollution and land appropriation, in particular—rather than the Party’s overall performance.) Incrementally increasing the cost and risk of investing in and buying from China can both reduce economic growth in China as well as reduce U.S. dependence on it—essential for national security—in a way that does not disrupt the American economy. Tactics include targeted and gradually expanding sanctions, starting with companies connected to the military and Uyghur genocide and gradually expanding to include a wider range of rights violations and dual-use technologies; broad, cross-cutting tariffs that increase over time; and greater monitoring and limitations on investment. The Trump administration’s tariffs—which cover about half of America’s imports—led, before COVID-19, “to a sharp decline in Chinese imports … with purchases … shifting to other countries.”

Tying sanctions and tariffs to a few human rights and corporate governance criteria would clarify the connection between CCP policies and American actions—and highlight how certain CCP policies work against the interests of Chinese businesses, the middle class, and the nation. If the Biden administration could convince American allies in Europe, Australia, Japan, India, and elsewhere to line up with the United States and pass parallel legislation (possibly tied to the same assessments), then the effect would be that much greater. A restoration of the 1974 Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which tied trade relations with Communist countries to their human rights records, could link trade privileges to a small number of issues, as was done during the Cold War vis-à-vis the USSR. Even though its application for China was annually waived, starting in the late 1970s as relations between the two countries warmed, and eventually ended when the country joined the World Trade Organization in 2002, the very process of renewal focused attention on China’s human rights record. This often-ignited controversy and threats in Congress to overturn the waiver, especially after the Tiananmen Square killings of 1989.

In parallel, the United States should be increasing the costs and risks to invest in China. Regulating the rapidly expanding environmental, social, and governance sector so that it encompasses not just environmental concerns (as is the case now), but also social and governance concerns (e.g., genocidal behavior, limits on religious freedom, limits of civil society) is essential to ensuring investors increasingly see China as an investment destination that should be shunned. Today, they flock to China without any concern that their investments are tainted, permitting the CCP’s continuing repression.

All these measures should be well communicated to the Chinese middle and upper classes even if the Party continues its longstanding effort to block alternative sources of information. It would be hard for the Party to deny the information even if it sought to wrap it in a self-serving narrative.

One of the best ways to reach key audiences inside China is to use Chinese language media outside the country—and outside the Party’s direct control. As such, it is essential that the United States and its allies eliminate the CCP’s influence over much of this media. This means restricting ownership by any individual or entity with a connection to the Party or United Front; threatening WeChat with a ban unless it alters its policies—and following through on one if it does not; ending the use by private companies of any Chinese-government linked broadcasts and articles; encouraging strong independent outlets (BBC Chinese, Apple Daily) to expand or enter the market; subsidizing syndication of articles from reliable sources (to replace CCP sources); establishing an independent source of funding of Chinese language media outlets; proactively leveraging Chinese language social media wherever possible; and closely monitoring the whole sector to ensure the Party or its operatives cannot intimidate any organization or individual working in the media space. The market is unlikely to provide such solutions, necessitating government action. Taiwan, which once played a much more prominent role in Chinese diaspora communities and has all the requisite knowledge on how to counter the CCP’s attempts to infiltrate and influence media from its own experience on the island, could be a useful partner here if the right mechanism for its involvement was developed. Allies should be encouraged to adopt similar measures.

For its part, the United States should pour more investment and creativity into reinvigorating America’s broadcasting capabilities—strengthening Radio Free Asia and leveraging a variety of new techniques such as shortwave radio (such as Song of Hope, which operates from countries just outside China’s borders), virtual private networks, and a variety of clandestine information channels to reach China’s population in ways that can overcome the Party’s concerted efforts to jam or block outside information. While their reach is unlikely to compare to that of the Cold War given the vastly different media landscape and greater capacity of the CCP to control information through traditional channels, these can still reach key audiences (e.g., the urban middle class) with unfiltered news and an alternative truth, if the quality is high enough. This will enable reports of abuses (e.g., corruption, mistreatment at the hands of officials) and actions (e.g., a strike) as well as alternative voices outside the country (e.g., President Joe Biden, dissidents) to reach a much wider audience than is currently possible, spreading dissatisfaction with the current regime.

Lastly, a concerted effort should be made to encourage Chinese elites to emigrate. Exiting is the strongest signal of dissatisfaction and can drain the country of some of its best talent. For the most highly skilled, the United States should develop a program similar to one of China’s many schemes to attract highly-skilled Chinese to relocate to the country, offering bonuses, subsidized housing, and support for families. The more elites take advantage of such opportunities, the greater awareness at home that life is better overseas, undermining the legitimacy of the Party’s message. While there may be some concerns over security in a few sectors—that might have to remain restricted or carefully monitored—most of these people will work in non-sensitive fields and can only enrich the United States with their talents.

THE UNITED States should also prepare for success. What might happen if American efforts begin to gain traction and the CCP fears losing support among the Chinese people? Given its long adherence to the four-part strategy outlined above (albeit with shifting tactics), the Party is likely to double down. On the one hand, that means taking the necessary steps to ensure livelihoods are secured—whether through reforms that give the private sector more economic freedom or that satisfy foreign demands (e.g., on selective human rights issues) or controls that limit prices or force companies to act in national (or Party) interest. We already see some of the latter (which is certainly more likely under Xi) with concentrated attacks on private companies (e.g., in the education sector) who are deemed to be making money in ways that promote inequality or raise living costs.

On the other hand, a CCP response may mean stirring up nationalist sentiment either through the media (as is often done now) or some action abroad. The latter would likely be something with limited risk but maximum play at home, such as stirring up tensions with Japan (always an easy bogeyman in China) or Australia (which is often portrayed as an American lackey) or taking an aggressive line on a border dispute, such as that with India or in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, the Party will increase its control over information—such as social media—and civil society. 

The biggest risk for the United States is overreaction, either forcing China to act precipitously (possibly provoking an unnecessary conflict) or in terms of compromise. A weakened CCP will likely either lash out or revisit its successful playbook of negotiating techniques (often leveraging the business community on its behalf to create ambitious dialogues, frameworks, or agreements that change little in the long run)—or both. The United States will need to see its strategy through with the persistence, patience, and restraint that it often lacks.

Our focus on undermining the Party’s legitimacy at home should be seen as a key offensive element as the United States confronts the challenges posed by China and seeks to build a broad coalition by incorporating countries and Chinese people from across the world. Given the economic interdependencies, policy changes will inevitably mean sacrificing some interests in the short term and overcoming resistance from those who most benefit from the status quo (such as Wall Street banks and firms sourcing goods in China). But challenging Beijing should be seen as in the U.S. greater national interest—essential to ensuring our, and the world’s, security in the years to come.