The world watches as President Bush relentlessly promotes democracy in the turbulent Middle East and Central Asia. Criticisms vary: Democracy is a confection of the West; Islam is in fundamental conflict with democracy; and most repugnant (and semi-racist), Arabs are unprepared for democracy. But in a journey to three Arab and Central Asia capitals, I found democracy developing at a dramatic pace. In Kabul, Beirut and Cairo, leaders and masses alike earnestly seek something better. The real regional debate, Arab and non-Arab, urban and rural, is not whether democracy but what form of democracy.

Few serious commentators favor rigid rule by monarch, military or mullah. Some put forth a vague form of governance wherein Allah perfectly instructs worldly leaders and followers alike, and a few others wrap themselves in theocratic, "Islamist" political garb to selfishly grasp corrupt control of governments from Tehran, Islamabad and Kabul to Algiers, Tripoli and Cairo. But the lack of progress throughout the entire region has proved to all but the most stubborn that another, yes, foreign form of government--democracy--is the best option to try.

Kabul: It's About Time

Three and a half years after liberation by the United States, there is an air of expectancy in the Afghan capital and throughout the country as it prepares for September's parliamentary elections. The elections will cap four steps agreed to in late 2001 at a unique conference in Bonn that included representatives from every sector of Afghan society. An Emergency Loya Jirga and subsequent Constitutional Loya Jirga were followed by presidential elections last October. Parliamentary elections complete a remarkably determined exercise by formerly fractious Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek ethnic groups, Sunni and Shi'a Muslims, and innumerable lesser tribes and sects.

Afghanistan's democratic development has experienced numerous inter-party vendettas, often settled by assassination, but enormous political progress is undeniable. The reason, according to a resident diplomat: U.S. strength and generosity, combined with Afghans' fierce, resolute will. "The Afghans have fire in their hearts", he says admiringly, "for getting it right and for creating democracy."

It takes raw determination and enormous political aptitude to run Afghanistan. Detractors notwithstanding, President Hamid Karzai has demonstrated both. Mullawy Abdul Rahman, formerly Taliban security chief of Kabul, barely hides his disdain for what he terms Karzai's "naivety" and "indecisiveness." Yet Abdul Rahman is one of four former Taliban leaders running for parliamentary seats as a direct result of Karzai's determination to provide a climate where all views are represented.

Other criticisms abound. A senior sub-cabinet member considers Karzai slow to make decisions, citing a six-month delay in giving Ismail Khan, former warlord and governor of Herat province, a ministerial post, removing him from his comfortable fiefdom, where he created what many consider the country's most attractive, efficient and corrupt city, Herat. Yet Zaid Haidary, a member of the Emergency and Constitutional Loya Jirgas, faults the president for impatiently going around fellow Afghan-American and Minister of the Interior Ali Jalali, in naming governors, considered a prerogative of the Interior Ministry.

Returning Afghan refugees, especially those with long experience in the West, bring much needed expertise to their mother country. Nearly thirty years of abysmal education and economics have left a generation of Afghans unprepared to build a modern nation. What the 24 million natives who did not leave have in abundance, however, is a steely determination to support--and defend--the creation of the foreign concept called democracy.

First Deputy Minister of Defense Yusuf Nuristani, educated in the United States and holder of dual passports, sees the situation as "a symbiotic relationship, although sometimes, of course, there are issues." Nuristani takes justifiable pride in serving as director of the International Foundation of Hope while in America. "The foundation created the largest nursery in the country", he noted when we discussed the country's rampant deforestation and urgent need for alternatives to poppy farming, "with two million fruit trees that can be a major source of alternative livelihoods for poppy farmers."

Multiple voices were raised during my visit, complaining that the government must move faster against the poppy scourge and the attendant corruption of officials. As Afghanistan accounts for 90 percent of heroin production worldwide, the criticism makes superficial sense, until one considers the enormous challenge of replacing the narcotics industry (representing 60 percent of Afghanistan's GDP) without strangling the struggling economy, creating mass starvation and fomenting open rebellion.

