THE WESTPHALIAN ERA, FAR FROM DEAD, IS MOVING INTO A POWERFUL NEW PHASE

by Paul R. Pillar
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America’s Default Foreign Policy by Robert W. Merry
President Obama’s recent decision to arm the Syrian rebels reflects the reality that humanitarian interventionism has become official Washington’s default position on foreign-policy issues. But America’s leaders are out of step with public opinion, which is both more nationalistic and less supportive of foreign interventions. This suggests that elites of both parties are due for a political reckoning.

Articles

The Age of Nationalism by Paul R. Pillar
We are living in the nationalist era. The emergence of the nation-state is the defining reality of our time, surpassing in significance all the recent preoccupations over civilizational clash, globalization, history’s end and great-power polarity. Nationalism drives many of today’s most salient conflicts, and any U.S. strategy must take into account the powerful sentiments of peoples and governments around the globe.

Asia’s Looming Power Shift by Rajan Menon
The strategic choices of three states are transforming Asia. China, India and Japan have diverse strengths and weaknesses, and along with their neighbors they are all jockeying for power and influence. Meanwhile, the region’s lack of agreement on a common course and its shortage of effective institutions mean that tensions are likely to increase and major problems will continue to go unaddressed.

The Case for Norman Angell by Jacob Heilbrunn
After the Great War made a mockery of Norman Angell’s 1910 thesis that economic interdependence had made conflict obsolete, his name became a virtual synonym for naive utopianism. Yet this assessment ignores Angell’s later career, in which he shed some of his old beliefs and came to value the importance of power in global affairs—even as his intellectual descendants today continue to cling to his early illusions.

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Getty: pages 6, 35, 87; iStockPhoto: pages 91, 94
The Deepening Chaos in Sinai  by Daniel Byman and Khaled Elgindy

The instability in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula represents one of the most dangerous crises in the Middle East. The security vacuum there has allowed terrorists and criminals to expand their operations, use the area as a launching pad for attacks on Israel, and smuggle weapons and goods into Gaza. This complicates Egypt’s already-troubled transition and raises the likelihood of renewed conflict between Israel and Hamas.

Erdogan, the Anti-Ataturk  by Aram Bakshian Jr.

For nearly a century, modern Turkey has been dominated by the legacy of its founder, Mustafa Kemal, known to history as Kemal Ataturk. Ataturk was a man of iron will who dragged his countrymen into the twentieth century. Now Ataturk’s achievement is at risk, challenged by a rising Islamist tide led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has centralized power, jailed journalists and sought to craft an idealized version of the country’s Ottoman-Islamic past.

Reviews & Essays

Roosevelt and His Diplomatic Pawns  by Conrad Black

In 1940 and 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt pursued a masterful strategy to bring the United States into World War II without appearing to want to do so. Michael Fullilove chronicles the actions of Roosevelt and five of his envoys during this period. His work is a fair and well-researched history, but ultimately it assigns too much importance to the men around Roosevelt and not enough to FDR himself.

Tracing China’s Long Game Plan  by Jacqueline Newmyer Deal

For decades, many Western observers have assumed that as China rose it would also liberalize and become a more “responsible” global actor. Orville Schell and John Delury’s book skillfully explains why they were wrong. Their account of the lives and thinking of Chinese elites over the past two centuries demonstrates that China is concerned first and foremost with its own wealth and power and is only interested in Western ideas to the extent that they can contribute toward those goals.

The Limits of U.S. Financial Warfare  by Michael Scheuer

The Treasury Department is at war. Former Bush administration official Juan Zarate recounts how he and his allies used an array of financial tools to combat rogue regimes, terrorist organizations, mafias and drug cartels. Their tactical victories are impressive. But the country’s broader policy of constant overseas intervention is severely damaging America’s security and interests.
President Obama’s June 13 decision to send light weapons and ammunition to Syrian rebels reflects a fundamental reality in the dialectic of American foreign policy. Within this administration and indeed throughout official Washington, humanitarian interventionism is the inevitable default position for policy makers and political insiders. There is no intellectual counterweight emanating from either party that poses a significant challenge to this powerful idea that America must act to salve the wounds of humanity wherever suffering is intense and prospects for a democratic emergence are even remotely promising.

This reality emerges in sharp relief when one attempts to find the reasoning behind the president’s Syria decision through a process of elimination. Perhaps, one might speculate, the president decided the time finally had come to turn the tide of war decisively in favor of the antigovernment insurgents and against the regime of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. But, no, that can’t be the driver because nobody believes Obama’s modest flow of military assistance will have a significant impact on the Syrian civil war. It would be insulting to suggest the president believes such a thing.

Perhaps, one might speculate further, Obama wanted to bolster the military position of those insurgents committed to a relatively open and pluralist nation, as opposed to the radical Islamist elements driven by jihadist passions and the dream of a theocratic nation, like Afghanistan before 9/11. But this doesn’t make sense, either. Many analysts believe the war’s jihadist groups—including Al Nusra Front, affiliated with Al Qaeda—are substantially stronger militarily than the secular rebels. It seems dubious that U.S. aid can be kept out of jihadist hands.

Perhaps there is a political desire to align government policy with public opinion. Wrong again. A Gallup poll shortly after the president’s announcement showed 54 percent of respondents opposed the president’s arms initiative, while 37 percent approved. A Pew Research Center poll released at about the same time showed that fully 70 percent of respondents opposed the idea of the United States and its allies sending arms to Syrian rebels. The Pew survey also indicated that large majorities of Americans believe the U.S. military is stretched too thin and doubt that Syria’s rebel groups would govern any better than the Assad regime.

So the decision can’t be explained by politics, nor by a desire to favor more secular rebel groups, nor by any realistic strategic aims in the region. That leaves the default explanation—that Obama turned to humanitarian interventionism because

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that is the foundational foreign-policy philosophy of his party and goes largely unchallenged from any serious Washington precincts. It also seems to be Obama’s own philosophy. As he said in explaining his 2011 military initiative in Libya, U.S. forbearance in the face of events there “would have been a betrayal of who we are.”

The president’s default decision on Syria raises two questions: Why did Obama feel a need to put up a pretense of trying to influence events there when in fact his actions will have little or no impact on the unfolding tragedy? And why is today’s foreign-policy discourse so bereft of any serious intellectual counterforce to the prevailing humanitarian ethos?

Partial answers to both questions can be found in the same phenomenon—the decline in nationalist sentiment within the Democratic elite. The natural counterargument to humanitarian interventionism is nationalism, the idea that America as a nation must concern itself first and foremost with its own interests and imperatives; must look after its own citizens as a top priority; and must avoid global adventures that could damage the country’s public fisc or undermine its security.

Nationalists usually ask a fundamental question when foreign adventures are proposed—whether the national interest justifies the expenditure of American blood on behalf of this or that military initiative (or this or that action that could lead to military initiatives). The fate of other peoples struggling around the globe, however heartrending, doesn’t usually figure large in nationalist considerations. The fate of America is the key.

This grates on many within the Democratic elite, who formulated a doctrine during the 1990s Balkans crisis that favored humanitarian considerations for overseas actions over nationalist considerations. The rights and well-being of the world’s people superseded for many the rights and well-being of the American populace. Indeed, as writer Robert D. Kaplan has observed, the liberal embrace of universal principles as foreign-policy guidance “leads to a pacifist strain . . . when it comes to defending our hard-core national interests, and an aggressive strain when it comes to defending human rights.”

This is pure Wilsonism. “I hope and believe,” declared Woodrow Wilson in a speech before Congress in which he admonished Americans to embrace U.S.
involvement in World War I, “that I am in effect speaking for liberals and friends of humanity in every nation. . . . I would fain believe that I am speaking for the silent mass of mankind everywhere.” When the United States later entered the war, Wilson bragged that his country was not motivated by any national interest. “What we demand in this war,” he stated, “is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in.”

This Wilsonian humanitarianism now is the bedrock philosophy of the Democratic Party to such an extent that even President Obama, who harbors an instinctive skittishness over the risks in interventionist adventurism, feels a need to placate it with meaningless action on Syria. Although the matter was debated heatedly within the administration, the default position prevailed.

Which raises a question: Where is today’s Henry Cabot Lodge? Lodge, a senator from Massachusetts and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee when Wilson sought to get America into the League of Nations, went after Wilson and his League with a vengeance. His weapon: American nationalism. “I must think of the United States first,” he declared on the Senate floor in August 1919. “I have loved but one flag, and I cannot share that devotion and give affection to the mongrel banner invented for a league.” Lodge didn’t oppose American interventionism in principle, only when it was untethered from U.S. national interests. He saw clearly that Wilsonism in its purest form and American nationalism are antithetical.

David Rothkopf sees that too, and that’s why he rails so viciously against American nationalism. Rothkopf, CEO and editor at large of Foreign Policy magazine, personifies the Davos-culture, humanitarian-interventionist sensibility of our time, which wishes to obliterate the last vestiges of what he calls “Westphalian nation-state nonsense.” Writing in Foreign Policy, Rothkopf laments that his country is among those that “celebrate individuality to a fault.” Its “market ideology”—more Charles Darwin than Adam Smith, as he puts it—dismisses those who fall behind as “merely part of nature’s grand equation.” Having erected this caricature of a heartless nation, Rothkopf indelicately gives it a name—“frontier fuck-you-ism”—and suggests even those of his fellow countrymen who don’t embrace it in domestic affairs certainly do so abroad. The result is our “narcissistic, head-in-the-sand nation-statism,” which “is putting us at risk.”

Rothkopf is a smart guy, and he seems to perceive that this “Westphalian nation-state nonsense” he decries poses, potentially, the only serious intellectual counterweight to the humanitarian interventionism that has captured the Democratic Party. No doubt he also perceives that, while there is no longer any serious debate on the matter within his elite circles or even in today’s normal political discourse, nationalist sentiment remains robust and lively among ordinary Americans going about their daily routines and endeavors. That must be why he turns so pugilistic when discussing the matter.

That’s understandable. History tells us that when elite thinking opens a wide

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gap between national policy and popular sentiment, a reckoning usually is in the works. The Democrats’ default position on foreign policy may not be subject to any serious counterweight now, but that doesn’t mean one can’t emerge.

Meanwhile, over in the Republican Party, the default territory is held by neoconservatives, who harbor the same affinity for foreign adventurism but for different reasons. And, with the exception of Kentucky senator Rand Paul, even those in the GOP who don’t embrace the neocon label refrain from questioning the neocon position with any force. Thus, the Republican elite too faces a rank and file increasingly uncomfortable with its interventionist notions. That means it probably also faces an eventual political reckoning.

Indeed, Georgetown’s Paul R. Pillar, in this issue’s cover article, posits the view, which he develops with plenty of analytical rigor, that we actually are living in a global age of nationalism, in which fealty to the nation-state is driving world events to a far greater extent than many American intellectuals are willing to recognize. He sees this as a compelling political sentiment in America just as it is in other regions. And author Rajan Menon, who teaches at the City College of New York/City University of New York, sees nationalism as a significant geopolitical force in his survey, also in this issue, of the future of Asia.

So nationalism is not dead, either here or abroad, and it seems likely to reemerge in America’s future as a counterweight to that humanitarian interventionism that has so thoroughly captured the Democratic Party and political discourse in general. The question is when—and what kind of crisis in U.S. foreign adventurism will trigger it.
The urge to apply era-defining labels to global affairs is strong and enduring. A label and a few easy-to-understand attributes associated with it can impart a reassuring simplicity to what is actually a complex and often-intractable reality. While the disadvantages of era labeling, including oversimplification, are probably as great as the advantages, the practice is here to stay.

Indeed, American analysts and commentators have struggled with this era-defining business ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union and of Communism in Eastern Europe. The Cold War between the United States and the USSR was such a dominant backdrop for U.S. foreign policy for so long that it overshadowed every attempt to characterize international affairs in any other terms during those years. The strength of the Cold War paradigm was demonstrated during the first decade after the Cold War, when the defining term most often heard was “the post–Cold War era.” That inherently unsatisfying nomenclature described what the era wasn’t but not what it was. Some attempted to encapsulate the times some other way, usually with an emphasis on economically oriented nonstate actors, but no one formula seemed to catch on.

Then, with the terrorist attacks of September 2001, after which the administration of George W. Bush declared a global “war on terror,” many thought we finally had a new defining theme. Some saw in this struggle nothing less than a looming “World War IV,” to be waged against radical Islam (with the Cold War viewed as the third world war after the two hot global conflicts of the twentieth century). This notion persists in many minds, but neither terrorism nor radical Islam provides a valid basis for understanding and characterizing current international affairs as a whole. Terrorism is only a tactic, and one that has been around for millennia. Radical Islamists are a fringe of a larger phenomenon in world politics, hardly of sufficient worldwide weight to reshape global affairs. Hence, much of this reasoning represents in large part an overreaction to a single terrorist incident.

And therein lies a problem with the era-defining enterprise. Most such efforts use too short a time frame and attempt to extract too broad a theme from single episodes, such as the breakup of the Soviet Union or Al Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks on American soil. But an understanding of the present requires that we look much further into the past, not to stretch the time frame of various eras but rather to get a sufficient sweep of political, social and technological developments to truly understand how the present has flowed from what came before.

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By looking far back into history, we can see in the past two decades the long-incoming consequences of that phenomenon known as nationalism but now in full and unfettered form. It took three and a half centuries for the basic components—the sovereign state, popular attachment to the state and worldwide spread of this popular attachment—to emerge in full force. It took two centuries to shake off the occluding and delaying effects of empire and of Left-Right competition that culminated in the dominating East-West conflict known as the Cold War. The ingredients of nationalism may be centuries old, but the combined result, viewed globally, is new. We are living today in the nationalist era.

This reality of our time has been obscured in recent years by the intellectual struggles of the early post–Cold War period to define the era and then by the impact of the 9/11 attacks on the American consciousness. In some instances, the two together have generated an added layer of muddle. Some of the ideas about World War IV, for example, reflect the concept of clashing civilizations developed by the late Samuel P. Huntington, who argued that among the many dimensions of civilizations, as he defined them, the most important is religion. Huntington was on to something, as demonstrated by the role of religion in many armed conflicts, large and small, in recent times. Yet there is plenty of evidence to support the chief legitimate criticism of Huntington’s concept, which is that there is at least as much conflict within civilizations as between them. We are seeing that in spades today with conflicts within Islam, one of Huntington’s civilizations.

More generally, ask any group of reasonably well-informed observers to name the principal characteristics of the current global system, and you are likely to get agreement on a few essentials. The United States is still the preeminent military power. China is the most conspicuous and important rising power, with its strength manifesting itself so far more on the economic than the military front. Demographic trends underlie decline in Russia and Japan. And so forth. All true, but the essentials do not add up to a single, clear, era-defining concept.

The polarity of the international system—the number of major powers or blocs of powers that have disproportionate weight in world affairs—is a favorite basis for trying to distinguish one era from another. A generation of students of international relations has been taught that the world of the Cold War was bipolar and the world since the Cold War is something else. Exactly what that something else is, however, has been a matter of disagreement.

Some say we live in a unipolar world, with the United States being the single pole. What commentator Charles Krauthammer termed the “unipolar moment” in 1990
continues in some eyes as much more than a moment. This view is held not only by those who share Krauthammer’s neoconservative objectives but also by analysts who look at how far the United States is still ahead of all other countries, based on several measures of strength. An alternative concept is multipolarity, with different possible formulations of who exactly, besides the United States, qualifies as a pole. China surely is one, and another is the European Union—which contains most of what were once the great powers in an earlier period of multipolarity and whose economy today, considered as a unit, is the world’s largest.

Some focus on a duopoly of China and the United States, with talk of a G-2 as being more important than the G-8 or G-20. Even with this focus, how should one characterize the relationship of the Big Two, which cannot simply be equated with the U.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold War? Harvard Law School’s Noah Feldman suggests the term “Cool War” to capture both a traditional struggle for power and deep economic interdependence. Clever, though probably not catchy enough to come into general use. In any event, this and other possible descriptions of the U.S.-Chinese relationship—which does not have the kind of globally preoccupying impact, including proxy wars in far-flung places, that the Cold War did—do little to characterize contemporary world affairs as a whole.

Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, advances another option by saying that we live in a time of “nonpolarity,” in which power is diffused among many different state and nonstate actors. This idea, along with ongoing disagreements among others about how many poles the current international system has, suggests that the whole concept of polarity doesn’t really help define the current era of global affairs. One problem is the multiplicity of dimensions by which to measure national power and thus to assess who qualifies as a major power. Another is that a large portion of what matters, and what is troubling or challenging, in world affairs today does not have much to do with the number, relative strength or relationships of major powers, important as they are. Haass’s idea of nonpolarity reflects this reality, but like “the post–Cold War era,” it says more about what today’s world isn’t than about what it is.

All this debate over how best to define our time brings us back to the nation-state. Over the entire history of human organization, from bands of hunter-gatherers to the international institutions of today, its emergence is one of the most important developments of humankind. Those international-relations courses that drill into students the concept of Cold War bipolarity also teach them that the modern nation-state was born in the mid-seventeenth century. The birth certificate was the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which marked the end of the religion-driven Thirty Years’ War and codified the concept of state sovereignty. What is sometimes called the Westphalian system is reflected in the clean lines drawn between states on today’s world map.
During the first century and a half of that system in Europe, it provided the board on which monarchs and their ministers competed in a multiplayer chess game. This was classical European balance-of-power politics, history’s most pristine example of multipolarity in action, in which the number and relative strength of major powers mattered much more than ideologies or internal politics. Rulers formed alliances, occasionally fought restrained wars with small armies, and otherwise maneuvered to try to add more land and people to their realms. The masses were not players in this game other than as part of the booty that occasionally was won by one ruler and lost by another.

This elegant game was upset by the French Revolution, in which the masses first made themselves heard in a big way. They did so not only in internal affairs but also in conflicts between France and the other European powers, with the levy en masse becoming for the first time a major part of international wars and the increasingly large armies that would fight them. Large citizen armies, even if formally an output of conscription, were made politically possible by a strong sense of loyalty and attachment of the general population to its nation-state—a sense that had been missing during the earlier monarchical chess game. The combination of the Westphalian state and popular, emotional identification with it produced true nationalism, in which both statehood (actual or aspirational) and mass sentiment based on the nation are the key ingredients.

The full impact of nationalism on world affairs and even European affairs would be delayed, however, by other developments. One was the force of empire. Napoleon Bonaparte’s attempt at empire was short lived, but Russian, Prussian and Austrian power expanded to subsume much of Europe, while the Ottomans clung to earlier conquests in the southeastern part of the Continent. State sovereignty was divorced from many nationalities other than the few that were at the top of an imperial heap. Many others were repressed or divided, such as the Poles, or co-opted, such as the Magyars in what became the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary.

Although this remained the political structure of Europe into the twentieth
century, other processes were percolating that would add to the strength of future nationalism. The historian E. H. Carr, in a short book entitled *Nationalism and After*, describes some of these, which he calls the “socialization of the nation.” Relevant trends during the last third of the nineteenth century, seen especially in Germany, included extension of the franchise and an increased economic role of the state. Together, these factors further increased the sense among ordinary citizens not only that their primary loyalty belonged to their own nation-state but also that their own fortunes were wrapped up with the nation-state’s fortunes. These trends continued into the great nationalism-fueled European bloodletting known as World War I.

That war did not reverse the increase in nationalism, and not only because revanchism left from the war was at least as strong as revulsion over the bloodshed. Carr points to a couple of other reasons: autarkic policies that further identified citizens’ economic prospects with those of only their own state and not others; and the large increase in the number of European nation-states as empires were broken up. There was plenty of nationalist sentiment left to fuel a second round of carnage two decades later.

Carr wrote during the closing days of that World War II bloodletting. Showing tinges of the Marxism that would characterize some of his later work, he believed that after this war nationalism would finally subside—hence the “and after” part of his title. Some of his predictions turned out to be rather good. He expected that advances in military technology, especially air power, would render national frontiers strategically less significant than before. He anticipated the establishment of multiple regional organizations and what would become United Nations peacekeeping forces. He foresaw that Great Britain would have to establish closer ties with Western Europe. He advocated humanitarian exceptions to state sovereignty—a posture that today is called the “responsibility to protect” doctrine. And he foreshadowed Huntington in talking about civilizations as “great multinational units in which power will be concentrated.”

On his basic prognosis for nationalism, however, Carr was badly mistaken. Given his firm conviction that the end of World War II would mark the end “of the old fissiparous nationalism, of the ideology of the small nation as the ultimate political and economic unit,” it seems reasonable to suspect he would be taken aback in our time to see nations as small as Kosovo gaining independence. And he would be chagrined to find that in his native Britain, even though it did get closer to the Continent in the postwar years, there is more talk today about getting out of Europe than about getting more deeply in.

The full extent to which strong and inexorable nationalism would prove Carr wrong would not become visible until after a couple of other developments. One was decolonization in the less developed world, which peaked around 1960 but continued well after that. This process has added new nation-states whose numbers dwarf the new European states that were created after World War I and that Carr identified as part of what propelled nationalism in the interwar years. The Westphalian state has been sold successfully worldwide, despite its made-in-Europe label.

The other development harks back again to the French Revolution, which began two centuries in which competition between ideologies of the Left and the Right was a dominant theme of global politics and conflict. Between the fall of the Bastille in 1789 and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Left-Right conflict had many
manifestations, from the Holy Alliance and Three Emperors’ League on the right to the Comintern and Socialist International on the left. Whatever the exact form it took, the Left-Right dimension was so dominant for so long—more than half the lifetime of the modern nation-state—that it preempted, disguised or diverted much of what would have been consequences of the growth of nation-states and popular attachment to them. Left-Right conflict intruded in significant ways even in the nationalism-fueled conflict of the first part of the twentieth century, exemplified by the Bolsheviks’ quick relinquishment at Brest-Litovsk of large amounts of the Russian empire to get out of World War I and by the role that fear of Communism played in the rise of European fascism.

The final phase of these two centuries was the Cold War, in which competition between the Left and the Right became competition between East and West. This phase, too, delayed or disguised many of the consequences of nationalism, subordinating them to the East-West conflict. Suppression of German nationalism, for example, was inextricably linked to the West’s confrontation with the East, as rearmament of West Germany was permitted only within the context of the Western alliance’s integrated military command. Britain’s willingness to tiptoe into European integration, as a founding member of the Western Union Defence Organization in 1948, was all about the need for cohesion in the West to stand up to a new Soviet threat. Soviet domination of Eastern Europe also delayed completion of the process, begun at Versailles after World War I, of giving postimperial European nationalities their own states. It was only after that domination ended that Germany was made whole and the southern Slavs of Yugoslavia and northern Slavs of Czechoslovakia got their own states. As did, of course, the national republics of the Soviet Union, which became the biggest recent class of entrants into the Westphalian club.

And so we see the emergence of the nation-state as the defining reality of our time, surpassing in significance all the recent preoccupations over civilizational clash, globalization, history’s end and great-power polarity. Indeed, it could be argued that the age of nationalism actually is a product of the human condition.

That the nation-state should be the primary focus of loyalties and conflicts flows directly from human nature and how it evolved. Possession (or hoped-for possession) of a well-defined patch of the earth’s surface is a manifestation of the “territorial imperative” that author and screenwriter Robert Ardrey popularized in a book of that name almost fifty years ago and that is a dominant trait of many species most closely related to humans. Attachment to a nationality whose home is more or less coterminous with that patch is also a deeply rooted, birds-of-a-feather trait. Once established, a nation-state adds institutional imperatives to the biological and evolutionary ones to make it even more the focus of attention. The state becomes the source of both obligations and, as Carr notes of the late nineteenth century, benefits. National myths, which help to achieve cohesion and cement loyalty within nationalities, often exacerbate suspicions and resentment between nationalities; think, for example, of how some Serbian national mythology centers on memories of a military defeat by the Turks more than seven centuries ago. Perhaps nation-states, including small ones, are not, as Carr puts it, the “ultimate” type of economic and political unit, but it should not be surprising that the intense attachments to them that constitute nationalism underlie a large proportion of the policies, conflicts and problems prevalent in today’s world.
Nationalism infuses and drives many of the most salient and active confrontations around the globe. The object of the Obama administration’s foreign-policy pivot—East Asia and the western Pacific—is a prime example. The most visible conflicts there largely take the classic nationalist form of territorial disputes. This is chiefly true of unresolved differences between China and its neighbors over islands in the East and South China Seas and over the land border in the Himalayas with India. Some of the disputes involve economic interests such as hoped-for undersea hydro-carbons, but all of them involve more visceral sentiments of competing nationalities, exhibiting their individual territorial imperatives, that a given piece of real estate is historically and rightfully theirs.

Nationalism in China, as in most other nations, is a combination of natural sentiment bubbling up from below and exploitation of that sentiment from above. President Xi Jinping voices nationalist themes, and needs to voice them, not only to preserve national unity but also to sustain political support for necessary reforms and to claim legitimacy for the regime now that Communist ideology no longer does the trick. China, which owes its growth and prosperity to its three-decade capitalist trek, epitomizes how the receding of the great Left-Right struggle of the past has opened the way to more unreserved expressions of nationalism.

China also illustrates how some of the globalizing forces such as border-hopping information technology, which often have been seen as eroding the role of the nation-state, can actually enhance that role and increase popular identification with the nation. In a country as large and previously undeveloped as China, modern mass communications have expanded the exposure and perspective of millions from village or district to the nation as a whole. In general, modern electronic communications enhance the symbols and affinities of a nation (as well as the powers of a national government) more than they do those of a tribe or subnational region.

The role of nationalism is just as apparent on the non-Chinese side of those East Asian territorial disputes. In Japan, the resurgent nationalism that is identified most often with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reflects the broader yearning of an exceptionally homogeneous population that has taken decades to find a capacity for the kind of assertiveness that was crushed by the disaster of World War II. In Vietnam, the
nationalism that the United States failed to recognize as its actual adversary during the Vietnam War, when it was obsessed with Communist ideology, is now expressed so clearly and strongly that even the most obtuse could not miss it. Amid the disputes over islands in the South China Sea, demonstrators in the streets of Hanoi shout, “Down with the henchmen of China.” The Vietnamese regime knows that suppressing rather than identifying with such feelings toward China would risk turning the demonstrations squarely against the government.

