Editor’s Note: The Red Cell series is published in collaboration with the Stimson Center. Drawing upon the legacy of the CIA’s Red Cell—established following the September 11 attacks to avoid similar analytic failures in the future—the project works to challenge assumptions, misperceptions, and groupthink with a view to encouraging alternative approaches to America’s foreign and national security policy challenges. For more information about the Stimson Center’s Red Cell Project, see here.

Red Cell

A second Trump administration could strain transatlantic relations by reducing U.S. military aid to Ukraine and NATO and imposing tariffs on European goods, potentially sparking a trade war. On the other hand, paradoxically, Trump’s nationalism could push Europe to reform and strengthen its defense and energy independence—ultimately benefiting the EU and the United States.

Not only is Europe too dependent on U.S. security and markets, but it also has an aging and shrinking population, slowing economic growth, and weak technology. Extremist and populist movements, which question the value of EU membership, as well as terrorism, war, and migration stemming from unstable political situations in neighboring countries, highlight the political and social divisions in Europe.       

While the EU remains a regional beacon for Ukraine, the Balkan, and Caucasus countries who want to join, its global influence has waned, as analyzed by a Brookings study on the EU’s faltering global influence: “Personalist nationalist leadership on the rise in China, India, the United States, Brazil, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere augurs a world that is completely antithetical to the EU’s model. It is a world where nations favor narrow interests over ‘universal’ values, compete or cooperate in zero-sum games, and where authoritarian regimes threaten liberalism.”

If Trump Wins…

The Ukraine War initially united the “old continent” while embracing the United States. However, irrespective of the U.S. presidential race, intra-European divisions have been surfacing on political and economic issues, along with weakening political leadership and a drop in economic competitiveness. Europe is straining to support Ukraine, while Russia appears to have the upper hand militarily. Whether and how long the United States can maintain the same level of arms shipments to Ukraine is questionable even if Vice President Kamala Harris wins because Republicans have a fair chance of gaining control of the U.S. Senate and maintaining control of the House of Representatives. 

Europe has banked its honor and reputation on a clear Ukrainian victory defined by minimal territorial concessions and Ukraine’s further integration into NATO and the West. Without any formal or backchannel route to the Kremlin, the EU has put itself in a position of possibly accepting the terms that Trump, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky decide if Trump succeeds with his negotiation scheme. The former U.S. president admires and trusts Putin. Still, it would not be a Trump plan without ambiguity or contradictions—which the self-declared negotiator-in-chief might justify as a means for gaining leverage. A Bloomberg report assesses that Trump would use the threat of stopping all military assistance to get Zelensky to the negotiating table while telling Putin that he would turn on the taps if he didn’t negotiate. If Zelensky refused to engage with Putin, Trump would have a good excuse to walk away from providing any help for Ukraine.

A Trump deal with Putin would most likely jeopardize Ukraine’s territorial integrity and could further impact Ukrainian security if he reduced the U.S. presence and involvement in NATO. The Washington Post has reported that “Trump has privately said he could end Russia’s war in Ukraine by pressuring Ukraine to give up some territory, according to people familiar with the plan... Trump’s proposal consists of pushing Ukraine to cede Crimea and the Donbas border region to Russia.” Trump’s running mate, vice presidential candidate J. D. Vance, has reportedly said that Trump is against NATO membership for Ukraine, favoring neutrality instead. NATO membership for Ukraine could be a nonstarter in Moscow’s negotiations. Moreover, most Trump advisers do not favor any further NATO enlargement, seeing additional members as increasing the U.S. burden. The Democrats could repudiate any concessions that the former president might make.   

Any hour negotiations between Trump, Putin, and Zelensky would be unlikely to succeed because Moscow’s and Kyiv’s war aims are vastly divergent, and neither side is inclined to put down its arms. However, a failed negotiation could put Europe in a more difficult position if Trump’s unsuccessful Korean talks are any guide. The former president simply walked away after negotiations with the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un broke down. Trump could leave the Ukraine problem to Europe, allowing European decision-makers to figure out how to help Ukraine continue to fight and rebuild over time. A U.S. withdrawal from unsuccessful talks under a Trump administration could further impact Ukrainian and European security, particularly if Trump reduces the U.S. presence and involvement in NATO.