Poppies are grown by more than 80 percent of Afghan farmers, who comprise 80 percent of the population. Eradicating poppy cultivation and introducing alternative pursuits will clearly take time. Yet, despite the narcotics trade's massive impact on the economy, UN studies estimate poppy production in 2004 was reduced by 30 percent from 2003.

While each of the many criticisms of Afghanistan's government may have validity, in context each is attributable to the extraordinarily complicated situation facing Karzai, his ministers and provincial governors in trying to knit together a nation torn asunder by factional rivalries, foreign intrigue and terrorist subversion. Mullawy Abdul Rahman knows from personal experience how different Karzai's inclusive leadership style is from Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Rahman and a group of mullahs had met with President Karzai in April. "I spoke my mind to him", the former Taliban leader reminisced, adding ruefully, "Mullah Omar really disdained my advice. At the end, he said to me, 'I really don't like you. You're too political, and politicians don't have much faith in Islam.'"

Most Afghans look forward to September's elections positively. Abdul Rasool Sayyaf, a leader long supported by Saudi Wahhabis and known for his commitment to make Afghanistan an Islamist state, admits:

"The results of the past three and a half years have been greater than we could expect in seven. . . . We should have a parliament that can help the government's good programs. Afghanistan needs Parliament to work day and night with the government, to make Afghanistan stand on its feet. We must rebuild Afghanistan at least to where it was fifty years ago. I am optimistic concerning the future."

Although there is concern about foreign meddling and money--from Pakistan, Iran, Russia, India and China, not from the United States--most observers believe the elections will be as successful as the presidential polls in 2004. Those elections were, according to a senior resident diplomat, "One of the most magnificent political events of the year, and it happened in this star-crossed, troubled country. We thought perhaps one million Afghans would register and half of them vote. In fact, 8.5 million people, 40 percent of them female, voted with no significant disturbing incidents." The former governor of Nangarhar province, Haji Din Mohammad, brother of slain national leaders Haji Abdul Qadir and Abdul Haq, is upbeat: "In the presidential elections, we called on the local population to handle security and protect polling stations. If we do so [again], these elections should be successful and peaceful."

Afghans have made enormous progress, admittedly with massive U.S. assistance, in fewer than four years. Leaders like Din Mohammad are grateful, if impatient: "The U.S. has given us more than the UN, UK, European Union and NGOs combined. The Agency for International Development and the Provisional Reconstruction Teams have done so much. . . . We just hope they can give more."

Despite only brief exposure to a constitutional monarchy in the 1970s, Afghans are tantalizingly close to establishing a working democracy. As Haidary puts it, "Afghanistan has never had an opportunity like today. We must all stand up!"

Beirut: A Place Between

It was July 1967, day three of the Six-Day War and my first conflict as a correspondent. My driver and I were headed from Beirut east into Syria, to go to the Golan Heights, where there was heavy fighting between Israeli and Syrian forces. Prior to reaching the border, we stopped along the roadside in Lebanon's beautiful Beka Valley, the main corridor to Syria from Beirut. As I stretched and admired the scenery, four Lebanese jets appeared, heading toward Israel. It seemed that Lebanon was at last joining the battle, having experienced several explosions in Beirut, attributed (not necessarily correctly) to Israeli agents or, what was equally incendiary, to the much-maligned CIA.

Just as the Lebanese fighters were overhead, four Israeli jets appeared. My driver took cover as I took out my camera for what would surely be spectacular photographs, but not a shot was fired by either group. Instead, as the planes approached perilously close to each other, the lead Lebanese pilot waggled his wings in a salute of friendship, and within seconds the lead Israeli aviator did the same, whereupon the Israelis headed northeast, toward Damascus, and the Lebanese made a sharp about face, returning to Beirut. Although I got no pictures, I learned something that frustrating day: Lebanon is the land "between"--between Syria and Israel, Muslims and Christians, anarchy and democracy, oil money and Western carpetbaggers, war and peace.