The magnificent supranational experiment in Europe is an obvious challenge to the proposition that identification with the nation-state is the dominant pattern in world politics today. That experiment has indeed solidified an apparently irreversible shift in which war is now unthinkable between some states that have warred often in the past. But a reassertion of nationalism is a major part of the European Union’s current troubles, in ways that go beyond the economic issues conventionally viewed as the main problems. Efforts to deal with debt problems in the euro zone have been plagued as much by national stereotypes, in which northern Europeans see southerners as lazy and southerners see the northerners as arrogant, as they have by the technical problems of having a common monetary policy without a common fiscal policy. The growing strength of nation-based sentiment in Europe shows up in many endeavors that are still organized along national lines, from soccer tournaments to the Eurovision Song Contest.

Britain’s shaky involvement with European integration illustrates some of the larger trends involved. When Britain was first negotiating for entry into what was then the European Economic Community, most of the issues were narrowly defined economic ones, such as what would happen to imports of butter from New Zealand. Today the issue of Britain’s relationship with the Continent is addressed in broader terms centered on the meaning and importance of British nationality. This trend coincides with the rise of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which calls for British withdrawal from the European Union. Prime Minister David Cameron once dismissed the party as “a bunch of fruitcakes, loonies and closet racists,” but the UKIP’s electoral success—it garnered a quarter of the vote in local council elections this May—has forced opponents to take it seriously. The Cameron government’s toughened stance on immigration and commitment to hold a referendum on British membership in the EU are some of the results.

Cameron also has agreed with Scottish nationalists to hold a referendum on
independence. This is an example of how the transfer of some powers from national capitals to Brussels, far from diminishing nationalist sentiment, has provided a supranational umbrella under which some nationalities, especially ones unhappy with the arrangements within their current states, have become more assertive. These include Flemings and Catalonians as well as Scots.

However successful the European experiment will ultimately be economically and in forever banishing intra-European war, it has far to go in establishing a sense of continent-wide identity that can displace national identities grounded in language and culture. Even greater cultural and linguistic commonality may, as the example of Latin America suggests, be insufficient to overshadow the histories and identities of nation-states. The Liberator, Simón Bolívar, thought a shared Hispanic culture could be the basis for a region-wide federation, but it was not to be. Today the Andean country named after Bolívar does not even have full diplomatic relations with its neighbor Chile, due to a territorial dispute left over from a nineteenth-century war.

Africa continues to be a monument to the strength of the nation-state as a point of reference and object of competition, no matter how arbitrarily drawn its boundaries or deficient its central governments’ control over their territories. The secession of South Sudan was a rare exception to a continent-wide resistance to tampering with the colonial boundaries left by European powers. A similar pattern has prevailed since the breakup of the Soviet Union in Central Asia, where arbitrary boundaries are the product of Stalin’s divide-and-rule line drawing. The arbitrariness underlies some intrastate ethnic tensions such as those between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, but nationalist themes also have helped such figures as Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan to transition successfully from a provincial Communist Party boss to a national leader with a secure hold on power.

The USSR’s principal successor state, Russia, has exhibited a surge of nationalism since the Communist regime’s dissolution. The process partly parallels the one in China, in which the old Communist ideology could no longer serve as a unifier and legitimizer. But in Russia there is also popular anger over economic dislocation and the lack of growth, as well as perceived threats to ethnic Russians from minorities that are still part of the Russian Federation. The term “Russian nationalist” is thus most closely associated with a xenophobic and extreme-right sensibility, although the nationalist resurgence in Russia extends far beyond that.

Some of the intensified Russian nationalism has in effect been exported in the form of migrants to Israel. The migrants shared with all Soviet citizens the illiberal and undemocratic political culture of the Communist era, along with racially tinged attitudes toward nationalities of the Caucasus. But Russian Jews did not have their own national republic to cling to when the union broke up. Today, immigrants from Russia constitute one of the most fervidly nationalist segments of Israel’s population.

The region surrounding Israel would appear to constitute another challenge to the idea of the dominance of nationalism, given the conspicuous attention to religion rather than nationality and especially to what is commonly perceived as a region-wide conflict between Sunni and Shia. That attention is a reminder that no one way of labeling the world explains everything, and religious conflict certainly explains a lot in the Middle East. Many of the recent and ongoing conflicts in that region, however, can properly be characterized, at least in part, as struggles to liberate nation-states
from the yoke of particular clans, ruling families or religious sects, or from the influence of foreign powers. That certainly is true, for example, of the wars in Iraq and Syria. Nationality has trumped religion when the two have directly conflicted, as when Iraqi Shia fought for Sunni-controlled Iraq during the eight-year war against Shia Iran. Identification with individual nation-states has been more durable even than region-wide “Arab nationalism,” including the Arab nationalism of Pan-Arabism’s leading champion, Gamal Abdel Nasser, whose political union between Egypt and Syria was short lived. The boundary lines drawn during World War I by Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot have lasted, just like the colonial boundaries in Africa. The leading challenge to those lines, in northern Iraq, has come from the biggest unrealized nationalist aspiration left over from the post–World War I treaties: that of the Kurds. Likewise, the most salient long-running conflict with the broadest repercussions in the Middle East is a clash between two nationalist ambitions: those of Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs.

The fact that nationalism in the Middle East has not yet gotten completely out from the shadow of religious conflict, as nation-states in Europe did in the seventeenth century, is part of a larger regional historical lag in which the Middle East also has been slower to get out from the shadow of empire. Historian Niall Ferguson, explaining why the twenty-first century is likely to be less bloody in most of the world than the twentieth, cites as one reason the fact that the messy dissolution of empires is now mostly behind us. But he names one major, conflict-ridden regional exception—the Middle East—where an empire is troubled but not yet dissolved, by which he means the American empire.

Troubled empire or not, the United States exhibits as much nationalism as anyone else—even though Americans do not call it nationalism. More often it is termed “American exceptionalism,” which carries the connotation not just of assertion of national identity and values but also of being something bigger and better than anyone else’s nationalism. Exceptionalism is what the citizens of a superpower get to call their own nationalism.

The United States also is part of the worldwide trend of increased and intensified nationalism during the past quarter century. Politically, this has partly taken the form of one of the two major U.S. parties moving away from the internationalism and realism of Eisenhower and Nixon in favor of a foreign policy of neoconservatism, the most muscular expression of American exceptionalism. A perceptive analyst of American nationalism, Anatol Lieven, suggests that this party can now most appropriately be called the American Nationalist Party. The trends involved are not limited to one side of the political spectrum, however; they are reflected in prevailing American habits and attitudes ranging from the wearing of flag pins on lapels to unquestioningly imputing goodness to a wide range of U.S. actions overseas simply because it is the United States that is doing them.
The intensity of American nationalism points to the chief prescriptive implications of living in the nationalist era, which come under the heading of knowing oneself. Americans should understand how much their own first inclinations for interacting with the rest of the world stem from the same kind of nationalist urges that underlie inclinations in other countries, however much the American version is portrayed differently by affixing the label of exceptionalism. They should bear in mind that first inclinations and urges are not always in the best interest of the nation that is the object of their affection and attachment. U.S. policy makers should be continually conscious of how U.S. actions may step on someone else’s nationalist sentiments, eliciting the sort of counteractions that almost always are elicited when competing nationalist perspectives confront each other.

In assessing sundry problems overseas and how to deal with them, one of the first questions that should be asked is how a problem reflects nationalist sensibilities and ambitions, of masses as well as elites, in other countries. The resulting perspective is more apt to yield sound, policy-relevant insights than is a vision of transnational contests between good and evil, between moderates and extremists, or between democrats and autocrats. Sometimes the policy implication may be for the United States to do less; other times it may be to do more—as perhaps, for example, with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where a two-state solution appears increasingly out of reach but where a one-state formula seems inconsistent with the strong nationalist aspirations of both sides.

No single model of the world can generate an all-purpose grand strategy. But the best fit for the nationalist era is a pragmatic realism that takes as the basic ingredient of global affairs the sometimes conflicting and sometimes parallel interests of individual nation-states—while recognizing the power that can be generated by nationalist sentiments within nation-states.
C artographical conceptions of Asia obscure what, in strategic terms, is a “Greater Asia.” It stretches from eastern Iran through Central Asia and South Asia to Indonesia, and from the Aleutian Islands to Australia, encompassing the Russian Far East, China, Japan, the Korean Peninsula and Southeast Asia. It is connected by multifarious transactions, cooperative and adversarial, resulting from flows of trade and investment, energy pipelines, nationalities that spill across official borders, historical legacies that shape present perceptions, and shifting power ratios, within and among states. This is not a closed system; after all, many Greater Asian states are closely tied to the United States, a non-Asian Pacific state whose prowess enables it to shape power balances and political and military outcomes across the region. Yet America will face unprecedented changes in the distribution of power in Greater Asia’s eastern theater and disruptions in the western theater, as domestic constraints—economic and political—curtail its choices. That, in turn, will necessitate strategic reassessments by states in the region, particularly those that have relied on American protection. All this will undermine long-standing analytical frameworks and policies.

These looming changes cannot be fully understood through the prism of the grand theories devised to depict the post–Cold War world, including the three most prominent ones: the “Clash of Civilizations”; the “End of History”; and globalization. All three, underpinned by reductionism and historicism, miss the manifold, complex and contradictory forces shaping Greater Asia.

Samuel P. Huntington’s perception of persistent civilizational clash missed the reality that in Greater Asia states, not civilizations, remain the principal wellsprings of change. True, something akin to civilizational conflict is visible in Afghanistan, Myanmar, Kyrgyzstan, Iran, Sri Lanka, China, the Philippines, Pakistan and Malaysia. But, while it may threaten the cohesion of such countries, it has not integrated them into any civilizational blocs. In Asia, the effects of culture and religion are fissiparous rather than integrative and will remain so.

There is no Hindu civilization capable of mobilizing Asian loyalties and resources and aligning states’ policies to India’s benefit. Within India, Hindu nationalism—Cassandras’ cries notwithstanding—has failed to overcome the abiding appeal of secularism among the country’s founding doctrines. Though imperfect in practice, secularism has more purchase in Indian politics than ideologies based
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on religion and remains the signature of the Congress Party, India’s only national political organization. Partly because of its association with the North’s “Hindu heartland,” the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)—previously the Bharatiya Jana Sangh—has shallow roots in southern India, the locus of much of the country’s innovation and high economic growth, and has failed to capture the national imagination. Only twice (in 1977–1980 and 1999–2004) has the BJP formed a multiyear national government. Singly or through coalitions, the Congress Party has dominated India’s national politics.

India’s 170 million Muslims, nearly as numerous as their Pakistani coreligionists, represent another barrier to Huntington’s view of a Hindu civilization. It’s hard to imagine a bigger threat to India’s future than millions of Muslim citizens so fearful of ascendant Hindu chauvinism that they can overcome differences of language, regionalism and theological pluralism within their faith. But no such Hindu nationalism has gained sufficient traction in the country to raise such fears among Muslims. Hindutva—the inchoate ideology that conflates Indian and Hindu—has never attained significant influence. Gujarat State’s chief minister, Narendra Modi, a BJP luminary and aspiring prime minister, has been undermined by his association with a 2002 anti-Muslim pogrom in Gujarat. And various other militant Hindu movements—among them the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and the Shiv Sena—have never gained national followings.

Even weaker is the transnational potential of Hinduism, a capacious creed with an array of deities, doctrines and rituals that is further fractured by differences rooted in region, caste, class and language. While Hindu communities exist in Malaysia and Singapore and Hinduism’s imprint is evident in Bali and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, Asia’s non-Indian Hindus would find their prospects imperiled, not advanced, by becoming associated with a religion-based political movement led by gargantuan India. Furthermore it would be self-defeating for India to adopt a civilizational strategy at a time when it will need allies to counterbalance a rising China.

A Sinic civilizational bloc is equally implausible. Confucianism’s transnational allure will not match the emotional pull of nationalism, particularly in Japan and Vietnam, still influenced by their conflict-laden history with China. Moreover, a campaign by China to organize a Han civilizational coalition would antagonize its minorities, particularly the Tibetans and Uighurs, but also the Hui, whose rising nationalism already poses problems. China’s minority nationalities constitute less than 10 percent of China’s population, but they inhabit more than half its landmass. Progress in education and economic development has strengthened anti-Han nationalism, not weakened it through assimilation. Tibetans have been engaged in serial self-immolations (119 since 2009) and riots; bombings and demonstrations have erupted in the autonomous region of Xinjiang, the Uighurs’ homeland and site of bountiful energy deposits. Tibet and Xinjiang are remote from China’s eastern power centers. Tibet borders four countries, including China’s preeminent Asian rival, India. Xinjiang borders eight. Geography and ethnicity conspire to compound the challenge of maintaining the state’s control.

The Chinese leadership can contain restive minorities through repression and co-option, but changes in the surrounding region could make it harder. New states have risen in the Turkic Muslim regions of Central Asia once ruled by Russia; this area neighbors Xinjiang and constitutes a kindred cultural zone. Separatist Uighurs also can seek succor in an unstable
Afghanistan. China’s minorities could prove even harder to handle should a prolonged economic crisis produce political upheaval in the East, weakening the government’s authority. Then minorities could become even more resentful over irritants such as Han Chinese migration and the building of Han-majority urban beachheads—massive regime policies since 1949. Unrest and violence in Tibet and Xinjiang could expand significantly.

Sinic civilization, like its Hindu analog, cannot undergird an effective foreign policy. The most receptive constituency likely would be the thirty-four million “overseas Chinese” in the Asia-Pacific, with about half residing in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. But these groups are regarded with envy and often hostility in host countries because of their share of national wealth. They would be ill served by becoming adjutants to what would look like a culture-based quest for primacy by a country already viewed with trepidation. The persistent political divide between China and Taiwan illustrates the limits of cultural kinship in producing political influence. Taiwan would scarcely join a Beijing-led civilizational coalition, which would likely be directed against the United States, the country most critical to continued Taiwanese independence, or at India, China’s most powerful Asian rival. If the communities and countries culturally closest to China are poor candidates for a civilization-based strategy, Beijing would have even less success with those further removed and with a history of conflict with China, such as India, Japan and Vietnam.

An Asian Islamic bloc is the least likely, as there is no obvious candidate to serve as a hub. Pakistan and Indonesia, which have heft in size and population, come closest, but an Islam-centered Asian strategy would further unsettle a Pakistan already awash in violence stemming from disputes over who is a true Muslim, what Islam demands of its devotees and the rights of non-Sunnis (Ahmadis and Shia). As for Indonesia, its efforts to orchestrate an Islamic coalition would estrange non-Muslims in Bali, Maluku, North Sulawesi and especially Papua, where nationalism and separatist sentiment remain resilient.

Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” thesis—that liberal-democratic capitalism remained the sole global ideology following Soviet Communism’s demise—fares no better as a guide to Asia’s future. In Iran, Central Asia, Russia, Singapore and China, there is widespread ambivalence toward democracy. Some leaders, invoking “Asian values,” attack the materialism and hyper-individualism they see in liberal democracy and criticize its lack of regard for order, hierarchy and social obligation. Denouncing democracy promotion as a push to advance American influence, they emphasize inconsistencies that arise when pragmatic interests and democratic principles collide. Russia’s government has developed a variation on this theme—a mélange of statism, nationalism, Orthodox Christianity, social conservatism and critiques of Western human-rights norms. These sentiments resonate with many Russians, as public-opinion experts have noted, and may have greater appeal than the street protests of big-city anti-Putin liberals suggest.

The “Asian values” manifesto, designed to forge a coalition against the United States throughout much of Greater Asia, has not had much effect. Some of its proponents, such as Singapore, rely on America for their security and conduct multiple transactions with it, some of which have cultural significance. Still, the weakness of this approach does not mean the people of Greater Asia are ready to embrace democracy over authoritarian alternatives. Consider the contrast between democratic
India’s checkered economic record, authoritarian China’s stunning economic successes, the galloping growth rates South Korea and Taiwan achieved when neither was democratic, Vietnam’s brisk economic growth, and Singapore’s enviable living standards and clean government. The democracies in Asia have not been most successful at instituting economic reforms. China, unencumbered by election cycles or opposition parties, has instituted reforms more rapidly than India.

Indeed, the India-China dichotomy raises questions about whether democratic India or authoritarian China will prove to be the more attractive model in Asia and whether the contrast in their economic records to date may shape attitudes in the region more than Western democratic ideals. Though opinion surveys in Asia show substantial support for democracy, people’s responses become more nuanced on such specifics as its effectiveness in delivering rapid economic growth and efficient, clean government. The point is not that authoritarianism is better than democracy at promoting growth or curbing corruption—which is massive in China and elsewhere in Asia—but that the former’s successes may shape Asians’ political attitudes more than the End of History thesis assumes. This may also explain the lingering support for authoritarianism reflected in regional opinion polls.

Globalization, the third grand narrative, overlaps with Fukuyama’s framework. Its gurus proclaim that the desire for economic growth and technological prowess will force states to adopt market economics and open politics. But the first priority of any government is the preservation of its power, not maximizing economic growth.

When leaders fear that liberalization could threaten their political power, economic privileges and patronage networks, they resist. North Korea is an extreme example. More pertinent, perhaps, are China, Russia, Japan, India, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Each, in its own way, has bent globalization to its own purposes. Asian governments have shaped globalization as much as it has shaped them. Several restrict trade, foreign investment and travel. They decree currency controls, manipulate exchange rates and violate intellectual-property conventions. They censor the mass media and block Internet sites (a practice even in democratic India). They suppress opposition groups and imprison, or even kill, their leaders. They assert state ownership over key economic sectors. Globalization’s advocates might retort that such measures are inefficient. But that misses the point that
governments covet stability and control more than efficiency. Seen thus, the curbs on economic or intellectual exchange in Iran, Central Asia, China, Singapore, Russia and other nations in Greater Asia have achieved their goals. On occasion, the refusal to adopt policies peddled by globalization pundits has proved prudent. During the 1997 East Asian currency crisis, Malaysia, India and China all limited capital mobility, faring better than Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand, which didn’t.

Each of the three narratives discussed above exalts a singular force, whether cultural, ideological or economic, as determinative and to which states appear hostage. But states remain the paramount political participants in world politics. Fashionable theories miss the mark when they proclaim states’ diminishing significance and assert that the political and military competition among them counts for less in the era of qualified sovereignty, global governance and nonstate actors. The biggest changes in Asia will result from the successes, failures and strategic choices of three states in particular: China, India and Japan.

Thanks to growth rates averaging 9 percent a year since 1978, an unsurpassed record, China overtook Japan in 2010 as the world’s second-largest economy. By 2030 its economic output is expected to exceed that of the United States. This economic success gives Chinese leaders vast resources for advancing their objectives and their standing in Greater Asia. The economic boom also has yielded other sources of strength: near-universal literacy, a vast middle class, political stability, modern infrastructure, soaring exports and enormous trade surpluses, vast capital reserves, big advances in technological innovation, and a substantial and versatile manufacturing sector.

China’s trade ties, investments and lending in Greater Asia already are making it the fulcrum of an economic system. It is the leading trade partner for nine of Greater Asia’s countries: India, Pakistan, Iran, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Australia, Mongolia and Taiwan. Central Asia—the preserve of czars and commissars for some 150 years—is being pulled eastward by Chinese trade, investment, migration, cultural programs, railways and energy pipelines. And this reorientation has happened in a remarkably short time frame: since 1991, the year the Soviet Union imploded. On another front, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization provides institutional legitimacy to China’s expanding role, and stake, in Central Asia’s security. In Afghanistan, China is investing in oil fields and minerals and countering India’s determined efforts to gain influence (though once NATO forces depart, Beijing will have to devise a strategy to defend its newly acquired assets amid instability). While China and India remain at odds, the former has become the latter’s biggest trade partner (and racks up surpluses). The West has moved to isolate Iran, but China has not. It is Iran’s foremost trade partner, while Iran is China’s third-largest source of imported oil. On Greater Asia’s eastern flank, Russia is connected to

The post-Mao political system has never had to operate outside the congenial context of breakneck economic growth, so we don’t know how much its stability hinges on maintaining the blistering pace.
China by oil flows, trade and arms sales, while a “strategic partnership”—featuring joint military exercises—born of a shared opposition to a unipolar, American-dominated world has ended decades of ideological polemics, territorial disputes and militarized borders. Underlying this, however, is a dramatic shift in the balance of power in China’s favor, another historic transformation.

American alliances (or implied promises of protection) span Greater Asia and are especially salient for Australia, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and the Philippines. But these commitments will operate in a different context from the recent past. China still trails the United States in the standard indicators of power: GDP, defense spending, armed forces’ reach and lethality, sea and air power, and technological innovation. Yet such indices obscure a subtle yet critical shift occurring in East Asia. China has increased the risks faced by the United States in defending friends and allies. It has done this by increasing spending; purchasing modern ships, submarines and aircraft from Russia; modernizing its own military industries; and upgrading its technological know-how. This has not gone unnoticed in the region.

The ambit within which China can now exact a toll on American forces is larger than ever before and will expand. Standard “force on force” comparisons or tallies of relative economic power provide a snapshot of how the United States and China compare in aggregate global power. But such comparisons obscure the altered distribution of risk in East Asia and the degree to which it will require states in the area—especially those that have long relied on America for their safety (above all Japan)—to rethink familiar defense strategies. As the twenty-first century advances, the question these nations must ask themselves is just how far the United States will go to defend them, especially if they clash with China over the rightful ownership of tiny islands and outcroppings or challenge the validity of China’s “nine-dash line,” which essentially asserts Chinese ownership of the South China Sea. The point is not that China is likely to attack these countries but that, if current trends continue, it could prevail on contentious issues and cast doubt on America’s reliability, without firing a shot. That is the way of Sun Tzu.

Yet China also faces pressing problems. Perhaps the biggest stems, paradoxically, from Beijing’s success in transforming China’s economy and society since 1978, when Deng Xiaoping’s reforms commenced. The ensuing socioeconomic modernization has been revolutionary. What has been lacking, though, is a corresponding transformation in China’s political order, which has produced a disjuncture between, in Marxist parlance, the “base” (socioeconomic forces) and “superstructure” (the state and its institutions). The signs include the increasing group consciousness of non-Han nationalities; sharp increases in protests (which reached 180,000 in 2010, twice the number in 2006) over official land grabs, corruption and environmental despoliation; new levels of labor unrest; and an anachronistic official ideology, Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, which is an impediment to economic growth and management. Continued socioeconomic change will only aggravate this misalignment, for which the Communist Party appears to lack solutions beyond repression, co-option, censorship and harangues about subversive ideas.

Deng and his successors maintained order in part by ensuring phenomenal economic growth rates that have recast the lives of Chinese, creating opportunities few had imagined. Yet the post-Mao political system has never had to operate outside the
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congenial context of breakneck economic growth, so we don’t know just how much its stability hinges on maintaining the blistering pace. High-tempo growth also has increased income inequality, pervasive corruption and environmental degradation, all of which have bred social turmoil. The Communist Party is likely to manage the polity-society misalignment by embracing nationalism (the true opiate of the masses) and touting China’s emergence from weakness to global power. Yet that could present its own problems. Chinese leaders will find it harder to reassure their Asian neighbors that China’s rise is benign and that they need not take steps to bolster their security. Beijing’s room for compromise during crises and confrontations, especially involving Japan or the United States, will also be reduced. Chinese citizens, increasingly nationalistic and equipped with information and technologies that empower protesters, will judge the party against its rhetoric. And the more powerful China becomes, the greater these expectations will be.

The mainstream view among Sinologists is that China will overcome all such problems or will not even face them. Yet increasing capital flight (circumventing low official ceilings on moving money overseas) and a surge in the numbers of wealthy Chinese choosing to emigrate to the West suggest that China’s most privileged are hedging their bets. While China may not be headed for collapse, its long-running success could be replaced by a period of turbulence and uncertainty. A faltering China, rather than a rising one, could be the challenge that awaits Asia. Prolonged instability in China would have wide repercussions. Chinese leaders could lean harder on nationalism as a legitimizing ideology under such circumstances. And because of China’s importance in the global economy, its misfortunes would spread well beyond its borders.

If China’s successes routinely make headlines, it is India’s failures that get attention. While the acceleration of India’s economic growth after its reforms of the early 1990s have received coverage, enumerations of India’s failings, especially relative to China, are more common, and there are many of them. India’s 2012 per capita GDP was $3,900, ranking 168th worldwide; for China, the respective numbers were $9,300 and 123rd; for Japan, $36,900 and 38th; for South Korea (whose income per person in the early 1950s was on par with India’s) $32,800 and 44th. India’s literacy rate is 73.4 percent, while those of China, Indonesia and Malaysia are over 90 percent. Fully 32 percent of all Indians subsist on less than $1.25 a day (in terms of purchasing-power parity), compared to 13 percent in China, 18 percent in Indonesia, 21 percent in Pakistan, 1.5 percent in Iran and
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0 percent in Malaysia. In life expectancy, India ranks 164th; in Greater Asia, only Pakistan, Nepal, Tajikistan and Afghanistan fare worse. Its infant-mortality rate ranks 50th; the only states in the region with worse records are Afghanistan, Pakistan, Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Bangladesh. India’s infrastructure is antiquated—a drag on economic growth and inward foreign investment—and a stark contrast to China’s. In the UN’s most recent “Human Development Index” rankings—a composite measure of individuals’ access to basic necessities—India places 136th, and the only countries in Greater Asia that trail it are the likes of Afghanistan, Myanmar and Papua New Guinea. India’s anemic industrial-manufacturing base is a major barrier to export-led growth and poverty reduction. Its university system, despite pockets of excellence, cannot meet present and projected needs in science and engineering. India’s cumulative inward foreign direct investment in 2010 was $191 billion, compared to China’s $574 billion and lilliputian Singapore’s $274 billion. Neighbors with far smaller populations—Thailand, Taiwan and South Korea—were close in absolute terms and far ahead per capita. Though the subject of much hype, India’s information-technology sector employs a tiny proportion of the workforce and cannot offset the country’s weaknesses in manufacturing.