NATO’s Gloomy Outlook

Early in his first term, Trump cast doubt on the United States’ reliability as a NATO security partner unless European members increased defense spending. In a backhanded compliment, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has acknowledged that Trump was right to press the Europeans during his first term. More recently, Trump has threatened that the Russians can “do whatever the hell they want” to delinquent NATO members, though he softened his warning in a British interview, where he termed his threat a “form of negotiation.” Trump clarified that the United States will “100 percent” remain in NATO under his leadership as long as European countries “play fair.” In the interview and subsequently in the recent Trump-Harris debate, he has warned European nations not to “take advantage” of American support. 

Even if the United States does not leave NATO under a second Trump administration, the extent to which it would defend European NATO members against further Russian aggression is questionable. Trump could cut back on U.S. funding and forces for NATO. Trump ordered the reshoring of some troops from Germany shortly before the end of his first term—a move that the Biden administration later rescinded. Furthermore, his advisers failed to persuade the former President to reaffirm NATO’s Article V and voice his support for collective security during his first term. 

A Sagging Europe

Europe’s troubles extend beyond potentially fraying transatlantic security ties. The old continent has been in relative economic decline for over two decades. Since 2000, real disposable incomes on a per capita basis have grown almost twice as much in the United States compared with those in the EU. Slow digitalization has impeded productivity growth. Today, only four of the world’s top 50 tech companies are European. 

Demography is also playing an increasing role in Europe’s slow economic prospects. According to the EU’s Eurostat Agency, “the EU’s natural population change (the difference between live births and deaths) has, however, been already negative since 2012. This is in large part due to the ageing population...as well as to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021.” The share of the total world population living in the EU “decreased from 11.68 percent in 1960 to 5.7 percent in 2020... and it is projected to be smaller still: just 4.35 percent in 2057 and 3.83 percent in 2100.”

Compared to Europe, a higher proportion of the U.S. population is in its prime working-age years. In 2022, the median age in the United States was 38.9—significantly younger than Europe’s median age of 44.4 years in that year. The loss of its working-age population will make it even harder for Europe to boost its economic growth. Mario Draghi, a former Italian Prime Minister and head of the European Central Bank, recently commissioned a report by the EU on European competitiveness, detailing the European economy’s decline and its lagging behind the United States and China. For example, if Europe wants to go digital, reduce its carbon footprint, build a defense capability, and keep its expensive social welfare programs, it would have to spend at least €750 to €800 billion more every year, which is about 4.4 to 4.7 percent of the EU's GDP in 2023. By comparison, investment under the Marshall Plan between 1948 and 1951 was equivalent to 1-2 percent of EU GDP. 

“Do This or It’s a Slow Agony”

Europe is at a crossroads: suffer continued decline, which Draghi labels “a slow agony,” or regain its former status as a global power. One of the biggest obstacles will be to convince the different member states, including their publics, to take on the challenge. Draghi and others advocate for increasing the EU budget to prioritize large-scale investment projects such as digitization and issuing “common assets” bonds. However, countries like France, which has always seen the EU budget support for agriculture as untouchable, as well as Germany and the Netherlands, which are wary of taking on more EU debt, could be against both of these ideas. 

European publics could be even more intractable when it comes to making the sacrifices required to reignite the continent’s economy. France’s much-needed pension reform has been so unpopular that it has effectively disabled the Macron presidency. Across Europe, as in the United States, the popularity of right-wing and populist anti-EU parties is growing. In France’s parliamentary elections France’s far-right Rassemblement National (RN) won almost double the number of votes gained by Macron’s centrist National Renaissance party. In Germany, Chancellor Olaf Scholz “saw his Social Democratic Party forced into third place behind the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a far-right party. Overall, right-leaning parties in Germany took more than 45 percent of the vote.” More recently, Germany’s far-right AfD claimed its biggest electoral success since World War II, winning a regional vote in Thuringia and coming second in Saxony, two eastern German states. More years of slow growth and belt-tightening could increase public support for anti-EU populism.