Seats in Lebanon's parliament and senior government positions are based on the relative size of 17 recognized religious sects, in what has been termed "confessional democracy." The president must be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies a Shi'a Muslim, the defense minister a Druze Muslim and so on. Equally, division of the 128 parliament seats is sorted out along religious lines. All this careful adherence to the numbers of citizens in each sect is based on the latest census, taken in 1932.

Everyone knows that the religious alignments have changed radically in 73 years, with the Christians losing their former population majority to the Muslims, within which the Shi'a have passed the Sunni. However, the Christians, hanging on to half the seats, regularly block calls for a new census, arguing that if one is taken it must include expatriate, mostly Christian, Lebanese who in turn must be allowed to vote.

One unfortunate solution has been to pass a new electoral law in advance of each of the last two elections, which has led to extraordinary gerrymandering of voting districts. Three-time Prime Minister Omar Karame has retired from electoral politics in frustration and disgust because of the ludicrous redistricting and huge spending increases. Karame told me that he had decided not to run for re-election in the May-June contest,

"Because they divide cities and towns down the middle, and the spending has become so great I cannot possibly compete. It all started when Rafiq Hariri entered politics and spent $200,000â€"300,000 in his district to get elected. This was big money ten to twelve years ago, and it has kept getting bigger. I recently said on television that Muhammad Safr, who also made his money in Saudi Arabia, spent $13 million in his election campaign. The next day he went on the air and corrected me: He said he had spent $25 million"

The assassination of Rafiq Hariri, who served as prime minister five times, launched a healing of historically unbridgeable rifts between different religious groups. Led by the country's youth, massive demonstrations in Beirut reflecting all Lebanon's sects and classes mourned Hariri and condemned his murder, widely attributed to Syrian agents. After three months of large and unrelenting demonstrations, the United States, Britain, Russia and France moved to demand that Syria, in accordance with UN Resolution 1559, withdraw its military and intelligence forces after thirty years' occupation.

And Lebanon's youth have not stopped there. Tactically, they are demanding the resignation of President Emile Lahoud, a Christian puppet of Syria. In addition, in concert with Washington, many of the same youth are seeking fulfillment of the rest of Resolution 1559, which calls for disarming of the Hizballah militia and the Palestinian refugee camps, plus free movement of the Lebanese army in the country's south.

Finally, the vocal and irrepressible youth are calling for an end to the feudalistic confessional political system that gives a few leaders power, longevity and wealth but results in little for their constituents. One twenty-something demonstrator told me, "We are sick of follow-the-leader politics; we want to vote based on issues, not on religion."

After decades of fruitless attempts to change the system, the latest effort could lead to a major overhaul of Lebanon's political structure, ending the sclerotic rule of the confessional oligarchs.

So far, the May-June parliamentary elections appear to have done little more than shuffle ever-changing political alliances. Although odds for success are long, it can be hoped that 35-year-old Saad Hariri, who has assumed leadership of his father's political organization and now heads the largest bloc of deputies, understands the expectations of his young countrymen--as well as the extraordinary opportunity he has to put order and honesty into Lebanon's political life. If he does, the country with the longest more or less democratic experience in the region can reclaim its pace-setting reputation and Beirut its former position as the peaceful, dynamic, democratic jewel of the Levant.

Cairo: Change in the Air

My first visit to Egypt in September 1969 came late in Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser's nearly two decade reign, and I imagined Shepheard's Hotel would reek of the air projected by Somerset Maugham.

Wrong: The original had been incinerated by an organized mob months before Nasser deposed King Farouk in 1952 and had been replaced by a neo-Soviet structure. The closest thing to excitement at the new Shepheard's was the visiting Joseph Alsop, one-half of the unique brother team of columnists, seated somewhat forlornly in the hotel's far-from-famous dining room.