It’s true that India has scored some gains, among them a drop in the poverty rate, made possible by its accelerated economic growth since the early 1990s—averaging 6 percent for much of the 1990s, 5.5 percent between 1998 and 2002, 8.8 percent between 2003 and 2007, and 6.5 percent between 2008 and 2012, a sharp contrast to the 3.5 percent average from 1950 to 1980. But the dismal quality-of-life statistics cited above make predictions of India’s impending rise as a global power sound hollow. India can’t soon close the economic gap with China. Nor, despite huge strides in modernizing its armed forces since the humiliating 1962 defeat at China’s hands, can it balance China militarily without powerful coalition partners—a reality that will remain unchanged during the next few decades.

Yet India has impressive strengths compared to China. China’s urbanization, advances in education and, above all, its draconian population-control practices have, in a few decades, reduced its total fertility rate (TFR), or children born per woman of childbearing age. It is now 1.55, well below what’s required (2.11) to maintain a country’s current population size. India’s TFR, by contrast, is 2.55. China’s population is shrinking, and this trend will continue, increasing the proportion of retirees, skewing the ratio of retirees to taxpayers and increasing expenditures on the nonworking population. This pattern bolsters the “demographic transition theory” (economic advancement reduces population growth), which has been evident in the West and Japan as well. But as the demographer Nicholas Eberstadt notes, Europe and Japan got rich before they became old. China’s experience will be the opposite, and that portends problems for sustaining high economic growth and investment. By contrast, 25 percent of India’s population is projected to be below twenty-four years of age by 2025 (compared to 18 percent for China), guaranteeing an abundant supply of labor.

Paradoxically, some of India’s apparent weaknesses are strengths. India lacked the preconditions deemed necessary for democracy (in particular, high literacy and a large middle class). Yet it established a democratic system in 1947 and has nurtured it successfully ever since. Power has been transferred peacefully numerous times through national, state and local
elections over nearly seven decades. India is a linguistic and religious kaleidoscope, but this trait, far from being an impediment to stability, has made it harder to organize mass movements against the central government. It also has increased the significance of state-level politics, thus localizing problems.

India’s diversity also has compartmentalized crises, whether violence in Kashmir, Sikh separatism, tribal and Maoist insurgencies, or riots provoked by the government’s efforts, now abandoned, to make Hindi the national language. The strong elements of decentralization in India’s political system reduce the probability that an upheaval in the center will radiate outward, encompassing the rest of the country—a contrast to what occurred in the twilight of the Soviet Union and to what could happen in China.

Then there are the clear-cut strengths of the Indian polity. The army has stayed clear of politics, which provides an added source of political stability. Despite Indian democracy’s blemishes (such as elections marred by corruption and patronage, and parties anchored in personalities), the country faces nothing comparable to China’s base-superstructure misalignment. India’s problem is the reverse of China’s: a lagging “base.” That’s a serious challenge but not comparable to the obsolescence of an entrenched political order.

The last of the trio, Japan, has long since solved the problem of meeting its citizens’ basic needs. And it rivals Europe and America in living standards. Japan took to democracy when it was imposed by America following World War II and has maintained it through the decades while avoiding the kind of social turmoil experienced by the West in the 1960s and by Europe now. Japan is about as monoethnic as countries get (and employs a restrictive immigration policy to stay that way). The homogeneity has eased the bargaining and compromises integral to democratic politics. Though Japan descended into decades of deflation after the early 1990s, it now seems to be emerging from that swamp. It retains a world-class industrial and technological base and service sector, and its economy is still the world’s third largest. These assets give Japan the wherewithal to increase its military power relatively quickly. It can also do so without significant economic strain: thanks to its alliance with the United States, defense spending has averaged below 1 percent of GDP since the end of World War II. Altering the established pattern will initiate controversy at home and abroad, but Japan’s decades-long strategy of relying on American protection—outsourcing defense—will become less tenable as the balance of power between America and China changes. Changes in Japan’s defense strategy loom, and it is absurd to see the choices as limited to the militarism of the past or the minimalism of the present.

The “peace constitution,” many citizens’ aversion to abandoning military minimalism and still-strong Asian memories of Japanese imperialism will together make it difficult for Tokyo to respond to the new context. Yet, with an economy reliant on imports for just about everything needed to keep operating, Japan is especially vulnerable to states with naval power capable of blocking sea-lanes. It has been fortunate for almost seventy years: the national interest of the United States, the world’s preeminent maritime power, required that it keep sea routes secure, including Asian sea-lanes. Though the United States will maintain its naval preponderance for many years, China, also dependent on sea-lanes and thus susceptible to their disruption, will continue to expand its naval power with the advantage of having significant resources in hand. For
the first time since 1945, Japan will face an ascendant Asian power that is an adversary committed to becoming a front-rank naval power.

Japan also faces serious demographic problems. Although the aging of Japanese society accelerated once Japan got rich, the process continues, and the Japanese seem unwilling to turn to immigration as a solution. Japan’s population, now close to 128 million, is projected to shrink to ninety-seven million by midcentury. Demographic constraints will shape Japan’s defense choices, inclining it toward sea and air power and high-tech weapons, but it will not rule out increases in defense spending or a rethinking of the established national-security strategy.

The biggest security challenge for much of Greater Asia will be balancing China, whose neighbors will hedge their bets even if the Chinese leadership uses sticks sparingly and carrots liberally, while emphasizing China’s “peaceful rise.” In the politics of nations, words have slippery meanings, and intentions are difficult to divine. Hence, states dwell on others’ deeds and on the changes in relative capabilities that create new power ratios.

Asian countries that have fought wars or had skirmishes with China will be particularly inclined to hedge. China’s growing capabilities will coincide with its territorial disputes with India, Japan and various Southeast Asian countries. It could resolve these disagreements to reassure the region, but that has not been the predilection of rising powers. China is more likely to retain what it has, offer partial concessions to India, and press its claims more forcefully over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands as well as the Spratlys/Nansha and Paracel/Xisha archipelagoes. A Chinese leadership reliant on nationalism to manage internal instability will be even less willing (or able) to make compromises.

Barring an internal crisis, China will have substantial superiority in power over other Asian states. Thus, strategies aimed at balancing it will be collective rather than unilateral or bilateral, and even the United States will seek partners to reduce the associated risks and costs. Pressing U.S. domestic needs—outmoded infrastructure, long-neglected social problems, the rising costs of health and retirement programs, budget deficits and debt, and the increasing proportion of retirees—are likely to reduce the revenues and reservoir of public support American leaders require to sustain expensive overseas defense commitments. Thus, a diminution in the American commitment appears likely, the current clamor about a pivot to Asia notwithstanding.

The most effective collective strategy for states seeking to counterbalance China would be to extend Chinese focus and resources across several fronts. Given China’s size, these fronts are widely separated and hence hard to reinforce. Simple geography suggests that the natural partners will be the United States, Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Australia, Singapore and India. Yet apart from the difficulties of orchestrating such a disparate coalition, its members’ varying degrees of economic

Changes in Japan’s defense strategy loom, and it is absurd to see the choices as limited to the militarism of the past or the minimalism of the present.
dependence on China and exposure to its military power will complicate cohesion and collective action.

Still, security consultations among these states have increased, and some (India, Japan, Australia and Singapore) have engaged in joint naval exercises. China’s rise has initiated a strategic convergence between India and the United States—a stark contrast to the Cold War years—and their 2008 agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation was a landmark. That deal constituted, in effect, America’s recognition of India as a nuclear-weapons state—a major departure from Washington’s traditional nonproliferation policy. Yet talk of a U.S.-Indian alliance is misplaced. India will seek the material and symbolic gains that flow from a partnership with Washington but without losing its leverage or alarming China. Given China’s proximity to India and its growing power, the risks of joining an overtly anti-Chinese alliance would outweigh any gains. This same logic will guide Vietnam.

Japan will face the toughest choices. The prevailing view among Japan experts is that it will not jettison its military minimalism for various reasons—public opposition, a quasi-pacifist culture, constitutional barriers, confidence in the American alliance and regional memories of Japanese militarism. Yet over the past three hundred years Japan’s foreign policy has ranged from isolationism to imperialism, with variations in between, and changes in its external environment have often forced these fluctuations. Furthermore, Japan’s choices are not limited to inertia or imperialism. It now spends a tiny proportion of its GDP on defense and could improve its military capabilities modestly without provoking panic. Moreover, depending on how China wields its power, regional attitudes could change, especially if Japan increases its military strength in tandem with a multilateral strategy and resolves its territorial squabbles with South Korea (over the Takeshima/Dokdo island groups) and Russia (concerning the South Kurils/Hoppo Ryodo).

Some states will stand apart from an anti-Chinese coalition. They include South Korea, as long as China does not pose a threat and remains North Korea’s principal patron. Russia will follow suit. Its vast Far Eastern provinces—almost three times the area of France, Germany and Spain combined—are sparsely populated (just over six million, 4.2 percent of Russia’s total population), far from Russia’s western industrial heartland (Moscow is five thousand miles away) and hence hard to support militarily. This is particularly true given that the four Chinese provinces across the border (Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, Jilin and Liaoning) alone contain about 160 million people. Russia’s relative weakness will give China a secure northern front and reduce any encirclement strategy’s efficacy. Mongolia—weak, exposed to Chinese power and lacking nearby allies—will respond similarly, while Laos and Cambodia will rely on China to balance Vietnam. For its part, Beijing will counter any encirclement strategy by preserving and extending interior lines of supply for energy and trade that connect it to Russia, Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. It will also seek access to ports on the coasts of Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Iran, so as to have supplements to the Straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok. China also will insist that any deal over the unification of the Korean Peninsula, which will require its participation, involve the removal of or a sharp reduction in American forces now stationed in South Korea.

On Greater Asia’s western flank, China will replace Russia as the state most consequential for Central Asian states’ economies and national security. But
this transition will unfold as much of Central Asia resumes its cultural trajectory southward, toward the wider Islamic world, a process interrupted by the nineteenth-century czarist conquest. In deepening its presence in Central Asia and Afghanistan, China will have to navigate cultural and religious currents that could flow into Xinjiang. Another challenge will be to safeguard its economic investments and security interests without provoking a backlash or becoming mired in conflicts in what promises to be a volatile area. That balancing act will be even harder should China experience a political crisis that makes distant Xinjiang harder to control, precisely at a time when the province is exposed to destabilizing influences.

China’s biggest problem in Greater Asia’s western theater would be Pakistan’s fragmentation, which would undermine the most important element of China’s outflanking strategy against India and trigger upheavals with follow-on effects that could flow into China’s westernmost provinces. Pakistan’s breakup would be even more dangerous for India, Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Each has borders and cultural and ethnoreligious connections with Pakistan, which would ensure that its problems would be theirs, too. India’s leaders, having long focused on Pakistan’s strength, would face new circumstances that are harder to comprehend, let alone counter, above all preserving nuclear deterrence with an adversary lacking a functioning state.

Five other problems could surface or become more difficult to manage were Pakistan to unravel. One is irredentism, given that the Pashtun homeland straddles Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Baluch territories traverse Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. The second concerns groups that couple terrorism and radical Islam, which would find it much easier to operate in Kashmir and Afghanistan in the absence of a strong Pakistani state. The third is the management of crucial water resources shared by India and Pakistan, and by Pakistan and Afghanistan, in ways that do not pit upstream states against their downstream neighbors. Fourth is the prospect that transnational drug and criminal networks spanning Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia and Iran could be strengthened. The fifth would be ensuring Afghanistan’s stability amid upheaval in Pakistan.

Another challenge on Greater Asia’s western flank involves stabilizing post-American Afghanistan. What looms is freewheeling competition—featuring India, Pakistan, China, Iran and Uzbekistan—
powered by fear and mistrust and without robust regional organizations that could foster collective action. Worse, as part of their rivalry, these states are likely to establish patron-client relationships with armed Afghan groups, making order in Afghanistan even harder to preserve. None of these states stands to gain from worsening turmoil in Afghanistan, yet each is acting in ways that increase its likelihood.

Would that one of the three prevailing megatheories offered a reliable guide to Greater Asia’s future. Alas, with so many forces at play in the region, tidy frameworks are useless. Greater Asia is like a big bus crammed with passengers of varying backgrounds and persuasions. Some are more important than others and can take a turn steering. But this bus has several steering wheels and no consensus on a common course, least of all among the drivers, who also lack maps and don’t trust one another enough to select a route or destination. Some vehicle parts are old and unreliable; others have yet to encounter rough terrain. And a thick fog obscures the road.

A likely consequence of the divergent interests among Greater Asia’s most powerful states and the absence of effective institutions to facilitate collective action is that problems that cannot be addressed effectively without multilateral cooperation will go unattended and fester. These problems include nuclear proliferation, terrorism, environmental degradation, territorial disputes and arms races. Among the desirables that appear infeasible are confidence-building measures that avert crises on land and sea; agreements that enable the cooperative exploration of contested oceanic energy deposits; rule-based management of shared water resources by riverine countries; and codes of conduct on cyberwarfare, trade and investment in a transaction-dense region. The pity is not merely that these challenges are likely to be missed opportunities for cooperation but also that they may aggravate already-abundant sources of tension and conflict resulting from changes in the balance of power. Thucydides would have found these tragic circumstances familiar, but our prevailing paradigms, long on sweep and short on subtlety, cannot do them justice.
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The Case for Norman Angell

By Jacob Heilbrunn

Over a century ago, a talented British newspaperman sent a manuscript on the irrationality of war to numerous London publishers. It was uniformly rejected on the grounds that the public was uninterested in the topic. After he paid a well-known firm to print his opuscule, it quickly garnered praise, and then, a few months later, an expanded edition became a publishing sensation. It sold several million copies and was almost immediately translated into twenty-five languages. At a moment when a highly nationalistic imperial Germany was arming itself to the teeth and Edwardian England was, in turn, bolstering its naval program, the book’s thesis was as revolutionary as it was sweeping—that growing economic interdependence among nations rendered renewed conflict a thing of the past.

Norman Angell’s triumph was not adventitious. Much of it was owed to the unstinting efforts of Lord Esher, a close friend of King Edward VII and chairman of the war committee, who touted Angell’s The Great Illusion as a profound work. Others agreed. The volume became the subject of a cult following, and study groups and societies in England and Europe were formed to discuss and propagate its views. Reviews in the popular press were seldom less than adulatory. The New York Times declared, “The author is enjoying the almost unlimited praise of his contemporaries, expressed or indicated by many men of eminence and influence, by countless reviewers who have lately hungered for a hero to worship.” The Boston Herald stated, “This is an epoch-making book.” A French economics journal called it “profound,” and it was hailed in Germany as “an invaluable contribution.” Edward VII read the book and an institute called the Garton Foundation was established to disseminate its message. Lord Esher wrote the author, “Your book can be as epoch making as Seeley’s Expansion of England or Mahan’s Sea Power. It is sent forth at the right psychological moment, and wants to be followed up.” Esher himself did just that: he lectured at the Sorbonne as well as to a group of high-ranking military officers, which included Sir John French, the chief of the General Staff, to explain that growing economic ties meant that armed conflict “becomes every day more difficult and improbable.”

Yet only four years after this volume appeared, the improbable occurred, severing the very economic ties that were supposed to render conflict among nations nugatory. In August 1914, Europe plunged into World War I. By war’s end, the Austro-Hungarian, German and Russian monarchies had been toppled. Dictatorships emerged. And so the heady acclaim that Angell had experienced on the eve of the Great War was replaced by withering scorn. Perhaps the most lasting verdict came in...
1962 with Barbara Tuchman’s popular history, *The Guns of August*:

By impressive examples and incontrovertible argument Angell showed that in the present financial and economic interdependence of nations, the victor would suffer equally with the vanquished; therefore war had become unprofitable; therefore no nation would be so foolish as to start one.

Angell enjoyed a career that included writing a total of forty-one books, winning the Nobel Peace Prize and becoming a member of Parliament—“It is the only gate before which I have ever stood filled with envy,” wrote Anthony Trollope in *Can You Forgive Her?*, “sorrowing to think that my steps might never pass under it”—but his popular reputation never really recovered. Instead, his name became a synonym for naive utopianism. Shakespeare’s description in *Julius Caesar* of Casca as belonging to the kind of men who “construe things after their fashion, / Clean from the purpose of the things themselves” comes forcibly to mind when considering Angell’s posthumous reputation. As the Canadian writer Dan Gardner sympathetically observed in his study of expert opinion, *Future Babble*, “No one has ever suffered more for a prediction that failed.”

But as the hundredth anniversary of World War I looms large—and a spate of books arguing about its real origins appears (was Germany the culprit? Russia? England? Austria?)—a fresh look at Angell, too, is surely warranted. Indeed, his remarkable life has attracted fresh scholarly scrutiny. Perhaps no one has done more to rescue Angell from the condescension of the past than Martin Ceadel in his punctilious study, *Living the Great Illusion*, which this essay draws upon. What emerges is an intriguingly contradictory character with a flair for self-promotion. A canny operator, he steadily sidled toward realist principles, abandoning some of his own illusions, even if he never quite explicitly acknowledged his transformation. He embarked upon a prolonged intellectual journey—from opposition to war to an appreciation of the centrality of power in international relations—that indicates he was a restless and, more often than not, insightful student of world politics.

The school of thought that this intellectual gladiator helped found—liberal internationalism—has demonstrated a remarkable perdurability. All along during the Cold War, the United States attempted to use a web of economic ties to create closer relations with and prosperity for
Europe and Asia. But, when the conflict with the Soviet Union ended, the thesis of globalization, harking back to Angell’s heady pre–World War I argument, reemerged. It reached its apex during the 1990s, in the time of the Clinton administration, which emphasized, or tried to emphasize, economic ties with other nations over the exercise of military force. Walter Wriston, who was head of Citicorp, heralded the information age in his 1992 book *The Twilight of Sovereignty* as marking a new era of global convergence, rendering national borders impotent and obsolete. Wriston saw the fax machine as the “pamphleteer of the late twentieth century.”

Today the most prominent globalization cheerleader is *New York Times* columnist Thomas L. Friedman, who announced in 1999 that Angell was “actually right.” In *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, he promulgated his “Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention,” which held that no two countries that had a McDonald’s would go to war with each other because getting a Golden Arches franchise signified membership in the new, globalized order of international cooperation. But, after war between Serbia and its Balkan neighbors put paid to that theory, Friedman amended it slightly in another best seller, *The World Is Flat*, by introducing the “Dell Theory of Conflict Prevention.”

Now, with the economic collapse that began in 2008 lingering on in Europe and America, the theory of globalization is under siege. This has led inevitably to dismissive references to Angell as the ultimate progenitor of delusions about international affairs (though it was, of course, Karl Marx who first discussed the phenomenon of the newly emerging global capitalism in *The Communist Manifesto*: “In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations”). But a look at Angell’s full career indicates that his story is more complicated—and more enlightening—than the caricature of many of his detractors would suggest.

Perhaps Angell’s most outstanding characteristic was his relentless desire to puncture conventional thinking. He went from foe of World War I to friend of Winston Churchill and vigorous opponent of the appeasement of the great dictators. After World War II, he warned about the Soviet threat. He never fully left the Left, but he didn’t hesitate to chastise it for its own naïveté about power politics.

Angell’s penchant for upsetting intellectual apple carts began at an early age. Born on December 26, 1872, into a prosperous family that lived in Holbeach, Lincolnshire, he soon rebelled against his mother’s Christian faith. As a lad, he immersed himself in political debates at a time, as he recalled later, “when George Bernard Shaw and H. G. Wells were just beginning to come into prominence.” These influences, along with the Fabian Society of that era and, as he recounted, “all the fermentation of socialism and what not,” transformed him into a “socialist, an agnostic, a republican.” Politics, he mused, was “entertainment”—there weren’t the distractions of football or movies, let alone video games. Then his father sent him abroad to Saint-Omer to study at a lycée. By age seventeen, he was editing an English-language newspaper while enrolled at the University of Geneva.

A young idealist, Angell came to regard Europe as suffused with parochial, nationalistic feuds and hopelessly backward when it came to power politics. He headed for the New World. He worked as a cowhand and prospector before becoming a homesteader in 1892 in California, where he also began writing essays about
Angell steadily sidled toward realist principles, abandoning some of his own illusions, even if he never quite explicitly acknowledged his transformation.

economics. He defended free trade and attacked Massachusetts senator Henry Cabot Lodge for espousing protectionism. He observed, “One may say without exaggeration that whole States in the West owe their prosperity to the British market.” Later he took a swipe at Theodore Roosevelt’s praise for the strenuous life, which Angell depicted as a reversion to the nasty habits of Europe that the New Eden was supposed to shun: “The superiority of this country to the Old World lay in our freedom from the burden of militarism, from the mischief of the military ideal.” Engaging in foreign quarrels, he said, was a sideshow for America and prompted it to “prefer indulgence in a sentiment of hostility to the furtherance of our interests.” The “our” indicates that Angell had come to see himself as something of an American. But for all his solicitude for his adopted country, he failed to make it financially and ended up accepting a well-paid position in Paris in 1897 as a newspaper editor for the Daily Messenger, where he continued to observe and write about international affairs. He was also deeply influenced by Gustave Le Bon’s new book, *The Crowd*, which heightened his conviction that the masses were susceptible to being manipulated by crude appeals to nationalism. In 1903, he published his first book, *Patriotism Under Three Flags: A Plea for Rationalism in Politics*, which drew on his experiences in England, America and France to argue against jingoism. This maiden effort went nowhere.

Angell was undaunted. The next decade saw what Ceadel terms an “astonishing improvement in Angell’s fortunes.” The newspaper magnate Lord Northcliffe, who was impressed by Angell’s knowledge of Europe, appointed him manager of the Daily Mail’s continental edition. So far, so good. But what really made Angell’s name was the publication in 1909 of a book called *Europe’s Optical Illusion*. At a moment when Europe seemed headed toward conflict, Angell offered a rosier scenario, suggesting that financial links had made conflict unlikely. This gave hope to England’s peace camp, which warmed to his blasé attitude about warfare. He wrote that “our defeat cannot advantage our enemy nor do us in the long run much harm.” This of course signified a woeful misunderstanding of Kaiser Wilhelm’s aims, particularly his desire to rule over a German-led Mitteleuropa.

Still, Angell was right to debunk the bogus notion that capitalism was responsible for war. This was not an insignificant contribution. Angell was entering the lists at a time when competing liberal and radical theories about imperialism were flourishing. Richard Cobden and John Bright, champions of a “little England” that focused on trade and didn’t intervene abroad, had argued that financiers were essentially interested in peace. But J. A. Hobson, who viewed finance capital as the main motor of imperial expansion and war, would have none of it. He offered a much more radical critique in *Imperialism*, which Lenin relied upon in composing his own misbegotten tract, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. Angell offered a different
critique that focused on the irrationality and hubris of various nations: “Vanity and all its concomitants: national pride of place, of mastery; coerciveness, that conception of ‘honour’ which demands

vindication by force of arms, the lust of rule and dominion, the pride of territorial possession, and the jealousy of like possessions in others.”

Europe’s Optical Illusion led a few months later to his breakthrough book, a revised and expanded version titled The Great Illusion.

How does this much-derided study hold up in retrospect? Angell’s primary gift was his journalistic talent—the ability to deliver sweeping statements in clear prose. He explained everything. The explanation for the armaments rivalry in Europe, he said, was not difficult to discern. The states’ motives were all too obvious:

They are based on the universal assumption that a nation, in order to find outlets for expanding population and increasing industry, or simply to ensure the best conditions possible for its people, is necessarily pushed to territorial expansion and the exercise of political force against others. . . . The author challenges this whole doctrine.

Angell warned that the heads of European states risked becoming the caricatures that Hobson and others depicted.

It was a commonplace that military success was the precondition for economic prosperity. “The fact that Germany has of late come to the front as an industrial nation,” he wrote, “making giant strides in general prosperity and well-being, is deemed also to be the result of her military successes and the increasing political power which she is coming to exercise in Continental Europe.” But this was turning things on their head. The belief that material advantage could be derived by conquering another country or by adding fresh territories to an empire was wrong: “It is universally assumed that national power means national wealth, national advantage; that expanding territory means increased opportunity for industry; that the strong nation can guarantee opportunities for its citizens that the weak nation cannot.”

This was the optical illusion of Angell’s initial title. He saw it as a snare and a trap, nothing less than a superstition that threatened to plunge the nations of Europe into a senseless war. In his eyes, a war would have such convulsive effects on international trade that it would render the aggressor prostrate almost immediately. He declared:

Even where territory is not formally annexed, the conqueror is unable to take the wealth of a conquered territory, owing to the delicate interdependence of the financial world (an outcome of our credit and banking systems),
which makes the financial and industrial security of the victor dependent upon financial and industrial security in all considerable civilized centres; so that widespread confiscation or destruction of trade and commerce in a conquered territory would react disastrously upon the conqueror.

Angell argued further that the fact that small states—Switzerland, Belgium or Holland—were as well off as larger ones with big militaries showed that armaments were no road to wealth. Even the direct occupation and confiscation of a foreign country’s assets would have no beneficial effect. According to Angell:

If the British could annihilate Germany, they would annihilate such an important section of their debtors as to create hopeless panic in London, and that panic would so react on their own trade that it would be in no sort of condition to take the place which Germany had previously occupied in neutral markets, leaving aside the question that by the act of annihilation a market equal to that of Canada and South Africa combined would be destroyed.

Angell was fascinated by markets. He subordinated everything to capital, and his worship of it led him to advocate a kind of international arrangement in which various countries would maintain financial order by accepting spheres of influence. He wrote, “It is more to the general interest to have an orderly and organized Asia Minor under German tutelage than to have an unorganized and disorderly one which should be independent.”

At the same time, Angell dismissed the idea that politics has to consist of a ceaseless struggle for power. Humans, he said, could change. Religious dogmas had been shed. So could militaristic ones. The notion that human bellicosity was irredeemable was mistaken. As he put it:

Man’s pugnacity, though not disappearing, is very visibly, under the forces of mechanical and social development, being transformed and diverted from ends that are wasteful and destructive to ends that are less wasteful, which render easier that co-operation between men in the struggle with their environment which is the condition of their survival and advance; that changes which, in the historical period, have been extraordinarily rapid are necessarily quickening—quickening in geometrical rather than in arithmetical ratio.

Angell also lobbed some intellectual mortars at the militarists who argued that the West was going soft, succumbing to what in the eighteenth century was known as luxury and effeminacy. Angell’s embrace of luxury contradicts Montesquieu and Edward Gibbon, who feared that citizens would happily exchange the freedoms of the republic for prosperity and indolence. As Gibbon put it in *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*:

In the purer ages of the commonwealth, the use of arms was reserved for those ranks of citizens who had a country to love, a property to defend, and some share in enacting those laws, which it was their interest, as well as duty, to maintain. But in proportion as the public freedom was lost in extent of conquest, war was gradually improved into an art, and degraded into a trade.

Where Angell went astray, however, was in underestimating the profits that could be extracted from colonies. Belgium, for example, profited immensely from the brutal exploitation of its territories in the Congo, as Adam Hochschild has vividly shown in *King Leopold’s Ghost*. He also was mistaken to suggest that warfare would almost instantly lead to general economic collapse. It did not. Instead, the war ground on for years. But almost
no one had anticipated the emergence of trench warfare. Moreover, it certainly was true that Germany, which, together with Austria-Hungary, started World War I, found itself in desperate straits by 1917 as it became unable to feed its population properly. But this was more a function of the naval blockade of the German Reich than it was of financial upheaval. The true turmoil came after the war, when the Allies sought massive indemnities from the fledgling Weimar Republic, a course that Angell, like John Maynard Keynes, whom he knew personally, correctly denounced as a punitive measure that would boomerang upon England and France. Still, Angell was clearly wrong to suggest that aggression was, as he put it, “out of date.” Indeed, several decades later the Nazi empire would be predicated on the notion that aggression could pay, and it did—for a while. The Nazis relentlessly extracted supplies and natural resources from the territories that they conquered in an effort to avoid any shortages on the home front.

During World War I, Angell understandably bridled at the idea that he was “attacking patriotism,” as one of his contemporaries put it. This was a canard. He was assailing what he saw as irrationality. But his opposition to it led him astray. The cold, hard truth is that Angell had wrongly deplored the centrality of power in international relations. In 1914, for example, he announced to an American journalist, “There will never be another war between European powers.” Once Germany backed Austria-Hungary’s ultimatum to Serbia, British progressives went into overdrive to avert England’s entry into the war. They failed. By the end of 1914, Angell was performing ambulance service in France. A year later he was traveling in America seeking U.S. support for Britain in the war. Once President Woodrow Wilson sought congressional approval for war against Germany and the Central powers, Angell became a staunch proponent of a league of nations. Collective security was to become his new mantra and the path back to respectability.

To his credit, Angell deplored the harsh settlement that emerged at Versailles. Like Keynes, he viewed it as counterproductive—why should American goods rot in docks because Germans were arbitrarily rendered unable to pay for them? The notion that an indemnity should be demanded was precisely what he had always opposed in arguing that war should not pay. His book *The Peace Treaty and the Economic Chaos of Europe* was written with his characteristic asperity. By June 1929, Angell had become a Labour MP, but he never achieved the high office he had hoped for from Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald. In 1931, his rehabilitation continued with a knighthood conferred upon him by King George V. Next came the bestowal of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1933—the year Hitler and the Nazis came to power.

Reflecting his new views on international power politics, Angell confronted the Nazi threat head-on. He did not indulge in the illusions of the British Left or Right, which embraced malignant forms of pacifism or appeasement. Angell became increasingly convinced of the need to stop Nazi aggression. And, departing from his pre-World War I outlook, he now embraced the idea of collective security. War could result, he argued, from the failure of well-intentioned policies. He noted in his Nobel address:

In England at this moment there is a considerable section of the press systematically opposing the League of Nations on the ground that it would involve Great Britain in the risk of war. There is no reason whatever to suppose that
these protagonists of isolationism are insincere in their professions of desire for peace. One of these groups has just organized a war museum for the direct purpose of bringing home to the public an intensified horror of war as an argument against the League. If their policy of destroying the League should ultimately produce war, it is not their intention which would be at fault, but their judgment; not their aims, but their calculations as to the means by which the end may be obtained.

But of course collective security was no panacea. In 1936, Hitler’s reoccupation of the Rhineland and Mussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia delivered a brutal buffetting to the League of Nations, which proved wholly ineffectual in stopping the dictators. Once again, Angell adjusted his views. As a result, writes Martin Ceadel, “Angell’s message was becoming increasingly realist in tone. . . . he was more concerned than ever before with the distribution of international power.” Angell established close ties with his former detractor Winston Churchill and inveighed against the dismantling of the British Empire, departing from a position he had previously trumpeted. Now Angell saw the empire as a vital force for stability abroad. Besides, he now believed that England had “an interest in the preservation of order in the area it covers.” At the same time, the British economy would be threatened if other countries claimed its resources. This, too, was diametrically opposed to his earlier contention that the assets of a country could not be profitably deployed against it. He attacked both Tory and Labour Party appeasers of Nazism and battled with the mendacious left-wing diplomat and historian E. H. Carr, who hailed the 1938 Munich agreement in his book *The Twenty Years’ Crisis*. In it Carr also loftily dismissed the “utopians” such as Angell who failed to understand what “realists” understood. But who was truly realistic about the Nazis? “For the final eighteen months of peace,” Ceadel writes, Angell “was to be an outspoken critic not only of the Chamberlain government for its appeasement policy but also of the Labour Party for its hostility to a popular front.”

He also insisted that it was essential to make common cause with Russia against the Nazi menace. Sounding like the ultimate realist, he said, “We are not concerned with the internal policy of a nation—we don’t care whether it is Fascist or Communist. What we are concerned with is its external policy.” During World War II, he championed the cause of the Western Allies. His metamorphosis was almost complete. After World War II, while Angell supported creation of the United Nations, he also became something of a cold warrior, warning of the “frightening communist conquest of the human mind” and favoring a close cooperation between America and England against the Soviet threat. In his autobiography.
Angell’s career provides an object lesson, not in the absurdity of liberal internationalism but, rather, in its limitations.

After All, which appeared in 1951, Angell complained about the “tendency of Liberals and the Left to subject Churchill to savage attacks while completely exonerating Russia” and to ignore the “doctrinal fanaticism of the Communist creed.” A particular Angell bugbear was Colonel Robert McCormick, the tyrannical Chicago Tribune publisher who opposed cooperation with the British and preached isolationism even during the Truman years. Angell placed him at the head of what he called the “professional Anglophobes”—the antediluvian remnant of isolationist American conservatives who believed that America was doing the bidding of Britain in opposing totalitarianism abroad.

Although Angell altered his own theories as he went along, his early belief in economic interdependence remains a powerful credo. Today the players may be different, but the realities of global competition are the same as ever. And the debates about them have not changed much either. China is a boisterous rising power that is challenging the international system, much as Wilhelmine Germany once did. What’s more, America is eyeing China’s rise with a wariness reminiscent of Britain’s at the turn of the last century. Japan, long an adherent of pacifism, is now beefing up its military in an effort to safeguard its security. This time, the potential for a military clash between China and the West, with Japan in the mix, is improbable, an exercise in futility and in no one’s interest, particularly given the economic interdependence of these nations. Or is it?

Angell I would have said that any move toward war would be self-defeating and hence improbable. But Angell II likely would have acknowledged the military threat that China poses and adopted a more cautious stance. Though he does not provide a road map to the present, he was one of the first modern, sweeping theorists of international relations. The next thinker to have a similar impact was George F. Kennan. Then, at the end of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama, in the pages of The National Interest, offered a modified version of Angell’s initial thesis, suggesting that history was coming to an end and detecting the “ineluctable spread of consumerist Western culture.” That proved premature as atavistic forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere rose up. Great-power competition has not disappeared. Nor have borders. Angell’s career provides an object lesson, not in the absurdity of liberal internationalism but, rather, in its limitations. He was a Davos man before Davos men even existed, but he gradually came to acknowledge the truths that many of his intellectual descendants continue to resist.
The growing instability in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula represents one of the most dangerous, and most anticipated, crises in the Middle East. Even before the 2011 Egyptian revolution, the security vacuum in the Sinai allowed criminals and terrorists, including those with an ideology akin to Al Qaeda’s, to expand their operations. In the chaos after the revolution, these problems have worsened. Meanwhile, various Palestinian groups use the Sinai as a launching pad for attacks against Israel. The large-scale smuggling of weapons and civilian goods to and through this territory—much of it bound for Gaza—has fostered an illicit economy in both Gaza and Sinai while helping Hamas bolster its military capacity and political grip over Gaza. Increasing violence and instability in Sinai could complicate Egypt’s already-troubled transition and raise the prospect of renewed large-scale conflict between Israel and Hamas. And the reverse is also true, as witnessed by the dramatic spike in deadly violence in Sinai following the ouster of Egypt’s Islamist president Mohamed Morsi in July. In addition to instability in Egypt, prospects for an Egyptian-Israeli military clash also could be heightened, in which case the United States could find itself caught between its closest ally in the region, Israel, and a vital Arab partner on which regional stability depends.

On the surface, the Sinai-Gaza crisis looks simply like an issue of border security. Fighters and weapons go to and from Gaza via the Sinai, and these, in turn, are used to attack Israel and undermine stability in Egypt. Meanwhile, the illicit economies that have grown on both sides of the Gaza-Sinai border are largely the product of increased smuggling operations that grew in response to the closure of Gaza’s borders. But this surface picture shrouds much deeper and far more complex political issues. For Egypt, policing the Sinai is caught up in the country’s turbulent internal politics, with successive civilian governments, including the former Muslim Brotherhood–led government, the military and the intelligence services all wanting to avoid responsibility while asserting their power vis-à-vis one another. For Hamas, the smuggling economy is vital both to its military power and its ability to prop up Gaza’s feeble economy. Meanwhile, for the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA), which was forced out of Gaza by Hamas in 2007, the Sinai problem underscores its growing political irrelevance.

The irony is that all of the main actors—Egypt, Israel, Hamas and the PA—would prefer to see changes in the status quo. Israel, of course, would like to have calm

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The Deepening Chaos in Sinai

By Daniel Byman and Khaled Elgindy
on its borders as well as neighbors that can deal effectively and responsibly with violence and smuggling, even if they are not openly friendly. Egyptian officials worry that instability in the Sinai will become a lightning rod for renewed war and a breeding ground for radicalism in Egypt, further undermining the credibility of the security services and any government, be it military or civilian. They also fear, with some reason, that Israel seeks to dump the Gaza problem in Egypt’s lap. Cairo also seeks to reassert its sovereignty in the Sinai, where restrictions imposed by the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty are seen by Egyptians as an affront to national pride. Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas and other PA figures would welcome the chance to return to Gaza as well as the added legitimacy that would come simply from being part of any new arrangement.

Even Hamas—or perhaps especially Hamas—worries about the Sinai. Many of the radicals there have links inside the Gaza Strip and oppose Hamas nearly as much as they oppose Israel, seeing the Palestinian group as insufficiently zealous in its pursuit of an Islamic state in Gaza and too accommodating with Israel. Moreover, whereas Hamas’s fortunes had improved following the Arab uprisings, the toppling of Morsi and the Brotherhood in Egypt dealt the most serious blow yet to Gaza’s Islamist rulers. Even under Egypt’s short-lived Muslim Brotherhood government Gaza’s borders were never fully opened. Moreover, since Morsi’s ouster, Egyptian authorities have imposed even tighter restrictions on the Gaza border and stepped up efforts to destroy the smuggling tunnels beneath the border, renewing and intensifying Gaza’s and Hamas’s isolation.

By working with Israel, Egypt, the PA and friendly governments in the region, the United States can help forge a new regional dynamic. All involved would have to make concessions, some of which would require risks. Doing so, however, would reduce the chance of a confrontation over Sinai, help protect Israel from attacks, make the success of peace talks more likely and improve regional stability. The goal would be to ensure not only that everyone gets something but also that everyone has a stake in continuing at least de facto cooperation.

Egypt and Israel have long enjoyed a largely peaceful border, but even before the fall of Hosni Mubarak in February 2011 the Sinai had become home to numerous groups bent on attacking Israel. On February 4, 2008, a suicide bomber entered Israel from Sinai and attacked Dimona, a city close to the border that is the home of Israel’s nuclear establishment. Later, in two separate incidents in 2010, rockets fired from Sinai hit the resort town of Eilat.

The situation became more fraught after Mubarak’s fall. The most deadly cross-border event in years occurred in August 2011, when infiltrators based in the Sinai conducted multiple attacks near Eilat, killing eight Israelis. The Eilat attacks were dangerous not only because of the lives lost, but also because of the risk of escalation. Israeli forces pursued the attackers into Sinai and accidentally clashed with Egyptian troops there, killing five. Israel initially blamed the Gaza-based Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) and bombed several sites in the Strip, killing fifteen Palestinians, including the leader of the PRC. Hamas responded with rocket attacks, in which one Israeli was killed. A few weeks later, Egyptian protesters angry at the killing of Egyptian soldiers stormed the Israeli embassy in Cairo, prompting the evacuation of the ambassador and his staff and sparking a diplomatic crisis between Egypt and Israel.

Cooler heads in both Egypt and Israel prevailed (aided by U.S. mediation), and
Hamas also backed down. But should another clash occur at a tense time in Egyptian politics—and Egyptian politics are very tense now—it may be hard for the regime in Cairo to avoid a confrontation. Israeli-Egyptian relations could sour, jeopardizing broader cooperation.

During 2012, the number of attacks on Israel originating in the Sinai grew considerably. According to a report from Israel’s intelligence service, eleven attacks emanated from the Sinai that year, including rocket attacks and five attempted infiltrations. Militants also routinely targeted the pipeline running from Egypt to Israel, exchanged fire with Israeli troops and planted explosives along the border. Many more attacks were thwarted.

Although Israel often blames Hamas or other Gaza-based Palestinian groups for the violence, frequently the attackers are Sinai-based jihadists, who are ideologically more like Al Qaeda than Hamas. As a report from Israel’s Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center concluded: “The Sinai Peninsula has been turned into a convenient venue for terrorist organizations affiliated with the global jihad.” Khalil al-Anani, a Middle East expert at Durham University in England, similarly warns, “Sinai is ideal and fertile ground for al Qaeda. It could become a new front for al Qaeda in the Arab world.”

Although the threat is predominantly homegrown, the mix also includes a handful of foreign fighters. Israel asserts that Iran-backed groups such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad are also active in Sinai.

The threat comes primarily from elements within isolated and often-disaffected communities in Sinai or Gaza—and very often both, given the many tribal, commercial and other links that exist particularly among the bedouin communities of Sinai, Gaza and even Israel. Within these marginalized and interconnected communities, various Salafi-jihadi groups have emerged. These groups do not always cooperate with one another, but they often share a common leadership, cadres, training and supplies. And they are highly dangerous. Some wish to affiliate formally with Al Qaeda, while others do not. However, Al Qaeda has so far been reluctant to embrace these groups, perhaps due to doubts about their operational sophistication and overall level of support, though in 2011 Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri praised the “heroes” in Sinai who attacked the gas pipeline to Israel.

The jihadists, who see attacking Israel as their main mission, seek to exploit the Sinai’s strategic position and instability to inflame regional tension. By attacking Israel, they hope to provoke Israeli strikes on Egypt, thereby inflaming the Egyptian public and forcing Egyptian authorities into a military response. Their objective is to set off a chain reaction, triggering tension, strife and even war. In so doing, they hope to destroy the thirty-year peace between Egypt and Israel.

The removal of Egypt’s first Islamist president in July breathed new life into jihadi elements in Sinai and elsewhere in Egypt. The weeks immediately following Morsi’s ouster saw a major spike in deadly attacks on both civilian and military targets.
in Sinai, while calls for jihad and the black flag of Al Qaeda became common features of pro-Morsi rallies across Egypt. After fifty Brotherhood protesters were killed by the army on July 8, one speaker in Cairo declared, “The era of peace has ended. If the army attacks us we will attack back. We say to the Egyptian army that the day might yet come when we tell it to leave Sinai.” While there is no clear evidence of any operational ties with the Brotherhood, the nearly daily attacks in the Sinai are looking increasingly like a low-level insurgency.

Beyond the risk of direct attacks, for years Sinai has been a concern to Israel because it is a source of, and path for, weapons, explosives and fighters going to and from Gaza. A 2012 State Department report found that the northern Sinai had become “a base for smuggling arms and explosives into Gaza, as well as a transit point for Palestinian extremists.” Israeli intelligence contends that weapons looted from Muammar el-Qaddafi’s arsenals in Libya and from the Sudan—including antitank and antiaircraft missiles as well as long-range rockets—pass through Sinai en route to Gaza.

These weapons could fundamentally change the threat to Israel from militant groups in Gaza. While Hamas has long been Israel’s enemy, historically it has been poorly armed, and most of its rockets have had little accuracy or range. But Hamas’s ability to send fighters in and out of Gaza for additional training in Lebanon and Iran also makes the organization more formidable. In addition, Sinai-based militants have entered Gaza to fight Israel. Many of the worst networks of jihadists and criminals overlap both Gaza and Sinai. During Israel’s eight-day Operation Pillar of Defense in Gaza in November 2012, Islamist organizations in Egypt sent money, weapons and fighters to oppose “the enemy of God.” As Israel regularly clashes with Hamas, anything that increases Hamas’s military strength is viewed as a grave threat.

Israel has tried to meet the threat from Sinai as it has met past cross-border threats: by employing a mix of diplomacy, threats, punishments, stepped-up intelligence and defenses. Israel’s preferred approach is to push Egypt to solve the Sinai problem. This has worked only fitfully at best. Senior Israeli defense official Amos Gilad contends: “There is constant and in-depth dialogue with the Egyptians.” Israel, however, is leery of high-profile efforts or coercion, fearing that it would put the Egyptian government in a corner and, given Israel’s deep unpopularity in Egypt and the political uncertainty there, lead any regime to turn against Israel to curry favor with the Egyptian people.

Because neither Egypt nor Hamas can control Sinai, Israel has fallen back on improved intelligence gathering and defenses. Israel’s intelligence networks in Sinai were weak under the former regime of Hosni Mubarak; they relied on the Egyptian
regime to exercise control and thus didn’t need a robust capability of their own. Although Israel’s networks have improved, it is difficult to gain a comprehensive intelligence picture on all the small groups in the Sinai and thus anticipate all attacks. Since 2010, Israel has built more than a hundred miles of fence along the Israeli-Egyptian border from Gaza to just north of Eilat. Sixteen feet high, the fence uses cameras, radar devices and other means of detecting infiltration by Sinai-based smugglers and militants. It also serves as a means of barring illegal migrants from entering Israel from Sudan and Eritrea.

Although this fence suppresses some infiltration, the threat to Israel is not just from cross-border attacks. As Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu conceded, “We are building a very impressive security fence, but it doesn’t block rockets.” For rockets, he added, “We will hit those who come to hurt us and we will also hit those who send them.” Such talk sounds tough, but in practice it is hard to implement. Striking directly at groups in Sinai would violate Egypt’s sovereignty and risk inflaming Egyptian nationalism—exactly the sort of passions the jihadists want to generate. And hitting Hamas in Gaza does little to control violence from jihadists in Sinai, many of whom are also critical of Hamas. The jihadists reject the concessions Hamas has made in the name of governance, being particularly critical of its regular cease-fires with Israel and its failure to Islamicize Gaza fully.

Threats and punishments have worked with Gaza to some degree, however. Israel regularly strikes a range of sites in Gaza to put pressure on the Hamas regime, particularly after a rocket or terrorist attack. At times, as in Operations Cast Lead (2008–2009) and Pillar of Defense, the military punishment is massive, leading to widespread devastation in the Strip. More quietly, but more importantly for ordinary Gazans, Israel also maintains a host of severe restrictions on trade and travel to and from Gaza as well as on energy supplies entering the Strip. Since September 2007, Israel’s stated policy has been to allow in just enough to prevent a humanitarian crisis, while making daily life difficult and normal economic development impossible.

According to a statement issued by Israel’s security cabinet shortly after Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip:

Additional sanctions will be placed on the Hamas regime in order to restrict the passage of various goods to the Gaza Strip and reduce the supply of fuel and electricity. Restrictions will also be placed on the movement of people to and from the Gaza Strip. The sanctions will be enacted following a legal examination, while taking into account both the humanitarian aspects relevant to the Gaza Strip and the intention to avoid a humanitarian crisis.

In addition to restricting what goes into Gaza, Israel’s blockade has also meant a virtual ban on exports from the impoverished Strip; in all of 2012, a paltry 210 truckloads of goods made their way out of Gaza, compared with more than 5,290 in 2006 and 15,255 in 2000.

Israeli coercion has limited attacks from Gaza because Hamas is capable of policing itself and, to some degree, other groups in Gaza. But it is far less likely to work in the Sinai because, while Hamas exploits the Sinai, it does not control it. Hamas has cracked down on these groups in Gaza, at times harshly and bloodily, but it cannot do so in Sinai.

Beyond Egypt’s risk of a clash with Israel, Egyptians themselves are paying a heavy price for Sinai-based terrorism. Years of neglect by successive Egyptian governments, along with a harsh and mountain-
ous terrain, have made the impoverished Sinai an ideal breeding ground for extremist elements. A series of spectacular terror attacks on popular tourist destinations in the Sinai between 2004 and 2006 left some 150 Egyptians and foreigners dead and hundreds more wounded. It also dealt a major blow to Egypt’s tourist-dependent economy.

The erosion of law and order that has plagued Egypt since Mubarak’s fall has only compounded the growing security vacuum in the Sinai. Since February 2011, the security checkpoint in El Arish, near the Gaza border in North Sinai, has been attacked at least thirty-nine times, while the natural-gas pipeline to Israel and Jordan has been bombed no fewer than fifteen times. Attacks on Egyptian security forces and even multinational forces stationed in the Sinai have become routine. The deadliest attack occurred in August 2012 when armed militants ambushed an Egyptian military outpost near the Egypt-Gaza-Israel triborder area; they killed sixteen soldiers and commandeered two armored vehicles. In May 2013, gunmen abducted seven Egyptian police officers in northern Sinai. Although the kidnapped officers have since been released, the incident demonstrated that large swaths of Sinai territory remain outside the control of Egyptian authorities.

Two overriding interests guide Egyptian responses to Sinai: maintaining stability and safeguarding Egyptian sovereignty. Egyptian authorities have cracked down periodically on jihadist militants as well as smuggling networks in the Sinai-Gaza arena, but they are equally worried about the prospect of unilateral Israeli actions in the Sinai. Egyptians also have long feared that Israel seeks to permanently push Gaza, demographically and politically, onto Egypt. This fear feeds into other goals of the Egyptian government, including the promotion of Hamas-Fatah reconciliation and restoration of Egypt’s regional prestige and leadership role.

Egypt’s determination to control the situation in the Sinai-Gaza arena was demonstrated last November when Egyptian authorities brokered a cease-fire agreement that ended eight days of fighting between Hamas and Israel, as well as intensified operations against Sinai jihadi elements and Gaza tunnels.

Long-term calm in Gaza, however, requires more than just an arrangement between Hamas and Israel and Egyptian security operations along the border; it also requires political arrangements
Israel’s preferred approach is to push Egypt to solve the Sinai problem. This has worked only fitfully at best.

between Egypt and Israel, and between Hamas and Fatah. So long as Hamas continues to operate as a free agent, outside the authority of the PA, it will remain unpredictable and hence a potential threat, as well as vulnerable to threats by even more radical groups. Consequently, internal Palestinian reconciliation, while still shunned by Israel and the United States, is in many ways a matter of national security for Egypt.

Yet political rivalries and uncertainty complicate any Egyptian approach. While security matters in the Sinai have long been mainly the purview of the military establishment and intelligence services and, to a lesser extent, the Interior Ministry, Morsi’s Brotherhood-led civilian government did play at least a limited role as last November’s Gaza cease-fire demonstrates. In fact, in the lead-up to his ouster, some reports indicate Morsi frequently clashed with his military commanders over Sinai and Gaza policy. Preferring dialogue over confrontation, Morsi repeatedly ordered the military to halt planned operations against jihadi militants believed to be involved in the abduction of Egyptian police officers in May. The military was also suspicious of Morsi’s relationship with Hamas and resisted his entreaties to improve relations with Hamas. In response to the spike in violent attacks following Morsi’s ouster, the military intensified operations in northern Sinai, requesting and receiving Israel’s approval to increase its troop deployment in the area. Under Mubarak, Egypt’s notoriously corrupt internal-security services treated Sinai residents with more contempt and brutality than they did the rest of the population. Consequently, after Mubarak’s fall, Egypt’s as-yet-unreformed police force became a frequent target of Sinai-based militants and was less eager to police the Sinai than the major population centers to the west. The military, meanwhile, although it values Egypt’s security ties to Israel and places a premium on internal stability, has neither the desire nor the capacity to police the Sinai—or, for that matter, any other part of Egypt. In the wake of Morsi’s overthrow, deadly attacks on police and other security personnel became an almost-daily occurrence, while Egypt’s previously embattled police force resumed its prerevolutionary levels of brutality. The current wave of violence has reinforced Egyptian authorities’ traditional security-focused approach to dealing with the Sinai, while neglecting the deeper economic and developmental problems that afflict the troubled region. For years the United States has offered millions in development aid for the Sinai, although Egyptian authorities have yet to decide whether or not even to accept it.

Sinai instability has been both an asset and a liability for the Gaza Strip’s Hamas rulers. Since the closure of Gaza’s borders by Israel in 2007, the tiny enclave has relied on the elaborate network of tunnels constructed beneath the Sinai-Gaza border for the smuggling of basic goods as well as weapons, most of which are transferred to Gaza via the Sinai. As one Israeli security analyst put it, “Whatever isn’t al-
owed to move above ground will find its way below it.” Tunnels beneath the Gaza-Egypt border have existed since at least the 1980s, but were limited mostly to the smuggling of contraband such as cocaine and hashish. After Hamas’s takeover of Gaza and the imposition of the Israeli blockade in the latter half of 2007, however, the tunnel network expanded greatly. Hamas has used the tunnels to smuggle in weapons and to smuggle out fighters for training. However, most of what is smuggled into Gaza through the tunnels are civilian goods, including building materials and basic consumer goods that are scarce or unavailable due to the Israeli-imposed blockade.