Led by Nasser, the governments of Egypt, Jordan and Syria had declared war on Israel 26 months earlier, resulting in the Arab military forces being decimated in six short days. Ever since, Nasser's government had been seized with a paranoid paralysis, awaiting the next whirlwind war they feared would occur at any moment.

Cairo seemed other-worldly, not in the classic casbah sense, but in the fetidly fascistic air that filled the city. Entrances to government buildings were barricaded with steel-reinforced piles of sandbags and guard posts on each side. Taxi drivers sized up passengers, weighing their worth to report to the mukhabarat military intelligence service, whose agents were omnipresent in hotel lobbies, restaurants and the streets.

The descendants of the military coup that ended Farouk's bloated reign hold power 36 years later. Anwar Sadat succeeded Nasser after his death in 1970, as Hosni Mubarak followed Sadat's 1981 assassination. A longtime personal friend, not a revolutionary but one of the many who wish to see Mubarak's regime end peacefully, told me, "Things still go bump in the night." He was referring to mysterious road accidents, unannounced late-night arrests and unsolved murders, all of which remain a disturbing feature of Egyptian life. At all levels of Egyptian society there is a great thirst for free, open elections and transparent government. After nearly a quarter-century of Hosni Mubarak's rule, virtually all analysts agree that a large majority awaits his passing from the scene, peacefully if possible. "He has done many good things, especially in the area of infrastructure development and maintenance of security", Dr. Mohammad El-Sayed Said, deputy director of the Center for Political and Strategic Studies of the government-owned Al- Ahram newspaper, told me. "The trouble is, the president sees politics as a debit, not helpful to society. In that sense he is very much a military man: discipline, stability, the fundamentals. He genuinely sees no need to question his methods or motives, no demand for debate and discussion, no requirement for elections." Then, even more clearly: "It is time for him to go." Numerous close advisors to Mubarak and his son Gamal believe it is time for the president to step down, though few believe he will prior to presidential elections in September.

There are two favorite scenarios among Cairo political buffs. One calls for Mubarak to name a vice president prior to election but not install him until he has been returned to office; the other, for him to resign in 2006 after election to a fifth term, and leave it to an obedient National Assembly to select his son Gamal, who more than a year ago renounced his interest in assuming the presidency following a ten-year preparatory quest. Both alternatives could in fact occur. The Egyptian constitution states that a vice president who assumes the presidency does so temporarily, for sixty days, while the National Assembly selects a permanent replacement. Having said he was not interested in succeeding his father, Gamal Mubarak has continued to be very active in the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). It was the younger Mubarak's initiative that last year successfully urged the president to appoint a group of technocrats to invigorate Egypt's sluggish economy. Led by Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif, a seasoned businessman and sometime government minister, the team has significantly strengthened most economic indicators. The younger Mubarak's mother, Suzanne, strongly supports his taking over directly from his father. While cooler heads urge that a loyal, appointed vice president be allowed to finish the presidential term, Suzanne reportedly strongly opposes taking the risk that, once in office, the formerly loyal placeholder might decide he liked the job too much to step aside.

Dr. Taher Helmy, prominent attorney and president of the Egyptian American Chamber of Commerce, serves on the NDP's Economic Committee as chair of the Investment Subcommittee. In this capacity, he has been instrumental in achieving sharp reductions in both corporate and personal tax rates as well as a complete overhaul of Egypt's customs regulations "to six clear sections from a telephone book." A close friend and advisor to Gamal Mubarak, Helmy believes "it would be better for the president to appoint a vice president. Gamal is certainly well qualified for the job, but if he is to become president, there should be an interregnum. Preparing an orderly transition to democracy", Helmy concludes, "would be the greatest legacy President Mubarak could possibly have."