At its peak in mid-2010, Gaza’s illicit trade network consisted of some thousand tunnels funneling more than four thousand different types of products, both consumer goods and contraband, into Gaza. But things changed after the flotilla incident of May 2010, in which Israeli commandos raided a Turkish vessel carrying civilian goods bound for Gaza and killed nine people aboard the ship. In response to the widespread criticism unleashed by that episode, Israel eased restrictions on imports into Gaza. As a result, 70–80 percent of Gaza’s tunnels were put out of commission. Moreover, Hamas taxes these tunnels, and Israel has largely tolerated them in order to ease some of the economic pressure on Gaza (and diplomatic pressure on Israel), thereby helping Hamas to consolidate its economic and military hold over Gaza while displacing Gaza’s legitimate economy. So long as these networks remain financially viable, they will continue to support smuggling and illicit networks in Sinai as well.

Hamas’s immediate priority is to maintain and strengthen its grip over the Gaza Strip. At a minimum, this requires meeting the basic needs of Gaza’s population. Having been relatively successful at restoring basic law and order, the Hamas regime has focused much of its energies on pushing back against the restrictions imposed on Gaza from the outside, whether by Israel or by Egypt. The results have been mixed. Hamas’s ultimate objective is to see an end to the six-year-old Gaza blockade and the reopening of its borders. To this end, Hamas frequently tolerates (and occasionally engages in) rocket attacks against Israel, partly in order to bolster its “resistance” credentials and partly to challenge its containment. That was the case last November, when Israel’s eight-day offensive exacted a heavy price on Gaza in both military and human terms. But the cease-fire deal resulted in some limited but tangible improvements in the Gaza closure regime, such as the expansion of Gaza’s fishing zone from three to six nautical miles.

Hamas’s political ambitions go well beyond Gaza. In the short term it hopes to outgovern its Fatah rivals in the West Bank and ultimately to displace them. Since its formation in the late 1980s, Hamas’s position has gradually evolved from seeking to replace the traditional Palestinian leadership—initially embodied in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and since 1994 by the Palestinian Authority—to taking over these institutions. Such aims drove Hamas’s decision to participate in PA elections in 2006 after having boycotted all previous polls. Likewise, Hamas leaders now have set their sights on the PLO, the barely functional but traditional center of the Palestinian national movement. Although a shadow of its former self, the PLO remains the legal and political address of the Palestinian cause and is universally recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, both inside and outside the occupied Palestinian territories.

It is this international legitimacy that Hamas desires. Although international
attitudes toward Hamas have warmed somewhat in recent years, the movement is still shunned by most Western European states as well as the United States, to say nothing of Israel, and is once again on the defensive in the region. For the most part, the debate within Hamas, however, has not been about whether it will come to power but \textit{when} and \textit{how}—whether in the interim to share power with Fatah (via a reconciliation agreement) or simply to wait it out by banking on Fatah’s eventual collapse. In the absence of a credible peace process and with the Fatah faction in a perpetual state of disarray, the latter strategy had always served Hamas well. The fall of the Brotherhood in Egypt and its growing regional isolation, however, may force Hamas to reassess its options.

The loss of its Brotherhood allies in Egypt is an especially bitter pill for Hamas to swallow. Gaza’s borders have once again been closed, while the smuggling tunnels that are the lifeblood of both Gaza’s economy and Hamas rule have come under increasing attack by Egyptian security forces. Meanwhile, Gaza’s 1.7 million residents are growing impatient with Hamas’s increasing repression and the absence of a long-term plan for ending their predicament. As a result, reconciliation with Fatah, once the shock of Morsi’s loss has died down, may now be a more attractive option for Hamas.

Further, while Hamas does not control all the tunnel traffic, its reliance on tunnels was already beginning to backfire. Gaza has three times the population of Sinai (but less than 1 percent of its land area), and Gaza’s robust smuggling trade, including the influx of weapons and the promise of fast money, has helped to fuel the Sinai’s own illicit economy as well as increased violence. This growing incidence of attacks has prompted Egyptian security forces to crack down with increasing severity in recent months. They flooded dozens of tunnels beneath the Sinai-Gaza border in January and closed Gaza’s border crossings with Egypt in June. Egypt’s antitunnel activity and border restrictions intensified further following Morsi’s overthrow, leading to acute shortages in fuel and other basic necessities in Gaza. This combined with Hamas’s loss of its Brotherhood allies in Egypt feeds its willingness to renew rocket attacks on Israel.

Regardless, Hamas is keen to maintain its “resistance” credentials, notably its weapons and armed militias. This is so not only because much of its legitimacy has come from confronting Israel but also because it wishes to avoid the fate of its Fatah rivals in the West Bank, whose decision to cooperate with Israel left them open to allegations.
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Worsening conditions in Gaza, far from enhancing the position of Abbas and Fatah, as many U.S. policy makers have believed, actually erode the PA’s overall standing in the eyes of Palestinians.

of being “Israel’s subcontractor.” Hamas is determined to avoid what it views as the fundamental mistakes of Fatah, which agreed to recognize Israel and abandon armed struggle without getting an end to the Israeli occupation. Parallels with the PA are reinforced by Hamas’s periodic crackdowns against more radical Salafi and jihadi elements in Gaza, mirroring Fatah’s treatment of Hamas in the West Bank. The growth of even more radical critics in Sinai and Gaza poses a political risk to Hamas and makes it more likely that Hamas will fall back on violence.

Among other things, this means the conditions laid out by the so-called quartet, comprised of the United States, European Union, Russia and the UN—that Hamas disarm, recognize Israel’s right to exist and abide by past agreements—are simply no longer viable. For one thing, demanding that Hamas unilaterally disarm while Israel continues to impose realities on the ground through force of arms, including a blockade on Gaza and an occupation in the West Bank, would be seen by most Palestinians as tantamount to surrender. Indeed, Hamas leaders are convinced, perhaps rightly, that were it not for its arms it would probably not have survived all these years.

Although recent developments in the Sinai-Gaza theater have clearly put Hamas on the defensive, they do not change the continued irrelevance of Mahmoud Abbas’s Palestinian Authority in Gaza. Not long after Hamas handily defeated his Fatah faction in the 2006 PA elections, Abbas’s Fatah forces were expelled from Gaza by Hamas in June 2007. Since then, Abbas has longed to return to Gaza and restore his credibility; without at least a nominal role in Gaza, Abbas cannot truly claim to speak for all Palestinians. The fact that Gaza, rather than the West Bank, has been the main driver of events on the Israeli-Palestinian front for nearly a decade—beginning with Israel’s unilateral “disengagement” from the Gaza Strip in 2005 and extending to last November’s miniwar between Hamas and Israel—has only compounded Abbas’s and the PA’s growing sense of marginalization.

Even though Gaza remains beyond the reach of Abbas and his PA, this has not insulated them from the fallout of events there. Ironically, events such as Operation Cast Lead, the Gaza flotilla disaster, controversies surrounding the so-called Goldstone report on military abuses in the 2008–2009 Gaza war, and Operation Pillar of Defense, while principally involving Hamas, proved particularly damaging to Abbas and Fatah. This was equally true of the most recent round of fighting in November 2012. Whereas Hamas emerged from the conflict militarily weakened but politically strengthened, earning the respect and sympathy of both Palestinians and Arabs across the region, the crisis served to highlight Abbas’s powerlessness and growing irrelevance.

Although the Brotherhood’s downfall in Egypt has improved Abbas’s prospects, it may not be sufficient given that expectations are so much higher for Abbas’s Fatah leadership than for the Hamas regime in Gaza. As the PA president and head of the PLO, Abbas remains (at least
Theoretically) the leader of all Palestinians, including those in Gaza and even in the diaspora. Thus, whereas outside Gaza Hamas must do little more than survive and claim it could do better if it had more power, Abbas's leadership must do much more; in addition to delivering tangible improvements in the lives of West Bank Palestinians, Abbas is also expected to bring about an end to the Israeli occupation, establish an independent state with its capital in Jerusalem and find an equitable solution to the Palestinian refugee problem. Indeed, worsening conditions in Gaza, far from enhancing the position of Abbas and Fatah, as many U.S. policy makers have believed, actually erode the PA's overall standing in the eyes of Palestinians. It is worth noting that the reverse is decidedly not the case; failures in the West Bank do not hurt, and usually help, Hamas.

Given its interconnectedness with other issues, any solution to the Sinai problem involves tradeoffs. Egyptian, Palestinian and Israeli interests all are involved, and of course the militants in Sinai also will have their say. Different options involve working more with Hamas to solve the problem, encouraging the Palestinians as a whole to take action via a unity deal and providing more incentives for Egypt to act.

One potential approach to Sinai is to work through Hamas and Gaza. But can this be done? Hamas now is at a crossroads, holding on to "resistance" while trying to gain recognition as a credible political actor and a legitimate government. The tension between these two goals can be increased by allowing Hamas to gain further credibility and legitimacy through more diplomatic recognition and a chance to improve Gaza's economy in exchange for rejecting violence. Hamas would not disarm or recognize Israel, but it would stop its own attacks and use its influence to hinder others from doing so, whether in Gaza or through its Sinai networks.

This approach carries two risks—one obvious, the other more subtle. The obvious risk is that Hamas may not moderate. It could use any respite to better arm itself and otherwise make itself more formidable. Yet such an approach would jeopardize the diplomatic gains Hamas has made in recent years and decrease its popularity among ordinary Palestinians—very real costs. In any event, the military balance between Hamas and Israel would remain overwhelmingly in favor of Israel.

The more subtle risk is that the policy succeeds in making Hamas emphasize politics over violence and, in so doing, helps Hamas to supplant the West Bank leadership of Abbas with a more confrontational though less violent approach. The result would be a Hamas-led Palestinian polity whose leadership likely would be less interested in peace and generally more hostile to Israel.

One way—perhaps the only way—to mitigate these risks is to push for "normalizing" Hamas firmly within the framework of Palestinian reconciliation, the outlines of which were agreed to by Fatah and Hamas along with other Palestinian factions in April 2011. The deal, which has been reaffirmed and expanded in subsequent agreements, calls for the formation of an interim government comprised of independents and technocrats not affiliated with either Fatah or Hamas, but approved by both, thereby avoiding U.S. and international bans on dealing with Hamas members. Affording Hamas a formal role in the PA and the PLO would give Hamas what it seeks most, international recognition and legitimacy, but in a way that is both controlled and conditional. Implicit in the deal is a Hamas cease-fire with Israel and Hamas's tacit acceptance of Abbas's authority to negotiate with Israel—a huge potential gain for Israel.
All of this remains highly theoretical, however, as implementation of the Palestinian unity deal continues to be held up by both Hamas and Fatah, each of which seems to believe it can wait out the other. The internal stalemate is further buttressed by lingering differences over the fate of Hamas militias in Gaza and Fatah’s security cooperation with Israel in the West Bank, although these obstacles may not be insurmountable. A more inclusive and representative PLO may make it harder to reach a deal with Israel, but such a deal would be far more credible and durable. Conversely, a deal signed by a weak and noncredible Palestinian leadership is unlikely to hold, and Hamas and other spoilers could undermine it at will.

If the prospect of participating in (and perhaps ultimately controlling) official Palestinian institutions is not enough to induce Hamas to go along, more immediate practical realities might. As noted previously, the Gaza blockade continues to pose a challenge from both the Egyptian and Israeli sides of the border. Since neither Israel nor Egypt trusts Hamas to police the border, reopening Gaza’s border crossings will require a return of Abbas’s Palestinian Authority there. Yet since Abbas has vowed never to return to Gaza “on the back of an Israeli tank,” there is no realistic way for the PA to return to Gaza without Hamas’s permission, which can only happen in the context of internal reconciliation. Meanwhile, the current security vacuum in Sinai, which has exposed Hamas’s vulnerability, particularly vis-à-vis Egypt, presents an opportunity for Abbas that he is keen to exploit. With Hamas now weakened by events in Egypt, this may be the most opportune moment to push reconciliation on terms more favorable to Abbas and Fatah.

More can be done from the Egyptian side of the border as well. Restrictions on Egypt’s ability to deploy in the Sinai, outlined in the security annex to the Camp David accords, limit the numbers and types of forces Egyptians may deploy there. Such restrictions are seen across the board—by the Egyptian military, Islamists and secular political groups—as an affront to Egyptian sovereignty and national pride. Moreover, they are often cited as a serious challenge to Egypt’s ability to deal effectively with the growing threats in the Sinai. Although Israel has resisted the idea of formal changes to the treaty, it has on several occasions allowed Egypt to increase its armed deployments in areas adjacent to the Gaza Strip, whether through separate agreements (such as after the 2005 Israeli “disengagement” from Gaza) or on an ad hoc basis.
Israelis note that troop allowances in the current treaty are sufficient to quell the unrest in the Sinai, and where they are not, Israel has allowed augmentations on a case-by-case basis. But this offers only a technical solution to what is essentially a political problem. Doing so would leave the Egyptian government and military open to allegations of being Israel’s lackey. So unless Egypt can find some political cover and portray the crackdown as part of a broader deal in which it extracted concessions from Israel, it will be politically difficult for it to marshal the necessary forces for a sustained period of time.

The United States also has interests in Sinai beyond America’s desire that its allies be free from violence and generally well governed. The return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egyptian sovereignty was central to the success of the American-brokered Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, which in turn has formed the cornerstone of America’s diplomatic and security posture in the region for more than three decades. Some of the terrorist groups in Sinai loathe not only Israel and the Egyptian government but also the United States. In addition, instability in Sinai and radical politics there are potential sources of unrest in Egypt that could further complicate its already-troubled democratic transition. Most important, the United States wants to prevent any renewal of the Israeli-Egyptian conflict, even one that falls well short of outright war. Such a clash would put the United States in a difficult position between its closest Middle East ally and the most populated and influential Arab country—and one whose transition may influence the course of others in the region. A clash would place the U.S.-Israeli alliance in the spotlight, further discrediting Washington with many Egyptians and with Arabs in general.

The United States can play an important role in helping reduce instability emanating from the Sinai. Part of the role is continuing vigilance in the region to prevent any unrest from Sinai from escalating into a broader clash that would sour Egyptian-Israeli relations. The United States can also encourage Israel to allow a renegotiation of the annex to the Camp David accords. As discussed above, the treaty itself is not a serious limit to an Egyptian crackdown. However, by giving Egypt’s government and its military a political “win,” it increases their desire and ability to crack down in a sustained way.

The United States can also encourage Israel to explore options with Hamas that fall short of an all-out deal for either side but decrease the risk of violence and Hamas’s use of the Sinai as an outlet for its illicit networks. Gaining stability in the Sinai is vital for Israel’s security and relations with Egypt. And since the Sinai’s fate is intimately bound up with that of Gaza, further reducing the blockade of Gaza will also need to be on the agenda if Hamas is to make more concessions on stopping smuggling.

Finally, in the long run, U.S. policy toward Egypt should also include support for governance and development initiatives in the Sinai. Such steps will reap fruit only in the long term, but they will make various bilateral arrangements more likely to hold over time.
Erdogan, the Anti-Ataturk

By Aram Bakshian Jr.

This November 10, at precisely 9:05 a.m., for the seventy-fifth time in the history of the Turkish Republic, the nation will grind to a halt. In Istanbul, for sixty seconds sirens will drone, ferryboat horns will blare in the Golden Horn and traffic will freeze. Throughout the country, millions of ordinary Turks will stand still and mute to mark the death anniversary of their nation’s founding father. It is an impressive moment, and deservedly so. Mustafa Kemal, known to history as Kemal Ataturk (“Father of the Turks”), was an indomitable blend of soldier, diplomat, politician, intellectual and nation builder. One of the twentieth century’s most remarkable leaders, he was a man of iron will and incredible vision.

A war hero even as the Ottoman Empire he served crumbled around him, Ataturk was instrumental in defeating an invading British army at Gallipoli. At the end of World War I, when the victorious Allies occupied Istanbul and began to partition Ottoman territory, he took to the Anatolian heartland, forged a new citizen army, routed Greek forces that had seized Smyrna (now Izmir) and much adjoining Turkish territory, and then drove the Allied occupation forces out of Istanbul. But that was only the beginning. As president of his own newly minted, custom-designed Turkish Republic, with inspired eloquence and brute force, he dragged his fellow countrymen, many of them literally kicking and screaming, into the twentieth century. The Turkish language was modernized and systematized. The Latin alphabet replaced an archaic Arabic script. Massive industrial, education and infrastructure initiatives were launched and a new sense of Turkish identity—part authentic, part invented in rewritten history textbooks—replaced the old Ottoman way of thinking. In most respects, this was a great plus for the vast majority of poor urban and rural Turks. Under the Ottoman Empire, even in the glory days when it ruled large chunks of Europe, Asia and Africa, and was mistress of the Mediterranean, most ordinary Turks were part of the impoverished peasant masses. Commerce, finance and other professions were monopolized by a small, educated elite, many—in some cases, most—of them non-Muslim Greeks, Armenians and Jews.

The end of the empire changed all that. At times it was not a pretty picture; transforming the truncated remains of the multiethnic Ottoman Empire into a cohesive, racially rooted nation-state was achieved at great human cost and more than a little tampering with historical truth. While Ataturk had condemned the extermination of Armenians during World War I by his Young Turk predecessors, calling it a “shameful act,” he presided

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over a brutal but less horrific forced mass transfer of populations in which Anatolian Greeks—who, like the Armenians, had lived there for centuries before the arrival of the first nomadic Turkic invaders—were driven from their homes. The same fate, it is worth noting, awaited a smaller number of ethnic Turks living in Greek territory.

The only substantial minority that remained in modern Turkey were the Kurds, fellow Muslims but with their own language and customs, who are still a source of considerable friction today. Even they were subjected to a clumsy attempt at what might be called bureaucratic assimilation. The republic invented a new name for them: until a few years ago, they were officially classified as “mountain Turks,” denied a legitimate identity of their own.

A charismatic speaker and popular hero, Ataturk stumped the republic, defining a new sense of “Turkishness” and denouncing anything and everything he considered divisive or reactionary—from fez and veil to traditional Ottoman music and religious orders. Like Peter the Great in Russia two centuries before, he was determined to overcome centuries of backwardness and decline, by brute force if necessary—and it often was. Also like Peter the Great, he had seen the greater world outside his homeland, and he liked what he saw. Once firmly in power in the mid-1920s, he would declare:

I have no religion, and at times I wish all religions at the bottom of the sea. He is a weak ruler who needs religion to uphold his government; it is as if he would catch his people in a trap. My people are going to learn the principles of democracy, the dictates of truth and the teachings of science. Superstition must go.

Only it didn’t. Today, many informed observers feel that Ataturk’s achievement is at risk, threatened by a rising Islamist tide led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, an unashamed—and historically uninformed—admirer of an idealized version of the Ottoman-Islamic past that exists mainly in his own imagination. It is both significant and ironic that the mass anti-Erdogan protests that swept Turkey this June were initially triggered by his arbitrary decision to destroy Gezi Park, one of Istanbul’s few remaining green areas, to replace it with a “replica” of Ottoman-era military barracks and a shopping mall. Other plans included building an enormous new mosque in adjoining Taksim Square, site of the Monument of the Republic.

Why this nostalgia for a romanticized, not to say imaginary, Ottoman-Islamic past? Perhaps it begins with a deep sense of grievance on the part of Turkish Islamists, shared by their brethren throughout the Middle East—the belief that a golden age of Islamic dominance was destroyed by the forces of Western Christianity and Western technology. Whatever is driving this nostalgia for a romanticized past of Islamic vibrancy and power, it has become a compelling force in modern Turkish politics. The late Samuel P. Huntington of Harvard, a leading political scientist of our time, called Turkey a “torn country”—a nation belonging culturally to a particular civilization but whose leaders wish to redefine it as belonging to another. Hence, any effort to understand the dynamics of Turkish politics today must begin by probing the rise to power and remarkable national stewardship of Kemal Ataturk, as well as the leadership vacuum that ensued upon his death.

He was one of many bright, young Ottoman officers of his generation who had been posted as military attachés in Europe before World War I. These young men often came home dazzled by Western
society and technology, with a newfound contempt for traditional Ottoman culture and religion and with an indiscriminate zeal for all things Western and modern. At the dawn of the twentieth century, this often meant embracing fashionably “enlightened” free thinking, anticlericalism, and the rather naïve belief that science and rational materialism could solve all of society’s ills if only the right people (i.e., themselves) could take charge from their elders.

In 1908, they did, pressuring the reactionary Sultan Abdul Hamid II to hold parliamentary elections and embrace constitutional government. When he tried to renege a year later, Young Turk officers and their troops deposed him, replacing him with Sultan Mehmed V, an elderly nonentity who served as a ceremonial figurehead. But rather than arresting the imperial decay, the Young Turks actually accelerated it, suffering a string of humiliating defeats in the first Balkan War, losing most of what was then European Turkey. The humiliation only ended when the Christian victors—Serbia, Greece, Montenegro and Bulgaria—turned on each other in the second Balkan War and the Turks managed to reclaim some of their lost territory. Total disaster followed after the Young Turks plunged their creaky old empire into World War I on the side of the Central powers, proclaiming a jihad against the ultimately victorious Allies.

Unlike Enver Pasha and the other members of the Young Turk junta, Kemal Ataturk put no stock in jihads. While he would sometimes invoke the name of Allah to rally the masses during the early days of the republican struggle following World War I, his mission was modernizing and Westernizing Turkey. While a new class of privileged, Westernized Turks rose to the top of republican society and replaced most of the old minority-dominated commercial and professional elites, millions of poor city dwellers and the vast majority of the rural peasantry remained poverty stricken, uneducated and, for better or worse, true to their old customs and Muslim faith in a quiet, low-key way. The shallow tide of Western modernity swept over them but did not carry them with it. If Ataturk—who played as hard as he worked and was a notoriously heavy drinker—had not died early, he might have completed his modernizing mission by sheer force of character. But his passing in 1938 at the relatively young age of fifty-seven left a void no successor could fill. His loyal wartime aide, Ismet Inonu—a brave soldier and a staunch patriot, but a leader of limited vision—succeeded him, but Ataturk’s initial reforms froze in place.

When he died on the morning of November 10, 1938, in his small, modest bedroom in Istanbul’s vast old Dolmabahce Palace, all the clocks in the building were stopped. They remain so to this day. Like the static moment of mourning each year commemorating Ataturk’s death, the stopped clocks in the Dolmabahce Palace serve as an unintentional reminder of what that premature death meant to Turkey: the beginning of a long era of suspended animation, of social and political inertia bordering on stasis.

Like Peter the Great in Russia two centuries before, Ataturk was determined to overcome centuries of backwardness and decline, by brute force if necessary—and it often was.
Even with the strongest of wills and best of intentions, Atatürk’s successors would have had a hard time continuing his work. He had died at the worst possible time. In 1938, the Western democracies were still reeling from the Great Depression. To many politicians and intellectuals, Communism and fascism—both with a heavy emphasis on police-state tyranny and centrally managed economies—seemed to be the wave of the future. Europe was also about to plunge into a disastrous Second World War, and Turkey’s leaders would have their hands full simply protecting the sovereignty and neutrality of their impoverished, militarily vulnerable nation.

Atatürk’s whole life had been spent broadening his understanding and seeking sensible new solutions. The Turkish future he envisioned was one of expanded education, opportunity and prosperity for the poor, uneducated Turkish masses with gradually evolving democratic institutions as progress was made. While his rhetoric remained in place, most of his vision died with him. Until free-market economic reforms were ushered in by Turgut Özal, who served as a genuinely reformist prime minister and then president from 1983 to his suspicious death in 1993, Turkey did remain a secular state—but it also remained a 1930s-style corporate state based on crony capitalism, government corruption, and a senior military and moneyed class that defended its own special privileges at least as zealously as it protected the secular state. When politicians—Islamist or otherwise—got in the way, they were removed by force. One of them, Adnan Menderes, an economic reformer who courted religious voters by promising to remove restrictions on the traditional Arabic-language call to prayer and to allow new Muslim schools and the building of new mosques, was not only removed in a coup d’état but also hanged by the military after a hastily improvised trial.

The sad case of Menderes—a genuine reformer but also a rabble-rousing populist who jailed opposition journalists and politicians and openly appealed to voters on religious lines—starkly illustrates the fault line in modern Turkish politics. On the one hand, all too often the advocates of needed economic and social reform have also been political demagogues willing to play the religion card and trample on the rights of their political opponents. On the other hand, when the republic has been “rescued” from such men by the military, and the secular nature of the state has been preserved (along with the special privileges of the “rescuers”), desperately needed economic and social reforms have been either tabled or rescinded.

This pattern is far from unique to Turkey. The same scenario has played out repeatedly in Muslim countries as different as Egypt,
Pakistan and Bangladesh. What makes it particularly tragic in the case of Turkey is that—unlike new postcolonial nations with artificial borders and no strong patriotic tradition to draw on—it possesses most of the raw materials for a healthy, modern civil society. Indeed, Turks have been trying to “modernize” since at least the last quarter of the eighteenth century.

Admittedly, the results have been mixed at best. Sultan Selim III, who reigned from 1789 to 1807, attempted to revive the empire and modernize the obsolete Ottoman military system only to be overthrown by the traditional Janissary corps and murdered shortly afterward. Sultan Mahmud II, who reigned from 1808 to 1839, managed to establish a “new model” army of sorts, abolish the Janissaries and modernize the civil service. But the empire had already begun to disintegrate, with Greece gaining full independence and Egypt remaining nominally Ottoman but autonomously ruled by its own hereditary dynasty of Khedives. The Western-oriented technocrats of the “Tanzimat” reform era of the mid-nineteenth century and the later Young Turk movement that overthrew the reactionary Sultan Abdul Hamid II had both tried to inject new life into the Ottoman Empire to little or no avail; indeed, it was Young Turk leader Enver Pasha’s insistence on entering World War I on the side of the Central powers that sealed the empire’s fate.

Only with the death of the empire, which left a smaller but more cohesive core Turkish nation, was Ataturk able to succeed where the best and brightest of Ottoman soldiers, sultans and statesmen had failed. And yet a strong residue of sentiment remained in the country that resisted any impulse toward Westernization and longed for a return to that golden age of Islam that lit up the world before the West’s inexorable rise.

A superficial glimpse at the medieval world would seem to bear out this wistful view of history. As the doyen of Near and Middle Eastern historians Bernard Lewis has pointed out, “In the course of the seventh century, Muslim armies advancing from Arabia conquered Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and North Africa, all until then part of Christendom, and most of the new recruits to Islam, west of Iran and Arabia, were indeed converts from Christianity.” Further gains would be made in Spain, much of which was overrun by Muslim North African Arabs and more recently converted Berber tribesmen. Eventually other non-Arab converts to Islam, most notably primitive but tough Tartar and Turkic nomad warriors, would carve out Muslim empires in large parts of Eastern Europe, Russia, the Levant, India and the Balkans.

More important than this military success was the fact that, in the early years of the Muslim surge, cities like Baghdad, Damascus, Alexandria and, to a lesser extent, Cordoba were centers of a cultural flowering that preceded and—by preserving, recovering and building on classical knowledge lost in most of the surviving Christian West—helped make possible the brilliant achievements of the European Renaissance. This, in turn, led to the development of the modern Western civilization that would, in a few centuries, leave the Islamic world behind in the dust. Was the rise of the Christian West responsible for the decline of the Muslim East? Or was the relatively short period during which Muslim-conquered cities in the formerly Christian world of antiquity became centers of progress and learning a mere blip on the screen, a temporary, albeit benign, “hijacking” of more advanced, more populous societies by a primitive, desert-sprung society of warrior-conquerors that overran them?
Surely it is no coincidence that nearly all of the cultural blossoming under early Islamic rule occurred in places far from Mecca and Medina (the cradles of Islam), and with centuries of history rooted in the Greco-Roman and early Christian past. Other centers of high Islamic culture like Persia and Mughal India were also homes to ancient civilizations long predating Islam. Thus, the intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic roots of the short-lived golden age of Islamic culture were almost entirely pre-Islamic in their origins and nature. Even the system of “Arabic” numerals that revolutionized mathematics was not really Arabic at all; it was borrowed from India by Arab traders.

The decline of Islam’s golden age occurred as Islam tightened its grip on the cultures it had overrun and, in the case of Europe, as a rapidly progressing Christendom began to push back the Islamic advance. The more pervasive Islam became in the territories it had conquered, the more those territories fell behind, perhaps because of the Islamists’ belief that their religion contains a complete, hermetically—and prophetically—sealed formula for the running of every aspect of human society. Such a mind-set has a built-in hostility to the spirit of inquiry and the desire to subject prescribed notions of faith and fate to the tests of intellectual rigor. Ask no new questions and you will discover no new answers.

The decline of the once-mighty Ottoman Empire mirrored the earlier decline in the rest of the Islamic world, culturally, militarily, economically and intellectually. “The Ottoman experience,” writes Turkish historian M. Sükrü Hanioglu in his Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, “provides a superb opportunity to examine the impact of modernity in a non-European setting.” Leaders like Ataturk who lived through the imperial collapse attempted to build a modern Turkish alternative. It was a daunting task, and even its partial success was a remarkable achievement, remaining so to this day.

At the height of the Cold War, it used to be said that Vienna, which had repulsed a Turkish attack at the height of Ottoman power, was two different cities. Approached from the Communist-dominated East, Vienna was a bustling, modern metropolis compared to anything Hungary, Poland or Czechoslovakia had to offer. But approached from the West, Vienna seemed more like a charming but antiquated relic than a living center of modern commerce and culture. Earlier this year, while reviewing Turkish Nobel laureate Orhan Pamuk’s novel Silent House, it occurred to me that the same is true, though in a very different way, of contemporary Turkey:

Straddling the great divide between Europe and Asia, Christendom and Islam, Turkey wears two faces. Viewed from the East, it looks like a prosperous pillar of stability and civic order, especially when compared to any of its Muslim neighbors. Viewed from Western Europe, however, it presents a different picture, that of a country dangerously divided: on the one hand, a pampered and often corrupt pseudo-Western economic and social elite relying on
the Turkish military to protect both its privileges and its secular values; on the other hand, a growingly militant and sometimes violent mass movement of Islamists—many of them poor urban immigrants from the backward, neglected countryside—determined to purge their country of alien “impurity” and turn it into a theocracy by whatever means necessary.

For ten years now the latter of these two flawed factions has had the upper hand, thanks mainly to one man—the determined, driven visionary, Erdogan, who wants to remake Turkey in his own image and his own imagination. A powerful orator and skilled political organizer with a strong autocratic streak, boundless energy and an obsessive sense of his (self-perceived) historic mission, Erdogan was described by one observer I spoke with in Istanbul this May as

a strange joke played on Turkey by history. If Kemal Ataturk had had an evil twin, it would have been someone exactly like Mr. Erdogan. Most of his views are mirror opposites of Ataturk’s, but he is the first overwhelming, larger-than-life figure in Turkish public life since the Ghazi [Ataturk] himself.

Like Ataturk, whose father was a minor government official, Erdogan rose from obscure origins through intelligence, drive and unbounded ambition. But there the similarity ends. Ataturk was, at most, an agnostic who felt that Islam, as practiced in the Ottoman Empire, was an enemy of progress; Erdogan is a devout Muslim who often waxes nostalgic about the good old imperial days. But that was after his party—the Justice and Development Party (AKP)—came to power in 2002 with a 34 percent plurality in the national parliamentary elections. On his way to the premiership, Erdogan had run as a democratic reformer, promising to fight entrenched corruption, open up the economy to competition and growth, and bring basic services such as improved schools and sanitation to the poorer regions of the country, just as he had done to Istanbul’s poorer neighborhoods as a reforming mayor.

Erdogan kept many of his promises. Government graft and cronyism still exist, but the swag is no longer the privileged preserve of a small, old elite. Corruption has not been eliminated, but it has been

 democratized. And Erdogan has devoted billions of lira to development projects, especially in poor, rural areas where they are most needed. As a self-made business millionaire himself, he also understood—and delivered on—economic and regulatory reforms following the earlier example of Turgut Ozal, mentioned above. Under Erdogan’s leadership—although not entirely due to it—in less than a decade the Turkish economy became the eighteenth largest in
the world and per capita income nearly tripled, which helps to explain the AKP’s strong showings in the 2007 and 2011 elections (it received nearly 50 percent of the vote in the latter). It can truly be said that, as prime minister, Erdogan delivered on much of his public agenda. The problem is with his private agenda. According to Der Spiegel he once said, “Democracy is like a train. We shall get out when we arrive at the station we want.”

After his party’s record victory in the 2011 elections, Erdogan seems to have decided he was approaching his station. Wall Street Journal correspondent Joe Parkinson summed it up rather neatly:

Since [the 2011 elections], the prime minister has sought to impose further restrictions on alcohol consumption and abortion and repeatedly called for all women to have at least three children to grow Turkey’s population. He has held forth on what citizens should eat at the family dinner table, and intervened to censor sex scenes in prime-time television series. His government has sought to muzzle the press; Turkey now jails more journalists than Iran or China.

He has also denounced raki, an anise-based liquor similar to the Greek ouzo—Turkey’s alcoholic beverage of choice for centuries—declaring ayran, a drink made from diluted yogurt, the new national beverage. He has even declared war on white bread, his personal preference being the brown variety. On the brighter side, unlike the unhinged Latin American dictator in Woody Allen’s comedy classic Bananas, he has yet to order everyone to wear their underpants over rather than under their trousers.

More significantly, Erdogan has pushed for constitutional changes that would reduce parliamentary powers—and those of the prime minister—while transforming the office of the president from a largely ceremonial post to an “imperial” presidency his friends liken to that of Charles de Gaulle and his opponents liken to that of Vladimir Putin. If he can get the desired changes, he intends to run for the presidency and, if elected, would be eligible to run again for a second five-year term, giving him ten years as an elected autocrat. As Ilter Turan, a political scientist at Istanbul’s Bilgi University, told the New York Times, Erdogan “has a highly majoritarian understanding of democracy. He believes that with 51 percent of the vote he can rule in an unrestrained fashion. He doesn’t want checks and balances.”

All of these factors help to explain how what began as the protest of a few environmentalists to save a small wooded park in Istanbul metastasized in hours into mass protests involving hundreds of thousands—possibly millions—of Turkish citizens in major cities across the country. In Washington before my recent trip to Turkey, and in Istanbul days before the demonstrations began and were brutally suppressed, I talked with Gareth Jenkins, a British journalist who has resided in Istanbul since 1989. Jenkins is an expert on the Erdogan government’s mass arrests and show trials of civilian and military critics of its regime, as well as its mounting efforts to intimidate journalists by arresting and trying reporters and applying economic pressure—fines, litigation and the threat of the same—to newspaper and broadcast owners.

Some of the allegations of planted evidence and rigged trials would be funny were it not for the human price paid by the innocent victims. In one case, a retired general returned to his home to find it had been ransacked and to learn he was about to be charged with conspiring to overthrow the state. He knew he was innocent, but he was told that investigators had found incriminating documents in his home that...
named him as a plotter. It turned out that the “evidence”—which must have been planted and was probably concocted—had nothing to do with him, but contained the similar name of another retired general who was probably innocent as well: two cheers for the gang that couldn’t frame straight.

When I asked Jenkins why Erdogan’s power plays seemed to be growing more and more blatant, he mentioned that in November 2011 the prime minister underwent emergency surgery for the removal of a malignant growth in his intestines, that he had a second operation in February 2012, and that he is now heavily medicated and subject to frequent health checks—with a distinct possibility that his cancer will return. Heavy medication could explain some of Erdogan’s odder statements in recent weeks, such as his declaration that “there is now a menace which is called Twitter. . . . To me, social media is the worst menace to society” and that “the death of 17 people happened” during the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations in New York. (The latter was a totally false claim; there were no fatalities at all.) He also repeatedly has claimed that anti-Erdogan demonstrators desecrated an Istanbul mosque by smoking and drinking beer in it, even after the imam of the mosque insisted that no such thing happened and that the demonstrators had been invited to take shelter in the mosque, suffering from police-inflicted injuries and tear-gas inhalation.

Whatever Erdogan’s physical life expectancy may be, the mass demonstrations made it clear that time is not on his side. The prodemocracy demonstrators, overwhelmingly nonviolent and well behaved, were also overwhelmingly young, the vanguard of a rising generation of Turks who care about personal freedom and will not be bullied into silence. They represent a new political demographic that can’t be pinned down as strictly right wing or left wing, observant Muslim or secular. And they are a generation of young people with access to electronic communications no tyranny can fully block, with a strong awareness of their rights and of those who would deny them those rights.

But you can’t beat something with nothing. The absence of strong, credible opposition leaders has left the political stage to the highly skilled Erdogan, who sometimes reminds this observer of a cross between Huey Long, Margaret Thatcher and Juan Peron. In the short term, growing doubts and divisions among his parliamentary followers may put more of a brake on his aspirations than any number of peaceful demonstrators. But, as Jenkins points out, even if most of the protesters represent a specific section of society, the demonstrations that swept the country “are arguably Turkey’s first ever spontaneous, grassroots political movement . . . the participants [are] feeling empowered, determined but also bewildered by what is happening. They have never been here before. And neither has Turkey.”

One thing is certain. Except for the ones in the Dolmabahce Palace, the clocks in Turkey have started ticking again.
Roosevelt and His Diplomatic Pawns

By Conrad Black


This is certainly an interesting and meticulously researched book, agreeably written and rigorous in its assertion of historical facts. The only reservation that arises is that the basic premise seems to confer too much importance on the five people who are its subjects, in their shared roles as special envoys for President Franklin D. Roosevelt between March 1940 and July 1941. This was a terribly complicated and intense period in international relations, in which the United States moved to confirm President Roosevelt’s prediction (in his speech accepting renomination in Philadelphia on June 27, 1936), that “this generation of Americans has a rendezvous with destiny.” Roosevelt led it to that rendezvous with astonishing agility and both tactical and strategic brilliance. The contention of this book appears to be that the five men featured—Sumner Welles, William J. Donovan, Harry Hopkins, Wendell Willkie and W. Averell Harriman—were indispensable to making it to the encounter with destiny and making the experience a national and international success.

Unfortunately, that case is not really made, and I don’t think it is accurate. The author generally grasps Roosevelt’s methods and recognizes him for the deft cynic that he was, almost always in the service of broadly good objectives. He also was ultimately, at the summit of his career, the indispensable man to the victory of democracy, though he shared that honor, at least in 1940 and 1941, with Winston Churchill. And on the last page of the book, Michael Fullilove writes, “For the most part, [Roosevelt] moved his envoys around the globe with great skill and élan.” His envoys “were instruments of his will.” But Fullilove also declares, “Sometimes, especially in his moments of irresolution, they shifted his thinking.” There is not a jot of evidence, here or anywhere, that any of these five ever shifted his thinking at all. It is undoubtedly true that Harry Hopkins was an informative observer of the determination of the British to persevere and of the high qualities of Churchill as a war leader, but these were not exactly revelations when Hopkins made his first visit to Britain in January 1941. Indeed, as the author records, Hopkins advised Churchill and his entourage, “The President is determined that we shall win the war together. Make no mistake about
it. He has sent me here to tell you that at all costs and by all means he will carry you through, no matter what happens to him.” Roosevelt sent Hopkins with that message; he did not adopt that policy after listening to Hopkins tell him about the state of British morale and war capability and Churchill’s strong personality.

Even before Hopkins arrived in London, the United Kingdom had won the Battle of Britain, smashed the Italian navy, sunk the *Bismarck* and was threatening to sweep the Italians out of North Africa. Hopkins’s role was to buck up the British and assure them that help was coming, as Roosevelt had already conceived the lend-lease program and it was proceeding through Congress. Even Roosevelt, inscrutable though he was behind his apparently guileless bonhomie and overwhelming charm, liked company, and he sought it from women less opinionated and more deferential (and physically alluring) than Eleanor (Missy LeHand, Margaret Suckley, Lucy Mercer Rutherfurd), and from his senior political loyalist and adviser, Louis McHenry Howe, until he died in 1936. Three years later, Roosevelt invited the unhealthy widower, Hopkins, who had been a remarkably capable welfare and workfare administrator for Roosevelt when he was governor of New York and in the New Deal, to take Howe’s place as a resident of the White House and confidential sounding board. The night before the Pearl Harbor attack, he reviewed with Hopkins the decrypted Japanese message, scheduled for delivery the following day, and said, “This means war.” There is no known instance where Hopkins did more than carry out missions for his chief, very important though those assignments sometimes were. As this book recounts, when Willkie, the industrialist and 1940 Republican presidential candidate, asked Roosevelt why he employed such a controversial man as Hopkins, FDR said that it was important to have someone around who wasn’t asking for anything and only wanted to serve, which Howe and Hopkins did. But when Hopkins remarried and moved out of the White House, he lost access to Roosevelt, and they were not close again. It was Roosevelt’s nature to use people and discard them, with a smile and a joke and a kind word, but absolutely ruthlessly. His mentor Al Smith, party chairman Jim Farley, fixer Thomas Corcoran, all of the original so-called brain trust, nearly all those who supposedly had any influence with him—all departed eventually as if through the trapdoor on a gallows.

By making his book effectively a snapshot of America starting in early 1940, Fullilove inadvertently incites the inference that Franklin D. Roosevelt entered this critical phase of the war with unformed ideas about the correlation of forces in the world. In fact, Roosevelt knew Western Europe well and spoke French and German fluently. He attended school in Germany, and from his first visit to a performance of the “Ring” cycle at Wagner’s Festspielhaus at Bayreuth with his mother in 1896 he considered Germany to be a nation of delusional warmongers. As soon as Hitler was installed as chancellor, while he was
preparing for his own inauguration, he said
to his entourage that it would be impossible
to maintain peace with him on satisfactory
terms. This view was bolstered in May 1933
when he met with Hitler’s finance minister,
Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht, whom
FDR considered “extremely arrogant.” The
president listened to Hitler’s speeches with
his staff in his office and translated them
for the others. When Albert Einstein visited
Roosevelt, they spoke in German.

Thus, Roosevelt saw the war coming as
early as 1933 and came to his conclusions
about Hitler even before Churchill did. It is
inconceivable that after the outbreak of the
war in Europe, Roosevelt intended to retire,
though he was determined to try to make
it look like he was a reluctant draftee to a
third-term nomination, as he was breaking
a tradition as old as the Republic. Based
on the votes in Congress on peacetime
conscription, increased defense spending,
lend-lease aid and protection of arms
shipments to Britain through 1941, it is
clear that no one but Roosevelt would
have thought in such terms and no one
else could have brought congressional and
public opinion with him. While unctuously
claiming to be neutral, he gave the British
and Canadians anything they wanted with
an indefinite repayment, and he extended
U.S. claims on territorial waters from three
to 1,800 miles into the Atlantic and ordered
the U.S. Navy to attack on detection any
German ship. This was a novel definition
of neutrality, and no one else—certainly not
the well-disposed amateur Willkie—would
have thought of, much less accomplished,
such a thing. So artfully conceived and
brilliantly executed a plan of genius was not
the distillation of the findings of talented
special envoys; they each had a part to play
but had no idea what their leader thought
or what his overall design was.

Roosevelt knew that if Germany were
able to consolidate its hold on all that it
had conquered by the summer of 1940—
including most of France, Poland and
Scandinavia, plus Benelux, Bohemia and
Moravia—it would have a population as
great as America’s and an economic strength
almost as great. Within a generation, this
greater Germany would dominate Europe
and be a mortal threat to the position of the
United States as the world’s most powerful
country. FDR had warned the French not to
allow the remilitarization of the Rhineland
by Germany in 1936 and had warned Stalin
in the last week of August 1939 not to sign a nonaggression pact with Hitler. He had admonished the British ambassador in Washington, Sir Ronald Lindsay, against “this ‘We who are about to die, salute thee’ attitude,” and asked the British king and queen to visit the United States as an add-on to their trip to Canada in June 1939, partly to warm relations between the two countries and partly because he considered successive British prime ministers—Ramsay MacDonald, Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain—to be hopelessly irresolute. This caused him to welcome the return of Churchill to government in 1939 and to enter into direct contact with him, even though his recollection of their one previous meeting, in 1919, was not a happy one.

From the time of his 1937 “quarantine” speech in Chicago, in which the president posited the idea of resisting the Axis powers through economic sanctions, Roosevelt tried to prod the British and French into being more resistant to German and Italian aggression. He laboriously explained when importuned by the leaders of those countries that it was hard for him to be as purposeful as they might wish when they, Hitler’s immediate neighbors, were so steeped in passivity and addicted to appeasement. For the next four years after the quarantine speech, he steadily ratcheted up American opinion, but after each oratorical escalation he deftly insisted that nothing had changed. Strangely, King George VI understood Roosevelt’s technique better than Churchill or many of Roosevelt’s own circle. He wrote Roosevelt on June 3, 1941: “I have been so struck by the way you have led public opinion by allowing it to get ahead of you.”

What this history demonstrates is that the envoys chronicled by Fullilove were not pathfinders guiding their president and countrymen to destinations that only became discernible as a result of their research. They performed important tasks assigned them by the president, whom they served in furthering a plan of favorable engagement and retrieval of civilization that he had been silently preparing for years and started to execute with the quarantine speech. Obviously, details of it had to be adapted and timed to events that Roosevelt could not foresee or control.

FDR did not require the advice of Hopkins or Donovan or Willkie to reassure him that helping Britain stay in the war against Germany was a good idea. As for Willkie, Roosevelt liked him as a progressive Republican, unlike the other GOP leaders who had succeeded his distant cousin, Theodore, in leading that party. Herbert Hoover and Alf Landon were supporting the isolationists—as was Senator Robert Taft, son of the former president—and Roosevelt had fought a bruising juridical battle with the 1916 Republican presidential candidate, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes. Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge had died—and were isolationists anyway. (Roosevelt had run for vice president along with James M. Cox against the Harding/Coolidge ticket in 1920.) He welcomed a Republican nominee whom he did not regard as a member of the political flat-earth society. Roosevelt had thought

It was Roosevelt’s nature to use people and discard them, with a smile and a joke and a kind word, but absolutely ruthlessly.
about trying to rationalize American politics by expelling the segregationist South from his party, as he had tried partially to do with some Southern Democrats in his attempted purge of 1938, and attract moderate Republicans in their place. Willkie might have played a role in that, but events of the war prevented him from pursuing such a course.

Likewise, there is no reason to believe William J. Donovan did more than confirm Roosevelt in his well-established opinion that Britain had to be assisted in every politically feasible way to remain in the war and serve as America’s first line of defense against the Nazi threat. Curiously, Fullilove does not mention Donovan’s most important service prior to the U.S. entry into World War II—namely, his trip to the Balkans in December 1940, in which he advised the government in Belgrade that the United States would assist Yugoslavia, and this was soon broadened to include lend-lease aid, if Belgrade did not cave to the Germans. This information, amplified by the efforts of the British intelligence service, helped produce the coup that overthrew the pro-German government in Belgrade in February 1941, which, along with Mussolini receiving a good thrashing from the Greeks, caused Hitler to delay the invasion of the Soviet Union by almost six weeks while the Wehrmacht subdued those countries, a decisive time in the first year of the Russo-German war.

Similarly, the book does not mention that Hopkins explained to Churchill the political equation in the United States at the beginning of 1941. There were, he said, four distinct blocs of public opinion in his country. About 10–15 percent of Americans were Communist or Nazi sympathizers, sheltering behind Charles Lindbergh; they professed to be neutral, but wanted a German victory. Some 15–20 percent, represented by the catastrophic former ambassador to Britain, Joseph P. Kennedy, wanted to help Britain but were pessimistic about that country’s chances and did not want to run any risk of war. Another 10–15 percent thought war was inevitable and victory for the democracies essential and achievable; they simply wanted to get on with it. This group included much of Roosevelt’s cabinet, including Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau and Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes. Finally, the remaining 50–60 percent wanted to give all possible aid short of war to Britain and Canada even if that risked being drawn into the war, though they preferred to stay out of the war, at least for a time. Roosevelt had the support of almost all of this last group, as well as all of those who favored war and a chunk of the Kennedy faction. This represented 70–75 percent of the total, a formidable achievement in such political crosscurrents. Hopkins left Churchill in no doubt that Roosevelt himself was in the war camp with Stimson and the others, but he knew from American history, including Wilson’s experience in World War I, that he had to lead a united people into war.

It is true that in his brief visit to Stalin in July 1941, after his second Churchill visit, Hopkins did bring back some
impressions of Stalin and of Soviet staying power that were valuable to both Churchill and Roosevelt. Yet even here, Hopkins was reporting, not altering the president’s policy to assist Russia. His observations had nothing to do with Roosevelt’s determination, already formed as Fullilove acknowledges, to extend a great deal of assistance to Stalin. Still, Roosevelt and Churchill both thought it might be difficult for Stalin to hang on much more than the first year before making a separate peace on the lines of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, but with borders well to the east of where this conflict began. But Hopkins was not so much increasing Roosevelt’s insight into European affairs as conveying for him the message that the British could count on American assistance. Hopkins was in London to reinforce the resolve and morale of the British, not to tell Roosevelt what he already knew. Hopkins concluded his first visit, in February 1941, with the famous and stirring adaptation from the Book of Ruth: “Whither thou goest, I will go; and where thou lodgest, I will lodge; thy people shall be my people, and thy God my God, even unto the end.” Hopkins came with this mandate and successfully conveyed his message. Churchill wept. It had already been a lonely and brave struggle, and the prospect of the approaching might of the New World was a vision of inexpressible consolation. Hopkins was also useful in setting up the first meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill in their present leadership capacities, in Newfoundland, but that was already in train when he returned for his second visit in June 1941.

Roosevelt considered Willkie, with some reason, to be a political innocent in Babylon, in domestic politics and even more so in foreign affairs, though he was grateful for his support in aiding the democracies. Willkie went on to tour the world and write a rather naive paean to world fellowship called One World, and was unduly entranced by Madame Chiang Kai-shek, whom Roosevelt, though also taken by her charms, regarded with considerable suspicion. On his world tour, Willkie
Roosevelt saw the war coming as early as 1933 and came to his conclusions about Hitler even before Churchill did.

repeatedly shot from the hip, calling for a second front in Western Europe to alleviate pressure on Stalin, long before the Western Allies were in any position to launch such an attack as anything other than a sacrificial distraction to the German Wehrmacht. He also demanded the preemptive dissolution of the British and French empires. Churchill famously replied, “I have not become the king’s first minister to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.” And Charles de Gaulle responded in even more precise and dismissive acerbities. Willkie’s use to Roosevelt was to bring in Republican support and divide the opposition. When he was no longer of use to the wily president, Roosevelt discarded Willkie like so many others, though he issued a gracious statement when his former opponent died in 1944, aged only fifty-two. Willkie made a good impression on the British, as all Roosevelt’s emissaries did, but his principal accomplishment in London was physically delivering Roosevelt’s message to Churchill, including the famous quote from Longfellow:

Sail on, Oh ship of state!
Sail on, Oh Union strong and great.
Humanity, with all its fears,
With all its hopes for future years,
Is hanging breathless on thy fate.

Churchill read those lines over the radio in a world broadcast.

The real importance of Willkie and Donovan was that they contributed to Roosevelt’s effort to present what amounted to a coalition government without the president himself yielding a scintilla of his own authority or flexibility of movement. The week before the 1940 Republican convention, he had brought into his government Stimson, a former cabinet member of Theodore Roosevelt and Herbert Hoover, along with Knox, the 1936 Republican candidate for vice president. Stimson took over the War Department, while Knox became secretary of the navy. Then, within three months of winning a third term, FDR sent his Republican opponent to Britain as his special envoy. In the meantime, New Hampshire’s Republican governor John G. Winant had been appointed ambassador to Britain, and Donovan, a former GOP candidate for New York governor, had been effectively established as head of intelligence. He had also engaged Hoover’s war secretary, General Patrick Hurley, as another special adviser. All of these men—except Hurley, who was a reactionary Bull Moose—carried out their assigned missions very competently, and all had great symbolic value.