As for direct opposition to Hosni Mubarak's presumed re-election, there is no one in the field who can seriously challenge the incumbent. For good reason: the recently amended Article 76 of the Egyptian constitution calls for an open contest for the office of president, but specifically allows only candidates of registered political parties to run. Approved overwhelmingly by the rubber-stamp National Assembly and in a May referendum, Mostafa Bakry, editor of opposition newspaper El-Osboa, believes, "The change is at least a start, even though there are no serious contenders from the parties. The leading opposition candidate, Ayman Nour, will be lucky to get 20 percent of the vote, despite his appeal to many younger voters." Dr. Mohammad El-Sayed Said says ruefully: "The president has sucked the life out of the political parties; there are no candidates of wide appeal or interest to come forward. Even the Muslim Brotherhood, despite renouncing violence and endorsing the democratic process, has no one they can put forth seriously."

All analysts agree there is scant chance Mubarak will not be re-elected. "If there were an honest, fully open election", said one, "Nour might have a chance. As it is, he'll probably receive about 20 percent of the vote and the government might have to stuff the boxes in his favor to achieve that. . . . [T]he people just aren't interested because everyone knows what the outcome will be."

This is not the case for the parliamentary elections scheduled for November. Analysts predict hotly contested races across the country from political parties and independents and that opposition candidates could well win a majority of seats. If that happens, and especially if Hosni Mubarak heeds Taher Helmy's advice respecting his place in history, Egypt could at last be governed by a functioning democratic government.

Dr. Kamal Aboulmagd, vice president of the government's National Council on Human Rights, distinguished professor of law at Cairo University, respected practicing attorney and leading Islamic scholar, is straightforward about the situation: "Rulers do not give up power unless they must. We all must beware, beware, beware. . . . Things are changing."

Major challenges face residents and rulers alike in Kabul, Beirut and Cairo, as the search for democracy proceeds in each. Although success is by no means assured, the signs are encouraging, and not just in Afghanistan, Lebanon and Egypt. Besides developments in Iraq and Palestine that are so far encouraging, efforts to further liberalize constitutional monarchies continue in Jordan, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar, as do first steps in Pakistan for the military to turn political life back to civilians. Even in Iran's confrontational and potentially violent climate, the unyielding theocratic regime is opposed, by its own estimate, by 70 percent of the population.

The U.S. role in all this has been to encourage, to offer technical guidance, but not to attempt to direct the form each country's democracy takes. In fact, it can be argued that Washington is not paying enough attention to assuring that, whatever the democratic solution, sufficient institutional strength exists to break the follow-the-leader hierarchical pattern and, above all, to avoid a "one man, one vote, one time" outcome.

The march of democracy presents an enormous challenge to each country involved in the process, including the United States as the foremost proponent and motivator. As far as the Middle East and Central Asia are concerned, the challenges are eminently worth it, for the citizens of each country, for regional security and for the rest of the world.

As each society breathes the fresh air of democratic freedom and enjoys the material benefits of the free market, popular craving for something better will progressively abate from desperation to subsistence to satisfaction and with it become a steadily less fertile recruiting ground for terrorists. That is why a successful outcome in each of the three cities, different as they are, is so important.

Throughout their long struggles, Egypt, Lebanon and Afghanistan have maintained dynamic intellectual lives. Egypt has continued as the center of Islamic thought, including a number of religious and legal scholars, working on the challenge of defining a Muslim reformation. Lebanon, teeming with political intrigue, has churned out more books on political life and philosophy per capita than any country on earth. Afghanistan, the least developed of the three countries, has turned to its time-honored tradition, poetry. Dr. Whitney Azoy, director of the American Institute for Afghan Studies, honored me with the gift of one of his four copies of "An Assembly of Moths", a collection of the poetry of Khalilullah Khalili. Khalilullah's heart shines through every page, as in "What's Necessary":

"Grant me, God,

The pain that starts men weeping,

The burning zeal

Required to sing love's song,

The eye that opens

Toward my inner being,

So that my long-lost self can be called home."

Such contemplative fervor, honed by the sheer travail of existing in countries where nothing comes easily, reflects the unquenchable desire for something better, fuels today's drive for political, economic and religious freedom, and gives observers, resident and foreigner alike, hope for the future.