Again, there is no reason to imagine that Roosevelt expected much, if anything, from Sumner Welles’s trip to Rome, Berlin, Paris and London in March 1940. The president didn’t feel he should be completely inactive, but the author’s supposition that he harbored ideas of delaying the anticipated German spring offensive is completely unsubstantiated. The descriptions of the details here are interesting, but nothing was unearthed that did other than reinforce Roosevelt’s concern that the democracies were not strong enough to defeat Germany. The British and French, both stronger at
the start of World War I in 1914 than they were in 1940, could not defeat Germany without the intervention of the United States, even with Russia as an ally. And they certainly could not do so with the Russians as a neutral with friendly ties to Hitler under the Nazi-Soviet Pact.

Roosevelt had always doubted that the appeasement policy would succeed, and he considered the men of Munich, Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier, to be morally bankrupt and discredited, along with their coteries of appeasers, still thick in the ranks of both governments. Nothing happened during Sumner Welles's trip to alter that perception. Roosevelt considered Welles his best career foreign-policy aide, and he liked this fellow alumnus of Groton School (Welles, Harriman, Dean Acheson and the able ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, also were graduates of that school), but Welles was an executant of Roosevelt's orders and not more.

As for Harriman, he was, as the author volunteers, a highly motivated but rather pedestrian son of a very wealthy man. He hung around the fringes of the Roosevelt administration for two terms reviewing parades of New Deal workfare participants and had to prevail upon his sister and friends to champion him to Roosevelt, who did not even wish him to attend the Atlantic Conference with Churchill in July 1941. Although perfectly adequate, by all accounts, as lend-lease coordinator in Britain and an improvement over Laurence Steinhardt as ambassador to the Soviet Union, Harriman was always a journeyman. He never achieved much in the Roosevelt administration, as Truman's ambassador in London and commerce secretary, as one-term governor of New York, as Kennedy's ambassador at large or as cochairman of Johnson's Vietnam peace delegation. He may deserve some credit for the Limited Test Ban Treaty, but the Laotian neutrality agreement transformed that country into the infiltration super highway of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and he was not even able to negotiate the shape of the table at the Vietnam peace talks in 1968.

He was apparently a competent businessman and a diligent public servant who had an interesting career, but this effort to portray him as a “wise man” who played a seminal role in thirty years of successful American foreign policy is rubbish. There is no record that Roosevelt's view of anything was altered by Harriman. The British lavished immense attention on him, as they did on any official American as part of Churchill's desperate and perfervid campaign of ingratiation, waged with the conviction that U.S. entry into the war was the only imaginable deliverance for Britain. To this end, Churchill and his wife seemed not to notice the affair their daughter-in-law, Pamela Digby Churchill, had with Harriman (and subsequently with the leading American media figure in London, Edward R. Murrow, guru to such future stars of American television news as Walter Cronkite and Eric Sevareid); or their daughter Sarah Churchill's affair with Ambassador Winant. (As I observed on these relationships in my biography of FDR, Churchill was “an indulgent parent and a full-service ally.”)
As an Australian, Fullilove works in some interesting and relevant Australian material, which gives a refreshingly detached perspective, but he seems a little uncertain of the exact nature of American politics in this period. He refers to Roosevelt’s famous address in Boston on October 30, 1940, as “infamous,” presumably because he said: “I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again: Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.” Always before he had added the qualifier, “except in case of attack.” But he paid no price for this, as he made the point that if the United States were attacked it ceased to be a foreign war. Fullilove seems to have bought the idea that this was an impetuous commitment. He seems not to realize just how complicated Roosevelt’s path to war was. At the Atlantic Conference, Churchill urged Roosevelt to impose an absolute embargo on the sale of oil to Japan, which was at that point dependent on the United States for 80 percent of its oil, including aviation fuel. Roosevelt said he would retain the right to approve individual applications for export, tanker load by tanker load, so as not to put Japan absolutely to the wall, forcing it to choose between a humiliating exit from China and Indochina or going to war to assure an oil supply (from the Dutch East Indies, subsequently Indonesia). When he returned to Washington, he discovered that Dean Acheson, the assistant secretary of state for economic affairs, had laid down a practice, in the absence of a presidential policy, of declining to permit any exportation of oil to Japan. So Churchill was agitating for what was in fact the status quo, so desperate was he to get the United States into the war, even via the back door in the Pacific.

Roosevelt verbally outlined to the Japanese emissaries a modus vivendi in which the embargo on oil, scrap metal and rice would be partially lifted, while the Japanese would send no more forces to China or Indochina and some Japanese exports to the United States, such as silk, would be resumed. In the end, Roosevelt did not repeat this proposal or put it in writing. The Japanese were interested, as their decrypted diplomatic messages confirmed, but with the Germans at the gates of Moscow and Leningrad Roosevelt concluded it might be necessary for the United States to enter the war now, to assure that Stalin remained in the war. If Stalin made a separate peace with Hitler, it would require many hundreds of divisions and scores of thousands of aircraft to invade Hitler’s Europe successfully. Although Acheson wasn’t an envoy, the author would have done well to work him into his narrative. He was fired by Roosevelt as assistant treasury secretary in 1934 for indiscretions of which he was, in fact, innocent. But the president brought Acheson back into government after he publicly wrote during the 1940 election campaign that FDR had the constitutional authority to lend fifty destroyers to Britain without congressional approval. Roosevelt did so and recalled Acheson to government in consequence. Acheson, of course, remained in government and served with great distinction under President Harry
Truman as George C. Marshall’s deputy secretary of state and later as secretary of state.

Fullilove sets a toe in these waters with his question, attributed to the compiler of the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence, Warren Kimball: “Who was manipulating whom?” The answer, of course, was that Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt were all, to some degree, trying to manipulate each other. Churchill sought a resurrection of a power balance in Europe, reinforced by an alliance with America, in which Britain would play its centuries-old role as custodian of the fulcrum. Stalin sought the long-dreamed Russian advance into Western Europe. And Roosevelt sought the rout of the isolationists at home, the engagement of the United States in Europe and the Far East, and the gathering of most of the countries in those theaters into a gentle and cooperative subordinacy to the United States. America’s nature would be disguised by an international organization that the Western powers would dominate through their economic and military power and moral force, as well as through the votes of the quiescent Latin Americans and the commendably supportive British dominions.

None of these powerful men could win all he wanted, but Roosevelt was the big winner. Kimball only meant who, between Churchill and Roosevelt, was manipulating whom, and there the answer was neither. Both wanted America in the war and knew it had to happen for the war to end satisfactorily. The rest was tactics, well within Roosevelt’s purview. His judgment was accurate, his decisions correct, his execution brilliant. These five envoys were among the most prominent of his many helpers and well worth attention.

But it was these broader strategic questions that Roosevelt had to weigh. He retained Acheson’s complete embargo on oil exports to Japan; the Japanese responded by attacking the United States and other targets across the Pacific. By that time, Roosevelt already had advised Stalin that Japanese forces had moved south from the Siberian border, enabling Stalin to ship twenty divisions from the Far East across the Trans-Siberian railway as final reinforcements in the successful defense of his two largest cities. Of course, the Soviet Union remained in the war, though there were peace talks with the Germans in Stockholm in 1943. This is the same Roosevelt who stayed in the Soviet embassy at the Tehran Conference, rather than the British, although he assumed (correctly) that his rooms were bugged by the Soviets, because he needed to get Stalin’s support for the cross-channel landings in France, as opposed to Churchill’s hobbyhorse of...
moving up the Adriatic. Roosevelt was concerned that if the Western Allies did not invade northwestern Europe in 1944, either Stalin would make his peace with Hitler or he would advance so far into Europe that he would bag most of Germany and possibly be able to promote putsches by the powerful French and northern Italian Communist parties. Churchill and his advisers thought the cross-channel operation premature, and were convinced that Stalin supported that option only because he thought that the Germans would push the Allies into the sea, as they had at Dunkirk, Greece, Crete and Dieppe. Roosevelt thought that this might have been Stalin’s motive, but he had more confidence in the ability of the Allies to conduct a successful amphibious invasion and thought it the only way of winning the war strategically, by bringing most of Germany, as well as France, Italy and Japan, under Western occupation and back into the West as democratic allies, even though the Soviets were taking the vast majority of the casualties incurred in subduing Nazi Germany.

This global conflict, from beginning to end, was a war of intricate grand strategy on all sides. Hitler recognized, based on Roosevelt’s actions, that he was almost at war with the United States in mid-1941, and if he did not move to eliminate the Soviet Union he could find himself at war with the combined might of Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt. It was a huge gamble, but he had built his career on gambles. If Hitler had flattened Stalin before America entered the war, as bulked in Roosevelt’s reasoning when he resigned himself to a Japanese attack on America to bring it into the war before Stalin and Hitler signed a separate peace, it would have been a very daunting and almost-insuperable task to dislodge the Third Reich from control of Western and Central Europe. Historian A. J. P. Taylor was essentially correct when he credited Roosevelt’s strategic genius and said, “He made the United States the greatest power in the world at virtually no cost.” Of course it was a great cost—but it paled in comparison to what all the other great powers endured.

In pretending that its five featured envoys achieved more than they did and operated in a more spontaneous policy-making environment than they did, Fullilove’s book inadvertently gives an oversimplified notion of great-power grand strategy in World War II. In doing so, it shortchanges somewhat the president who sent them, respectfully treated though he is. It also pushes the basically unsound notion, largely advanced by Doris Kearns Goodwin, that these matters were more collegial than they were. This isn’t the place for a review of other books. But Roosevelt made all the decisions and was little influenced by advice; Eleanor was not a copresident, as Goodwin suggests in No Ordinary Time, any more than Lincoln’s men profiled in Team of Rivals had much influence on their president. But both were excellent books, and so is this an interesting and a good book. Anyone who keeps these limitations in mind will find Fullilove’s Rendezvous with Destiny a very rewarding read. □
Tracing China’s Long Game Plan

By Jacqueline Newmyer Deal


Since the 1990s, U.S. policy toward China has been premised on the idea that increasing Chinese wealth and international stature would lead naturally to domestic political liberalization. Early in the previous decade, the Bush administration also held out hope that China would become a “responsible stakeholder” in the international community. The intervening years have witnessed marked growth in China’s economic and diplomatic heft, with the country emerging as the second-biggest economy in the world. Its leaders refer to it as a “great power” alongside the United States. And yet the Chinese Communist Party (ccp) retains its monopoly on political authority, and since the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics the party-state has clamped down on domestic human-rights activists, lawyers and other advocates of liberal reform. Abroad, China has engaged in increasingly militarized efforts to press its claims to disputed territory, and it has also used economic tools, including threats to slow or halt commerce in certain goods, to this end. Where Chinese political elites once at least paid lip service to democratic values and international norms, now they actively tout their model as an alternative to the so-called Western system. How did successive generations of U.S. policy makers get China so wrong?

One answer is that they ignored indicators from modern Chinese history and the ccp’s record that would have called into question the notion of inevitable Chinese liberalization and assimilation to international institutions. Better late than never, Orville Schell and John Delury probe those indicators in their excellent and erudite new book, Wealth and Power: China’s Long March to the Twenty-First Century. Schell, a former dean of the University of California, Berkeley’s Graduate School of Journalism and current director of the Asia Society’s Center on U.S.-China Relations, and Delury, a Yale-trained historian based at Yonsei University in Seoul, combine scholarly learning with a reportorial appreciation of colorful, revealing details. They breathe life into their history through biographical sketches of pillars of Chinese intelligentsia and politics from the nineteenth century through the twentieth, and they argue that national rejuvenation—defined in terms of fuqiang (“wealth and power”)—has been the goal of these figures all along. Chinese elites over the past two centuries have attempted to convert the shame of their country’s

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nineteenth-century humiliation, when outside powers repeatedly exploited China’s military inferiority, into energy to fuel China’s ascent and redress its anguished past. If some of these elites from time to time promoted Western political values, they did so only fleetingly, at moments when they believed liberal democracy could enrich and strengthen the state. Schell and Delury’s introduction identifies a common theme across these cases:

Unlike democratic political reform in the West, which developed out of a belief in certain universal values and human rights as derived from a “natural,” if not God-given, source, and so were to be espoused regardless of their efficiency, the dominant tradition of reform in China evolved from a far more utilitarian source. Its primary focus was to return China to a position of strength, and any way that might help achieve this goal was thus worth considering. . . . Reformers have been interested in democratic governance at various stages in China’s tortuous path, not so much because it might enshrine sacred, inalienable political liberties but because it might make their nation more dynamic and thus stronger.

Among Chinese elites, concerns about power, understood as a function of economic and military capacity, have trumped any serious appreciation of human rights or the rule of law, whether at home or abroad. They see the world through power-hungry lenses. It is a dog-eat-dog competition out there, and the unit of account is the state, not the individual or citizen. While this perspective contrasts sharply with contemporary Western norms, it would have been familiar to nineteenth-century European statesmen such as Otto von Bismarck. Such an outlook precludes support for genuine political liberalization, which would entail popular sovereignty. Instead, China’s leading thinkers and statesmen have tended to see themselves as essential to their country’s effort to prevail in the global rat race—and, accordingly, as entitled to amass their own personal wealth and power.

Schell and Delury thus explain why China has not democratized, and this is a significant accomplishment. But they also illuminate the domestic underpinnings of China’s foreign and security policy. While the authors focus almost exclusively on Chinese internal developments, their analysis provides critical context for understanding contemporary Chinese strategy and its roots in the work and thought of key Chinese figures over the century and a half since the Opium Wars. For example, the authors profile the nineteenth-century reformer whose blueprint for both naval modernization and a “charm offensive” vis-à-vis Southeast Asia and Russia seems to guide Beijing today. And from the book’s treatment of Deng Xiaoping’s economic guru, Zhu Rongji, the careful reader may detect how and why Zhu let Western interlocutors deceive themselves into thinking he was a true free marketeer, when in fact he had no intention of abandoning state-sponsored capitalism. Since the emergence of the modern state at the end of the last dynasty, China’s leading thinkers and statesmen have set their sights on reestablish-
Where Chinese political elites once at least paid lip service to democratic values and international norms, now they actively tout their model as an alternative to the so-called Western system.
Their account of China’s internal evolution explains why its persistent authoritarianism is no accident but rather reflective of deeply held beliefs within the elite that stretch back at least a century and a half. The work also reveals that these beliefs are likely to preclude China from becoming what Westerners call a responsible stakeholder. With the exception of Liu Xiaobo, the book’s central figures have tended to view wealth and power as inextricably linked—and as the lodestars of international relations. In their minds, success in interstate commerce naturally produces geopolitical dominance, furnishing the resources for a robust military and facilitating global influence. Further, they have believed that in order to reassert Chinese primacy in a world dominated by wealth and power relations, China must strengthen itself—or “self-strengthen” (ziqiang)—in all possible ways and embrace realpolitik, which means, in part, learning from enemies and appropriating their winning ways. Chinese leaders have understood for decades that, during this period of learning and building up forces, China must defer to stronger powers. But, in accordance with the logic of realpolitik, Beijing also would try to divide hostile coalitions and exploit weaker powers. Finally, Chinese reformers in the late nineteenth century revived two classical Confucian principles related to harmony and shame that live on today, serving as a reminder of the fundamentally illiberal, antidemocratic premises of Chinese politics. Schell and Delury thus clarify that CCP leaders are steering the country down a path outlined more than a century and a half ago, when China was still an empire and international relations could realistically be characterized as the clash of colonial titans. China hatched its current approach
to domestic politics as well as to foreign relations in this nineteenth-century context.

It was in the mid-1800s that Wei Yuan articulated many of the themes that came to define the work of China’s twentieth-century modernizers. When the first Opium War broke out, Wei found himself in a ringside seat. Having repeatedly failed the imperial civil-service exam after a promising early academic career, he wound up advising provincial officials and accumulating a small fortune as an investor in the salt trade in the city of Yangzhou along the Yangtze River. There in 1842, he witnessed British warships steaming past after a successful attack on Shanghai. Wei’s response to the trauma of China’s defeat at the hands of a British force of only a few thousand men combined precepts from ancient Chinese philosophy with insights from his observation of modern statecraft and warfare. Wei did not turn to the traditional reservoir of Chinese thought, Confucianism, but rather drew on a rival school called “Legalism.” Where Confucianism propounds “benevolence, ritual propriety, and social harmony” as the “only legitimate and effective basis for good government,” Legalism stresses the need to “enrich the state and strengthen its military power” (fuguo qiangbing, which is alternately translated as “rich country, strong army” and from which the term fuqiang is derived as an abbreviation). In the place of the Confucians’ rule by virtue, Legalists argue for rule by law, defined as a system of incentives wielded by a ruler to ensure his subjects’ loyalty. Schell and Delury write, “These ancient Chinese realpolitikers had no patience for what they considered the moralistic blather of the Confucians. Since they put little stock in good intentions, wealth and strength alone were the ultimate arbiters of a policy’s success or failure.”

Realpolitik in this context refers to a purely pragmatic, results-based approach not only to domestic rule but also to foreign relations. As Schell and Delury note, Wei believed that Western powers like the British “promote trade by sending out soldiers,” so that “soldiers and trade are mutually dependent.” This idea was to persist in the minds of Chinese elites, including Sun Yat-sen, who wrote in 1894:

In the West the interests of the state and those of commerce flourish together. . . . National defense cannot function without money, and money for the military will not accumulate without commerce. The reason why Westerners are ready to pounce like tigers on the rest of the world and why they bully China is also due to commerce.

Wei’s emphasis on wealth and power and his attraction to Legalism—or, at least, his skepticism about Confucianism’s claim to a monopoly on civilized ways—may have helped him resist the traditional Chinese impulse to reject all things foreign as inferior. In a treatise on the first Opium War, Wei argued that China needed to accumulate wealth and power to recover its imperial greatness. In other words, it needed “self-improvement and self-strengthening” (zixiu ziqiang), which it could only achieve by “borrowing”—
that is, acquiring and copying—technology from abroad while enacting governmental reforms at home. This impulse to appropriate certain Western means and employ them toward the end of strengthening China against the West would become a key theme of Chinese modernizers, as would the Legalist spirit of realpolitik. With weak states condemned to be prey for strong states, China must work to amass its own wealth and power, deferring as necessary to its superiors while trying to learn from and, where possible, weaken them. Schell and Delury point out that Wei endorsed the idea of weakening China’s Western adversaries by playing them off against each other, or “yiyi zhiyi” (“using barbarians to control other barbarians”), a classic Chinese stratagem. Finally, self-strengthening would require intelligence about foreign states to identify their points of vulnerability, and diplomatic finesse to divide up hostile alliances. After the first Opium War, Schell and Delury explain, Wei regretted that the Qing had possessed too little knowledge of foreign relations in the outside world to exploit the tensions between Britain on the one hand and France and the United States on the other—despite the fact that both the French and the Americans had offered the dynasty support.

Wei’s intellectual heir, Feng Guifen, built on Wei’s ideas of self-strengthening and copying “techniques and methods” from foreign powers. Like Wei, Feng had proceeded all the way to the point of the imperial-level civil-service exams and then stumbled, and he lived at a time of great tumult, the period of the second Opium War and China’s enormous internal conflagration, the Taiping Rebellion. Schell and Delury highlight the query Feng posed in the wake of China’s defeat at the hands of French and British coalition forces, and in the aftermath of a civil war that left twenty million dead and effectively sounded the death knell for the Qing dynasty: “Our territory is eight times that of Russia, ten times the size of America, one hundred times bigger than France, and two hundred times England. Why is it that they are small and strong, yet we are big and weak?” Feng offered his response in an 1860 manifesto, Dissenting Views from a Hut near Bin,¹ that echoed Wei: “If we use Chinese ethics and teachings as the foundation, but supplement them with foreign countries’ techniques for wealth and power, would it not be ideal?” For those who remained skeptical, Feng reasoned, “If a system is no good, even though it is from antiquity, we should reject it; if a system is good, then we should follow it, even if it originates from uncivilized peoples.”

Consistent with Wei’s recommendation that China improve its knowledge of

¹ As Schell and Delury explain, though Feng was actually writing from Shanghai, the place name Bin (near present-day Xian) would have evoked for Chinese readers the ancient Zhou dynasty king Wu, a symbol of resistance to foreign barbarians. By situating himself in a hut, Feng acknowledged the boldness of his endeavor—daring to advise the imperial court on statecraft and strategy from his perch as a mere provincial official.
foreign powers (e.g., to facilitate playing them off against each other), Feng lobbied the throne to sponsor education in foreign studies. Schell and Delury note that his request was granted despite opposition from Confucian proponents of the classical Chinese curriculum. Today, China sends more students abroad than any other country, and China may also train the largest number of English linguists of any non-English-speaking state. While some of this effort is in the service of diplomacy and commerce, much of it is also part of self-strengthening—building up China’s military power. A recent report by the nonprofit Project 2049 Institute disclosed that the part of the Chinese military thought to house its cyberunits is the largest employer of well-trained linguists in China.

Feng’s message about self-strengthening gave rise to an eponymous reform movement in Beijing, and in 1896 the provincial official Zhang Zhidong even successfully petitioned the Empress Dowager Cixi for permission to establish a “Self-Strengthening Army.” Meanwhile, Feng’s endorsement of Wei’s notion of copying from the West helped to ensure that this concept would endure. As Schell and Delury note, Zhang also formulated the self-strengtheners’ famous motto: “Zhongxue weiti, xixue weiyong” (“Chinese learning should remain the core, but Western learning should be employed for practical use”). By the beginning of the twentieth century, Sun Yat-sen was using self-strengthening language to argue for the adoption of not only Western know-how but also the latest Western form of government, republicanism, and the overthrow of the Qing: “The future of China is like building a railroad. Thus if we were now building a railroad would we use the first locomotive ever invented [i.e., dynastic rule] or today’s improved and most efficient model?” Yet Sun evinced only a practical interest in republicanism. In his famous 1924 declaration of the “Three Principles of the People,” he qualified his support for rights and liberty with concern about unity and the collective: “The individual should not have too much liberty, but the nation should have complete liberty. When the nation can act freely, then China may be called strong.” Later in his life, Sun came to admire another foreign political model, Leninism, because of its ability to generate party discipline, underscoring his merely instrumental embrace of republicanism as the most promising new political technology to deploy in the service of China’s essence.

The thinking of the late Qing and Republican eras has influenced Chinese statesmen from Mao and his successor Deng Xiaoping to the current generation of CCP officials. They all have spoken of exploiting xiyong (Western function) while preserving zhongti (Chinese essence). Mao talked of adapting Marxism to China’s circumstances; Deng advocated importing Western market-based economic know-how while building socialism “with Chinese characteristics”; and the latest incarnation of this approach involves aggressively “borrowing” Western industrial and military technology. Witness China’s massive efforts...
to extract U.S. intellectual property using cybertechniques along with more traditional forms of espionage. Imitation is said to be the sincerest form of flattery, but in this case it should be interpreted as evidence of a consistent and enduring ambition on the part of Chinese elites. The goal, again, is not to become like the United States insofar as the United States is a democracy and supporter of the post–World War II international system. It is rather to preserve CCP rule and make China as strong as possible so that Beijing can establish a new global order on its own terms.

What would a Chinese-dictated world order look like? The details are murky, but it is nonetheless possible to identify certain contrasts with the current order. Rather than starting with the dignity of the individual and the entitlement of all human beings to certain fundamental rights, protected by law, the Chinese order would be premised upon the existence of the collective and the priority of its stability. Where Washington promotes liberty, Beijing would substitute the aim of datong ("Grand Harmony" or "Great Unity").

Part of Wei Yuan’s unorthodox approach to Confucianism was that he believed that instead of proceeding cyclically, with the rise and fall of dynasties, history was actually linear, progressing toward a utopian era of “Grand Harmony.” Schell and Delury explain that Wei belonged to a school of thinkers who contended that even Confucius understood history this way, and he secretly authorized the use of realpolitik methods “to keep the world orderly” until the arrival of datong. As with Wei’s conception of self-strengthening and its requirements, his view of realpolitik as the means and datong as the goal lived on well after Wei’s lifetime.

At the end of the nineteenth century, China suffered its most devastating defeat up to that time when it lost to Japan in the first Sino-Japanese War. On the heels of this trauma, the reformist scholar Liang Qichao, an intellectual heir of Wei Yuan and Feng Guifen, penned a preface to a new edition of Wei’s work on Legalism and statecraft. He wrote: “Those who open themselves to the new will prosper and grow strong. But those who confine themselves to the old will diminish and become weak.” Liang Qichao’s mentor, Kang Youwei, an adviser to Cixi’s nephew when he reigned as emperor for 102 days in 1898, published in that same year a book called Datong Shu (Book of Grand Harmony). Even as Kang was engaged in the practical task of advising a weak Qing emperor on how to reform and shore up his regime, he was conjuring a harmonious utopia. Kang had studied in the same scholarly circle as Wei Yuan and was in agreement on the linearity of history, the ultimate goal of datong and the usefulness of realpolitik in the intervening period. Mao later told the sympathetic Western reporter Edgar Snow that he was a big fan of Liang and Kang and as a young man

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2 In addition to revealing Western technical secrets, Chinese spying serves the aim of helping Beijing better understand its rival, consistent with the lesson that Wei Yuan drew from the first Opium War.
would “read and reread those books until [he] knew them by heart.” As the Chinese-educated, Kentucky-based political scientist Shiping Hua has pointed out, subsequent CCP leaders have not hesitated to hold out datong as the ideal while endorsing alternative near-term goals that seem more attainable for the present. He argues that “the persistence of Grand Harmony as an ideal also suggests that China’s evolution in the direction of Western-style liberal democratic capitalism is not very likely.”

The recurrence of datong across successive generations of CCP elites, including the virulently anti-Confucian Mao, reflects an entrenched Chinese tradition that puts the collective ahead of the individual and endorses realpolitik at home and abroad pending the arrival of the ever-elusive Grand Harmony.

Despite the focus of China’s late nineteenth-century reformers on modernization and their generally heterodox stance toward Confucianism, datong was not the only classical Confucian principle that they revived. Scholar-activists such as Wei and Feng also emphasized the traditional Confucian virtue of humiliation and packaged it into a force for modernization. Wei recalled the Confucian aphorism, “Humiliation stimulates effort; when the country is humiliated, its spirit will be aroused.” And Feng wrote, “Once one feels a sense of shame, nothing is better than self-strengthening.” Like datong, the motif of chi (“shame” or “humiliation”) endures to this day in China. In 1927, Chiang Kai-shek, Sun Yat-sen’s successor as head of China’s Nationalist movement, established National Humiliation Day, and the holiday continues to be observed. As Schell and Delury point out, many of the most popular tourist destinations for Chinese domestic travelers commemorate moments of Chinese defeat and devastation at the hands of Western or Japanese forces. These sites often take liberties with history; the state-run Opium War Museum, for example, erroneously includes the United States in the ranks of China’s opponents. A regime that persistently highlights national humiliation and manipulates history to galvanize the population for struggle is not
If China continues on its present trajectory of economic and military expansion, it will become a bolder actor in the world, not a more democratic or responsible one.

a regime on the verge of recognizing the individual rights of its citizens or embracing the current international order.

Although many of the figures covered by Schell and Delury considered democracy a source of the West's strength and therefore mustered at least an instrumental interest in it, none ended up a democrat—again, with the exception of Liu Xiaobo, currently imprisoned and not likely to gain much of an audience in China. Although Feng Guifen admired Abraham Lincoln's 1860 election, he was, in Schell and Delury's words, more of a “participatory authoritarian” than a democrat. Liang Qichao started out in favor of democracy before deciding that China wasn't ready for it. As noted, despite Sun Yat-sen's endorsement of republicanism, he never fully embraced the premises of the liberal social contract and eventually came to admire Leninist party organization. Chiang Kai-shek was out of the same mold: “While Chiang splattered his speeches and writings with references to ‘constitutional democracy,’ ‘liberty,’ and ‘freedom,’” write Schell and Delury, “he did so in much the same way as had Sun... . For him, these were vague, long-term aspirations, nowhere near as important in China's immediate struggle for survival and national rejuvenation.” The pattern is of flirtation with, but never true conversion to, liberal-democratic principles. Accordingly, Wealth and Power’s query as to whether China's leaders’ quest for international prestige might lead them to democratize seems to represent a wisp of optimism rather than a realistic projection for China’s future.

A n alternative vision of China's future comes from a rare source that Schell and Delury mention but neglect to mine fully. Wei Yuan's Illustrated Treatise on Sea Powers was published in 1843, four months after the signing of the Treaty of Nanking, which removed British warships from the Yangtze. This is the treatise in which Wei remarked on the mutual dependence of British military and commercial power. But as the scholar Jane Kate Leonard has observed, Wei goes well beyond this diagnosis of British success and presents a blueprint for Chinese naval modernization and geopolitical strategy. Elements of it could have come from an official planning document from the 1980s, so closely does Chinese behavior over the past several decades track with Wei's recommendations.

Wei begins from the idea that Western states derive their power from a network of bases that facilitate domination of maritime communications and trade. He cites not only the British ports in Africa, India, Ceylon and Singapore, which conferred influence over the Strait of Malacca, but also the Dutch facility at Batavia, which afforded access to the Sunda Strait between Java and Sumatra. He further concluded that China was not in imminent danger of invasion, so long as the Western powers had not penetrated mainland Southeast Asia, Nepal or Japan. (Had he lived long enough, Wei might have seen Japan's assault on Southeast Asia at the outset of World War II as a prelude to Japan's further incursions into China and thus judged his assessment to have been validated.) That said, Wei believed that the Western powers’ network
of bases in the region clearly destabilized the old tributary order—at China’s expense—and positioned the West to threaten the Chinese coast. Against the backdrop of this analysis, Wei’s Treatise proceeds to prescribe a course of diplomatic and military actions through which China might fortify itself.

The Treatise recommends that China focus its diplomatic efforts on mainland Southeast Asia, particularly Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia, along with Japan, which later demonstrated its ability to rebuff the West in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, and Nepal. Following the logic of yiyi zhiyi, Wei argued that Beijing should play external powers off against each other and use diplomacy with tributary states to weaken them. For instance, he suggested trying to balance the British presence at Hong Kong by giving France and the United States access to Guangzhou (then called Canton). He further recommended seeking support against the other Western powers from Russia—going so far as to advocate encouragement of Russian action against the British in Afghanistan and northwestern India, which would allow the Nepalese to destroy the British at Bengal. Such a chain of events would leave the British position in Singapore exposed, so that Thailand, in conjunction with Vietnam, could attack.

The world and the map have clearly changed in the 170 years since Wei penned this plan. Japan has been locked in an alliance with the United States since 1945, and the British no longer govern Hong Kong or India, are no longer on the ground in force in Afghanistan and are not the Western country that China most fears. But the essence of Wei’s recommendations still resonates and even seems to explain China’s recent diplomatic choices. Consider China’s charm offensive vis-à-vis Southeast Asia over the past few decades and the more recent inroads that China has made in India’s traditional sphere of influence, including Nepal. Consider, too, Beijing’s apparently tightening relations with Moscow, which deny other potential rivals the opportunity to form an anti-Chinese coalition with Russia. Finally, there also seems to be a modern-day analogue to Wei’s argument that pressure on British positions in other parts of Asia would yield dividends for the Chinese in their near abroad. In the context of Beijing’s efforts to cultivate a range of partners in the Middle East and Afghanistan, including America’s enemies, it would seem possible to substitute the United States for Britain and the Middle East for India and perceive the same indirect logic in operation—the need to divert and weaken the great power most threatening to China’s East Asian ambitions.

Complementing this diplomatic strategy, Wei offered a set of naval-modernization
recommendations that track even more closely with China’s military modernization over the past few decades. The blueprint begins with measures to shore up China’s coastal defenses in the short term. Next is the development of long-term defenses, along with a reorganization of the military and the promotion of innovation within it. Finally, the country would be prepared to emerge as a serious naval power—defending its key ports, possessing a network of strengthened bases, acquiring and developing advanced military technologies, and fielding a naval force that is smaller but qualitatively better than its predecessor. Since the early 1980s, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has pursued a strategy that exactly mirrors the Wei concept. Successive PLAN leaders have progressed from boosting the defense of China’s ports to increasing the distances from China’s coast over which Chinese forces can operate and interdict hostile forces. Today’s terminology for this effort refers to “island chains,” with the “first island chain,” bordered by Okinawa, Taiwan and the Philippines, a nearer-term goal than the “second island chain,” bounded by the Ogasawara island chain, Guam and Indonesia. According to this vision, the PLAN’s final step would be to push out to the blue waters of the Pacific and Indian Oceans under the protection of its new aircraft carriers.

China already has fielded precision missiles that can range targets in Guam, and the latest open-source estimates indicate that the country is on the verge of being able to hit moving targets up to three thousand kilometers from the mainland, well into the second island chain. Meanwhile, China’s first aircraft carrier has undergone flight trials, and several additional carrier keels have been laid. Finally the entire Chinese military has been shrinking in size as part of the effort to boost the quality of the force through the acquisition of new technologies, along with improvements in training and personnel policies.

Certainly, military modernization is not the only aspect of today’s China worth watching, but it would be reckless to exclude it from efforts to parse China’s future. Schell and Delury do an outstanding job of uncovering the thought and work of key Chinese reformers and leaders from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and their coverage of the late Qing period includes discussions of Li Hongzhang and Zeng Guofan, self-strengthening military commanders favored by the Empress Dowager Cixi. If China’s twenty-first-century self-strengthening effort continues as planned, with emphasis placed on both economic and military power, it might be worth including more contemporary Chinese defense intellectuals in a future edition of the book—such as, perhaps, Admiral Liu Huaqing, the so-called Alfred Thayer Mahan of China, who articulated the island-chain strategy in 1982. In the meantime, following the logic of Schell and Delury, we can say definitively that, if China continues on its present trajectory of economic and military expansion, it will become a bolder actor in the world, not a more democratic or responsible one. ❧
The Limits of U.S. Financial Warfare

By Michael Scheuer


America’s Founding Fathers believed little else would matter if the government they were forming did not reliably protect the new republic from foreign and domestic threats while also ensuring the liberty and growing prosperity of those it was to govern and defend. If that were not the Republic’s main and institutionalized organizing principle, the Founders believed, their effort to give it life would fail. The keys to success in ensuring national survival, liberty and prosperity were: stay out of debt; steer clear of foreign entanglements, alliances and wars that did not concern the United States; and avoid situations—whether products of ill-considered policies, fatuous and feckless idealism, or leaders’ inattention—that would lead to unnecessary wars and foreign military adventures, debt and eroded liberty. James Madison warned in the 1790s:

Of all the enemies to public liberty, war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded, because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent of armies; from these proceed debt and taxes; and armies, and debts, and taxes are the known instruments for bringing the many under the domination of the few. In war, too, the discretionary power of the Executive is extended.

Elsewhere, he added, “War is in fact the true nurse of executive aggrandizement.” Juan C. Zarate’s new book, Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare, shows how great a regression the Republic has undergone since the only-necessary-wars principle of the Founders’ era. Zarate, who served in the George W. Bush administration as assistant secretary of the treasury for terrorist financing and financial crimes and is now a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, offers a detailed study about what might be called “all war, all the time.” The author is described on the dust jacket of his book as “a chief architect of modern financial warfare,” and he unveils a catalogue of America’s financial-warfare adversaries, including Al Qaeda and other Islamist fighters; organized criminal groups, narcotics cartels and people smugglers; North Korea and Iran, with a short stopover in Libya; computer hackers; and obstructive, turf-conscious bureaucrats. What emerges is a stark reality: the Treasury Department is at war—and...
those involved in this financial warfare revel in it. Traveling the world to recover hoards of embezzled money, stop terrorist plots and confound North Korea’s money managers, these financial warriors thwart the bad guys through an array of tools ranging from old-fashioned publicity—to “name and shame” evildoers—to electronic whizbangs. And they do so in an amiable way, which is fitting for a group of men and women portrayed as if they are all “above average,” in the mold of the children of Lake Wobegon. Based on Zarate’s characterization, they are all brilliant, hard-driving, friendly, striking, optimistic, garrulous, savvy, confident, eloquent, masterful and so on.

It must be said that Zarate and others in Treasury’s war have accomplished some remarkable things for U.S. security—temporarily denying North Korea ready access to international financial markets; attacking the essential components of Iran’s economy such as banks and oil; dismantling parts of the financial networks of Al Qaeda and other Islamist insurgent groups; and recovering many billions of dollars stashed away by Saddam Hussein and Muammar el-Qaddafi for the debauched retirements they never reached. Perhaps most interesting, Zarate explains how successful he and others at Treasury were in forging ties to powerful private-sector U.S. and European interests—banks, financial managers and organizations providing security for international financial transactions—that allowed effective joint attacks on targets designated by the U.S. president. The reader will come away from Treasury’s War genuinely impressed by the tactical victories scored by those Zarate ably led and justly honors.

Zarate has written a useful and alarming book. Useful, because he instructs his readers about the wide range of lethal enemies the U.S. government has acquired in recent decades and, at times, motivated. And alarming because, as Zarate implies, the U.S. government has no national-security strategy worth the name. Resting complacently on the illusion that the tactical victories Zarate details will adequately defend the United States, Washington, under either party, continues to pursue a relentlessly interventionist foreign policy that cultivates more enemies and complements the strategies that our myriad foes have designed to seek our defeat. Sadly, at book’s end Zarate turns out to be an advocate of intervention.

The rub in the book arises when it becomes apparent that there is no clear and attainable set of strategic objectives that provides a framework for the war waged by Zarate and his team—or their successors. There is nothing, that is, that even faintly resembles what the Founders saw as the sine qua non for the Republic’s survival—a government organized on the single principle of defending and furthering the security, liberty and prosperity of Americans. As smart as Zarate’s team and their allies may have been and as hard as they may have worked, their attacks are pinpricks—often quickly healed—that hit the financial interests of a wide array of America’s enemies. The clear inadequacy
of this pinprick offensive is not their fault; they and all Americans are cosufferers of the national-security mess our bipartisan governing apparatus has cooked up since the Cold War’s end.

Throughout this nearly five-hundred-page book, the reader perceives no such thing as a “U.S. national-security strategy,” notwithstanding documents that are so entitled and published with some regularity and fanfare. What the reader sees is Washington—under both parties—running an uncoordinated, politically correct, ad hoc foreign and military policy that strikes out at numerous targets without sufficient power to destroy any of them. At this stage in its history, America’s security motto should be: “We take no enemy off the table.”

In the context of this amateurish foreign policy, successes like those scored by Zarate and Treasury’s warriors certainly are better than nothing, but they are not war winners. Like the U.S. use of drones, renditions, special forces and interrogations against Islamists, and the law-enforcement methods used against mafia groups and drug cartels, the operations heralded by Zarate reside on the periphery of the main components of genuine national power—namely, military force and a prosperous, low-debt economy. They are at best a complement to, and not a replacement for, these crucial ingredients of American strength. Indeed, notwithstanding the clear tactical successes scored through the methods Zarate describes, the United States today is losing to every entity Washington has designated an enemy.

Consider Zarate’s slate of enemies. Despite the successes against North Korea so well described in Treasury’s War, Pyongyang can still bring the world to a fretful standstill with its saber rattling, behind which it is gradually improving the quality of its nuclear weapons and their long-range delivery systems. It is true that Al Qaeda and other Islamist insurgents have suffered since 1996 from telling attacks at the hands of Treasury, the CIA and U.S. special forces. And yet, Islamist elements have defeated U.S.-led multinational armies in Afghanistan and Iraq and are quickly growing in manpower, geographic dispersion, and—thanks to the Arab Spring—access to veteran mujahideen and sophisticated weaponry. All of this means that Osama bin Laden’s strategy of bleeding the U.S. economy remains alive and viable. Meanwhile, Iran continues to build toward a nuclear capability, sucking up the pain and soldiering on despite the severe damage Western aggression has done to its economy via sanctions and cyberattacks. Tehran also maintains a capability to wreak terrorist havoc inside the United States—thanks to more than four decades of open U.S. borders—if we and/or the Israelis attack Iran.
And gangsters of all kinds, as *Treasury’s War* documents, continue to steal, hack, suborn, corrupt and kill. The Latin American drug cartels are expanding their manpower, monetary resources and firepower, challenging the state in Mexico, spreading into Central America, establishing smuggling networks in West Africa, corrupting banking systems throughout the Western Hemisphere, and, in alliance with Latino street gangs, showing signs of increasing influence and control in some towns and cities across the southwestern United States. Again, much of this is facilitated by the open U.S. southern border. Zarate’s book also explains the symbiotic relationship between organized criminal organizations (mafias, hackers—are-us groups, people smugglers, etc.) and globalism’s characteristic communication systems and portable high-tech gear. He makes the excellent point that even as the U.S. government has used cutting-edge electronic and computer equipment to hurt these organizations, they are growing increasingly capable themselves in this field. With seemingly unlimited cash, they can acquire state-of-the-art skills and equipment to defend and attack. Zarate wisely notes that these malefactors have an advantage over America because they do not care at all about collateral damage or breaking any laws. And he posits the troubling and probably accurate thought that it is only a matter of time before nonstate actors pose a potentially catastrophic threat to U.S. economic, financial and infrastructure interests that depend on the Internet and other electronic-communications systems.

How do we fix this problem, which is really asking how we ensure the Republic’s survival? Well, most helpful would be to accept the fact that the Founders were not dead, white, misogynist slave drivers, but rather smart, often-ruthless and practical fellows who were completely devoted to an “America First” national-security policy. If we can embrace this historical reality, and if the NSA and Department of Education do not discover the heresy and lock us up, we can begin to see that today’s U.S. government and the bipartisan political establishment that runs it are contributing significantly and knowingly to America’s vulnerability. Then perhaps we can begin to formulate a commonsense national-security strategy, which would incorporate all of the enthusiasm described by Zarate and some of the methods.

To get on the same page as the Founders and then employ what might be called the “Founders’ Rules” in America’s defense, Washington must do five things, aiming to shape a world in which Treasury’s economic tools, special forces, military drones and CIA covert actions have a chance to control a suppressed and greatly damaged enemy. This would supplant the current, unachievable mission of defeating a rapidly growing enemy that is too often motivated by U.S. adventures overseas.

The five imperatives are: extinguish the national debt; attain energy security; win the very few wars America needs to fight; take risks to defend America and annihilate its enemies; and end an interventionist foreign policy meant to install secular democracy around the world.
Zarate’s book admirably underscores the dire national-security threat posed by the almost-unfathomable level of our national debt. With much of it held by adversaries and competitors in China and on the Arabian Peninsula, the debt cripples our ability to shift or even find resources to meet emergencies or reequip our badly worn military. It also prevents us from effectively challenging China’s obviously official and highly damaging hacking campaign against U.S. government agencies and corporations. Further, it forces us to acquiesce in the well-financed and unending campaign of Saudi Arabia (about which Zarate is far too positive) to spread its murderous form of Sunni Islam around the world, including in the United States.

No viable national-security policy is possible until the debt issue is resolved. Until then, our national security depends on the unlikely success of Ben Bernanke’s monthly flood of backed-by-nothing fool’s currency and the prattling of foreign-monster-seeking politicians such as John McCain, Joe Lieberman and Lindsay Graham, bent on rattling sabers that have become dull blades following the U.S. debacles in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In noting the importance of energy security, Zarate rightfully stresses the pleasing prospect of substantial near-term advances in that direction via shale oil and natural gas. Washington must realize these possibilities for both the energy security they will yield and the jobs they will produce. The United States already does more than any other great power to reduce environmental degradation, and for now it is time to put that issue on the back burner. President Obama’s politically motivated delay of the Keystone XL pipeline and his war on the coal industry cruelly cost jobs and degrade U.S. national security. It is time to ignore the ecozealots, the politicians who pander to them and their media supporters, while simultaneously squaring away our future energy security and ending our humiliating and war-causing dependence on effete but oil-rich Arab despots.

Although Zarate never says so explicitly, his book makes clear that human beings are, as ever, hardwired for war and lesser violent conflicts. Therefore, the wars that America must fight—and there are very few—must be decisively won. The widespread idea, embraced by Zarate, that the world has moved away from using military power to win wars and that America can now prevail by employing the pinprick tools described above is nothing less than lethal nonsense.

Since the mid-1990s, America definitively has proven that such tools can hurt its enemies but cannot win wars; indeed, in the long run they make matters worse by prolonging wars and ensuring our enemies survive, grow and—as Zarate accurately notes—learn how to turn our own pinprick tools against our very vulnerable economic and financial sectors. If we fix the debt and stop causing or intervening in unnecessary wars with countries that pose no threat to us (Iraq, Libya, Syria, Iran, etc.), we can refit the U.S. military and await a chance to unleash our forces against our most lethal enemy, the Islamists, in a manner that focuses on destruction of their fighters,
their infrastructure, and their supporters and abettors.

My own guess is that this necessary war will come in West Africa, where Al Qaeda and related Islamist groups are cooperating with Latin American drug cartels and organized criminal organizations to solidify their positions in and near areas that produce oil, strategic minerals and uranium, which are life-and-death national interests for the economies of America and several of its European allies. When this war occurs, it should be formally declared by Congress—a quaint but clear constitutional requirement—and then fought with as few allies as possible. It should be waged as the U.S. military sees fit under a presidential directive that simply orders it to annihilate the enemy as quickly and thoroughly as possible and then come home. Intense, indiscriminate and enemy-erasing lethality applied as fast as possible is, after all, the only mercy in war.

In Treasury’s War, Zarate also makes clear that U.S. politicians and senior civil servants have yet to realize that the Cold War is over, and that with it went the near “certainties” they once enjoyed about the intentions and capabilities of America’s major nation-state opponent, the Soviet Union. Once their leaders at last absorb this reality, America’s defenders can begin to take well-considered but dangerous risks on America’s behalf. As much as Washington’s bipartisan elite hates it, regular risk-taking is now the order of the day.

Zarate describes a policy advancement that occurred when Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill allowed him and his team to work on an 80 percent rule, meaning U.S. action could be undertaken against the enemy when there was an 80 percent confidence level in the intelligence being used. But this formula was soon replaced by a near 100 percent confidence requirement. In reality, such high confidence levels are rarely achievable in the post–Cold War world, and when they are it is almost always regarding nation-states, which operate from fixed addresses and use communications systems and other assets that can be monitored by a broad range of U.S. intelligence tools.

In assessing Soviet intentions and capabilities during the Cold War, we often had very high levels of confidence. But that world has changed, and Zarate demonstrates that senior political leaders and civil servants still don’t understand that. Nonstate actors—precisely those detailed
by Zarate—are not vulnerable to many U.S. intelligence tools that are effective against nation-states because they have no fixed addresses, tank parks, airfields, fiber-optic cables, communications satellites, navies or electrical grids. Therefore, if America’s defenders secure a 25–30 percent confidence level that the United States is being threatened by a nonstate actor, close attention should be paid. If those men and women then become 35–40 percent certain that trouble is coming our way, U.S. political and bureaucratic leaders should destroy the threat, even if they have to risk being wrong, causing collateral damage, and then suffering condemnation by domestic political opportunists, the media, human-rights groups and foreigners—all of whom can stoop to criticize precisely because they are not responsible for America’s security.

It should be noted that today’s Islamist threat to the United States is so enormous because President Clinton's administration wanted Cold War–level confidence—75–80 percent certainty or more—in the intelligence about bin Laden before it would act to protect Americans. Not surprisingly, that level never came, and Clinton took no chance on Americans’ behalf. The result was September 11. When U.S. Navy SEALs killed bin Laden in May 2011, U.S. government officials told the media that the chance bin Laden was in Abbottabad was at best 50 percent. Against Islamists, narcotraffickers, mafias and other nonstate actors, that is a truly excellent level of confidence. If we do not act when or before that level is reached, we will always be chasing but never defeating nonstate actors.

The most essential reform needed to craft a viable national-security strategy is a decision by our bipartisan governing elite and senior civil servants to stop waging their war of cultural intervention—often backed by bayonets—against populations that don’t embrace Western norms and practices, and particularly against the Muslim world. The catalogue of meddling is extensive: intervening in Russian politics to criticize their gay- and human-rights policies; lecturing Latin American regimes on their democratic failings; hectoring societies whose level of women’s rights is not to our liking; and intervening militarily, diplomatically and economically in the Muslim world when we have no national interest at risk, such as in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Egypt and the Arab-Israeli conflict. These U.S. actions do more than any other factor to motivate the most lethal of the enemies Zarate describes. Oblivious to their penchant for self-inflicted overseas disasters, U.S. foreign-policy officials are, in Alexander Hamilton’s words, “political doctors whose sagacity disdains the admonitions of experimental instruction.” If these U.S. interventionist actions against foreign cultures continue, Washington will help give birth to a worldwide collection of enemies requiring military countermeasures of such magnitude that they eventually will damage liberty, prosperity and democracy in the only place those things really matter—inside the United States.

Despite Zarate’s experience in fighting nonstate actors and seeing their continued growth into more numerous, skilled and ruthless foes, he still enthusiastically encourages U.S. political leaders to

Interventionism-cum-empire building of the kind Zarate supports is a mistake that has severely undermined America’s honor and dignity.
continue and strengthen the interventionist orientation of U.S. foreign policy that makes the job of all America’s defenders—intelligence and military—more difficult and perhaps impossible. He writes:

The goal of our national security should not be just the defense and promotion of our interests, but the creation of conditions globally that are commensurate with American interests and values. The rule of law, freedom of expression, freedom of the press, the flow of information, respect for human rights, protection of minorities, the empowerment of women, free trade, systems that empower entrepreneurs and individual expression, the accountability of governments, and transparent civil institutions are all goals that the United States and American society should be promoting.

There is much in Zarate’s book that enlightens us, and he gets many things right and proposes some innovative ideas. But unfortunately he concludes by endorsing the same old Wilsonian recipe for endless overseas intervention that energizes many of the nonstate and state actors he correctly sees as American enemies that must be defeated. As the Founders explained, foreign policy is not about building an empire—an ambition, as John Dickinson noted, that is “fatal to republican forms of government”—but about defending America, protecting its material interests, and, at the margin, letting foreigners observe and perhaps choose to copy domestic behaviors that produce thrift, prosperity and liberty.

By endorsing an already-failed interventionist policy, Zarate urges the reinforcement of failure. It is “a mistaken opinion,” Benjamin Franklin once argued, “that the honor and dignity of a government is better supported by persisting in a wrong measure once entered into, than by rectifying an error as soon as it is discovered.” Interventionism-cum-empire building of the kind Zarate supports is a mistake that has severely undermined America’s “honor and dignity.”

More than two hundred years ago, George Washington said that U.S. foreign policy must focus on observing “good faith and justice towards all nations” and facilitate the cultivation of “peace and harmony with all.” The only path toward such a policy, Washington argued, was to abide by a hard-and-fast rule that “no nation has a right to intermeddle in the internal concerns of another; that everyone had a right to form and adopt whatever government they liked best to live under themselves.” Washington’s warning against U.S. intervention abroad remains today, as scholar Richard Norton Smith wrote two decades ago, “a brilliantly drawn road map to national survival and a fully realized independence.” This is particularly true given that the United States today faces the same condition that confronted it in Washington’s time: namely, as he put it, “a people . . . already deeply in debt, and in a convalescent state from the struggle we have been engaged in ourselves.”

At day’s end, America owes the world no more than the respect Washington pledged—and owes itself no less than the survival, liberty and prosperity his noninterventionism assured.
“In my view the most intriguing thinking on the right, as David Brooks has noted, is taking place among the renegades at the plucky American Conservative, where libertarian propositions are freely aired, where American foreign policy is invigilated, and where, above all, few shibboleths are left unchallenged. It has the feel of what Buckley’s magazine once represented, an insurgent movement with little to lose and much to gain.”

— Jacob Heilbrunn, The National Interest
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